Exam 19: C.L.Stevenson

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -According to Stevenson, the difference between descriptive and dynamic uses of language depends on the purpose of the speaker.

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -Stevenson claims that dynamic uses of language:

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -The "emotive meaning" of a term is:

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -According to Stevenson, moral disagreements involve:

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -According to Stevenson, traditional interest theories fail to account for the way judging something to be good creates a tendency to act in its favor.

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -Stevenson identifies the meaning of a term with:

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -In Stevenson's view, ethical disagreements are disagreements in belief.

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -Stevenson claims that the term "good" is ambiguous.

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -Stevenson argues that any adequate philosophical account of ethical judgments must account for:

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -Stevenson draws a distinction between descriptive and dynamic uses of language. Explain this distinction and the role it plays in Stevenson's theory.

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -Interest theories of the good define goodness in terms of:

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -According to Stevenson, it is possible to sensibly disagree about whether something is good.

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -Stevenson claims that descriptive uses of language:

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -Stevenson claims that the primary use of ethical language is to state facts.

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -What account does Stevenson give of the nature of ethical disagreements? How does ethical disagreement differ from scientific disagreement, on his view? To what extent does he think it is possible to argue about ethics?

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -In Stevenson's view, goodness is not scientifically verifiable.

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -Stevenson claims that moral uses of the term "good" differ from nonmoral uses in that:

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -Stevenson's primary aim is to:

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -Stevenson thinks that "good" means "desired by me."

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests." Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain. -What does Stevenson mean by "emotive meaning"? What role does this notion play in his theory?