Exam 56: Judith Jarvis Thomson

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts? To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights. Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases). -Thomson claims that the stringency of the right helps distinguish the Fat Man case from certain variants of Bystander at the Switch. What is Thomson's argument for relying on the stringency of the rights in question? Do you find this argument sustainable? Explain your answer.

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts? To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights. Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases). -According to Thomson, if the bystander turns the trolley, it:

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts? To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights. Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases). -According to Foot:

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts? To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights. Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases). -According to Thomson, any plausible theory of rights must make sense of the idea of waiving a right.

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts? To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights. Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases). -Thomson often claims that "rights trump utilities." What do she mean by this metaphor? Do you find this to be a compelling picture of rights? Explain your answer.

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts? To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights. Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases). -Thomson claims that we can solve the trolley problem by:

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts? To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights. Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases). -Thomson believes that in the "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch the extra track makes a major moral difference.

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts? To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights. Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases). -Thomson argues that the difference between Bystander at the Switch and Fat Man is:

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts? To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights. Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases). -Thomson reports that when confronted with Fat Man, where one can push the one to save the five:

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts? To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights. Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases). -Thomson asserts that using someone as a means only cannot help with the Trolley Problem. What is her argument for this assertion? Do you agree with her? Why or why not?

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts? To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights. Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases). -Thomson thinks that in the Bystander at the Switch trolley case it is obligatory to flip the switch.

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts? To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights. Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases). -Thomson argues that the following fact explains the moral difference between the bystander and the surgeon:

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts? To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights. Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases). -Thomson argues that, by flipping the switch, bystander does not infringe any rights of the one track workman.

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts? To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights. Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases). -Thomson argues that killing one is worse than letting five die is:

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts? To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights. Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases). -Thomson maintains that if one would infringe a right by acting:

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts? To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights. Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases). -Thomson reports that when confronted with the Trolley Driver case, where the driver can turn the trolley onto the track with one to save the five:

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts? To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights. Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases). -Thomson asserts that the doing v. allowing distinction is too blunt to help with the Trolley Problem. What is her argument for this assertion? Do you think her argument is sound? Why or why not?

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts? To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights. Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases). -According to Thomson, no killings involve lettings die.

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts? To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights. Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases). -Thomson notes that the bystander does not make something be a threat to people which would otherwise not be a threat to anyone; rather:

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts? To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights. Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases). -Thomson thinks that in the Bystander at the Switch trolley case it is permissible to flip the switch.