Exam 42: James Rachels

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable. Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist. Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned. -According to Rachels, all ethical egoists are psychological egoists.

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable. Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist. Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned. -According to Rachels, the unselfish person is precisely the one who derives satisfaction from helping others. Why does Rachels believe that this poses problems for psychological egoism? Do you think he is correct about these problems? Why or why not?

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable. Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist. Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned. -Rachels claims that if I promise to do something I do not want to do but do it anyway, then I actually wanted to keep my promise.

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable. Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist. Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned. -Rachels argues that if someone desires the welfare and happiness of another person, this does not mean that this satisfaction is the object of his desire.

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable. Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist. Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned. -Rachels calls ethical egoism:

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable. Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist. Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned. -According to Rachels, a fundamental requirement of rational action is that reasons for action always depend on the prior existence of certain attitudes in the agent. What reasons does Rachels supply to defend this claim? Do you find this claim defensible? Why or why not?

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable. Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist. Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned. -Psychological egoism is the view that:

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable. Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist. Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned. -Rachels claims that we regularly desire some sort of "pleasurable consciousness" and then try to figure out how to achieve it.

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable. Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist. Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned. -Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. What might a psychological egoists argue in response? Do you think, once the genuine confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is a tenable position? Why or why not?

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable. Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist. Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned. -Rachels claims that the rational egoist cannot advocate that egoism be universally adopted by everyone. What is Rachels argument for this claim? If Rachels is correct, does this pose a problem for ethical egoism? Defend your answer.

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable. Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist. Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned. -Rachels argues that the following is an exception to the claim that people never voluntarily do anything except what they want to do:

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable. Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist. Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned. -Rachels claims that moral skeptics attack the claim that:

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable. Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist. Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned. -Rachels holds that unselfish actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent.

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable. Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist. Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned. -Rachels maintains that advocating one thing but doing another is:

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable. Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist. Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned. -Rachels argues that if we have a positive attitude toward the attainment of some goal:

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable. Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist. Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned. -Rachels claims the egoist's worry that decent society will collapse, if he does not honor the rules, is unfounded because:

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable. Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist. Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned. -Rachels notes that it is the object of a want that determines whether it is selfish or not.

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable. Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist. Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned. -Rachels claims that the popular objection to ethical egoism - that it cannot be universalized - successfully refutes the doctrine.

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable. Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist. Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned. -Rachels argues that we should interpret the ethical egoist as:

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable. Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist. Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned. -Rachels holds that a fundamental requirement of rational action is: