Exam 58: Thomas Nagel

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -Nagel argues that if death is an evil, then what is objectionable is:

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -Nagel claims that if people can be frozen without reduction of their conscious lifespan, it will be inappropriate:

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -According to Nagel, all people are fortunate to have been born.

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -Nagel argues that death at the age of 80 is bad for the person who suffers it.

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -What is Nagel's account of harms like betrayal and being ridiculed behind one's back? What implications does this account have for the issue of death? Do you find his account plausible?

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -Nagel defines permanent death as:

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -Nagel argues that the goods of life are irreducibly relational; they hold between reality and possible alternatives.

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -According to Nagel, it is commonly believed that:

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -Nagel claims that his case of the man with mental degeneration is an example of a harm that depends on:

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -Nagel claims that we can be harmed:

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -According to Nagel, being born is _________ and not being born is __________.

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -Nagel claims that the goods of life: