Exam 27: T.M.Scanlon

T.M. Scanlon: What We Owe to Each Other In this selection from What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon sketches an alternative moral theory to utilitarianism that he calls contractualism. For contractualism, the animating impulse of morality is not maximizing some good like human well-being, but a concern to treat others with the respect owed to them as rational subjects. We accomplish this, according to Scanlon, by conducting ourselves in ways we can justify to others. Right action, in Scanlon's view, is a matter of acting according to principles everyone can accept. Thus when a contractualist thinks about right and wrong, the central question is whether the principles we act on are ones that no one could reasonably reject. To decide whether a principle can be reasonably rejected, we must assess the principle from the individual perspective or standpoint of those persons in a position to be impacted by its application. More specifically, contractualism requires us to consider whether a principle burdens any individual person with costs more significant than the individual costs imposed by any alternative principle. If it does, then the principle under consideration can be reasonably rejected according to Scanlon. An important feature of this view, and one that distinguishes contractualism from utilitarianism, is that the costs associated with a given principle need not be understood in terms of well-being. On Scanlon's view, an individual may object to a principle on the grounds that it negatively impacts something valuable to her other than her personal well-being, such as fairness. The selection concludes with an extended discussion of another important feature of contractualism, namely, its rejection of aggregative moral reasoning. For Scanlon, this is an appealing feature of contractualism because it rules out some of the intuitively implausible implications of utilitarianism, for example, that it is morally justified to impose severe harms on a few to produce relatively minor individual benefits if the beneficiaries are large enough in number. Scanlon, however, acknowledges that there are some cases where the right thing to do does seem to depend on the number of people affected. For example, in a situation where we must choose between saving either a larger or smaller group of people from serious injury or death, it seems clear that it would be wrong not to save the larger group. At first glance, it seems contractualism cannot accept a principle requiring us to save the larger group because the individual objections against such a principle would seem to be balanced evenly against the individual objections alternative principles would generate. But Scanlon argues that there is an objection any member of the larger group can make that effectively breaks this tie, namely, that any alternative to the proposed principle would not give positive moral weight to his or her life. -To decide whether there are reasonable grounds to reject a principle, Scanlon argues that we must consider the burdens the principle imposes on people. Scanlon calls these burdens:

T.M. Scanlon: What We Owe to Each Other In this selection from What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon sketches an alternative moral theory to utilitarianism that he calls contractualism. For contractualism, the animating impulse of morality is not maximizing some good like human well-being, but a concern to treat others with the respect owed to them as rational subjects. We accomplish this, according to Scanlon, by conducting ourselves in ways we can justify to others. Right action, in Scanlon's view, is a matter of acting according to principles everyone can accept. Thus when a contractualist thinks about right and wrong, the central question is whether the principles we act on are ones that no one could reasonably reject. To decide whether a principle can be reasonably rejected, we must assess the principle from the individual perspective or standpoint of those persons in a position to be impacted by its application. More specifically, contractualism requires us to consider whether a principle burdens any individual person with costs more significant than the individual costs imposed by any alternative principle. If it does, then the principle under consideration can be reasonably rejected according to Scanlon. An important feature of this view, and one that distinguishes contractualism from utilitarianism, is that the costs associated with a given principle need not be understood in terms of well-being. On Scanlon's view, an individual may object to a principle on the grounds that it negatively impacts something valuable to her other than her personal well-being, such as fairness. The selection concludes with an extended discussion of another important feature of contractualism, namely, its rejection of aggregative moral reasoning. For Scanlon, this is an appealing feature of contractualism because it rules out some of the intuitively implausible implications of utilitarianism, for example, that it is morally justified to impose severe harms on a few to produce relatively minor individual benefits if the beneficiaries are large enough in number. Scanlon, however, acknowledges that there are some cases where the right thing to do does seem to depend on the number of people affected. For example, in a situation where we must choose between saving either a larger or smaller group of people from serious injury or death, it seems clear that it would be wrong not to save the larger group. At first glance, it seems contractualism cannot accept a principle requiring us to save the larger group because the individual objections against such a principle would seem to be balanced evenly against the individual objections alternative principles would generate. But Scanlon argues that there is an objection any member of the larger group can make that effectively breaks this tie, namely, that any alternative to the proposed principle would not give positive moral weight to his or her life. -According to Scanlon's analysis of the transmitter room accident example:

T.M. Scanlon: What We Owe to Each Other In this selection from What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon sketches an alternative moral theory to utilitarianism that he calls contractualism. For contractualism, the animating impulse of morality is not maximizing some good like human well-being, but a concern to treat others with the respect owed to them as rational subjects. We accomplish this, according to Scanlon, by conducting ourselves in ways we can justify to others. Right action, in Scanlon's view, is a matter of acting according to principles everyone can accept. Thus when a contractualist thinks about right and wrong, the central question is whether the principles we act on are ones that no one could reasonably reject. To decide whether a principle can be reasonably rejected, we must assess the principle from the individual perspective or standpoint of those persons in a position to be impacted by its application. More specifically, contractualism requires us to consider whether a principle burdens any individual person with costs more significant than the individual costs imposed by any alternative principle. If it does, then the principle under consideration can be reasonably rejected according to Scanlon. An important feature of this view, and one that distinguishes contractualism from utilitarianism, is that the costs associated with a given principle need not be understood in terms of well-being. On Scanlon's view, an individual may object to a principle on the grounds that it negatively impacts something valuable to her other than her personal well-being, such as fairness. The selection concludes with an extended discussion of another important feature of contractualism, namely, its rejection of aggregative moral reasoning. For Scanlon, this is an appealing feature of contractualism because it rules out some of the intuitively implausible implications of utilitarianism, for example, that it is morally justified to impose severe harms on a few to produce relatively minor individual benefits if the beneficiaries are large enough in number. Scanlon, however, acknowledges that there are some cases where the right thing to do does seem to depend on the number of people affected. For example, in a situation where we must choose between saving either a larger or smaller group of people from serious injury or death, it seems clear that it would be wrong not to save the larger group. At first glance, it seems contractualism cannot accept a principle requiring us to save the larger group because the individual objections against such a principle would seem to be balanced evenly against the individual objections alternative principles would generate. But Scanlon argues that there is an objection any member of the larger group can make that effectively breaks this tie, namely, that any alternative to the proposed principle would not give positive moral weight to his or her life. -Although contractualism is notably different to utilitarianism, it bears some similarities to Kant's ethics. What similarities do you see? Explain.

T.M. Scanlon: What We Owe to Each Other In this selection from What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon sketches an alternative moral theory to utilitarianism that he calls contractualism. For contractualism, the animating impulse of morality is not maximizing some good like human well-being, but a concern to treat others with the respect owed to them as rational subjects. We accomplish this, according to Scanlon, by conducting ourselves in ways we can justify to others. Right action, in Scanlon's view, is a matter of acting according to principles everyone can accept. Thus when a contractualist thinks about right and wrong, the central question is whether the principles we act on are ones that no one could reasonably reject. To decide whether a principle can be reasonably rejected, we must assess the principle from the individual perspective or standpoint of those persons in a position to be impacted by its application. More specifically, contractualism requires us to consider whether a principle burdens any individual person with costs more significant than the individual costs imposed by any alternative principle. If it does, then the principle under consideration can be reasonably rejected according to Scanlon. An important feature of this view, and one that distinguishes contractualism from utilitarianism, is that the costs associated with a given principle need not be understood in terms of well-being. On Scanlon's view, an individual may object to a principle on the grounds that it negatively impacts something valuable to her other than her personal well-being, such as fairness. The selection concludes with an extended discussion of another important feature of contractualism, namely, its rejection of aggregative moral reasoning. For Scanlon, this is an appealing feature of contractualism because it rules out some of the intuitively implausible implications of utilitarianism, for example, that it is morally justified to impose severe harms on a few to produce relatively minor individual benefits if the beneficiaries are large enough in number. Scanlon, however, acknowledges that there are some cases where the right thing to do does seem to depend on the number of people affected. For example, in a situation where we must choose between saving either a larger or smaller group of people from serious injury or death, it seems clear that it would be wrong not to save the larger group. At first glance, it seems contractualism cannot accept a principle requiring us to save the larger group because the individual objections against such a principle would seem to be balanced evenly against the individual objections alternative principles would generate. But Scanlon argues that there is an objection any member of the larger group can make that effectively breaks this tie, namely, that any alternative to the proposed principle would not give positive moral weight to his or her life. -A central feature of contractualism is that the justifiability of a moral principle depends on various individuals' reasons for objecting to it and its alternatives.

T.M. Scanlon: What We Owe to Each Other In this selection from What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon sketches an alternative moral theory to utilitarianism that he calls contractualism. For contractualism, the animating impulse of morality is not maximizing some good like human well-being, but a concern to treat others with the respect owed to them as rational subjects. We accomplish this, according to Scanlon, by conducting ourselves in ways we can justify to others. Right action, in Scanlon's view, is a matter of acting according to principles everyone can accept. Thus when a contractualist thinks about right and wrong, the central question is whether the principles we act on are ones that no one could reasonably reject. To decide whether a principle can be reasonably rejected, we must assess the principle from the individual perspective or standpoint of those persons in a position to be impacted by its application. More specifically, contractualism requires us to consider whether a principle burdens any individual person with costs more significant than the individual costs imposed by any alternative principle. If it does, then the principle under consideration can be reasonably rejected according to Scanlon. An important feature of this view, and one that distinguishes contractualism from utilitarianism, is that the costs associated with a given principle need not be understood in terms of well-being. On Scanlon's view, an individual may object to a principle on the grounds that it negatively impacts something valuable to her other than her personal well-being, such as fairness. The selection concludes with an extended discussion of another important feature of contractualism, namely, its rejection of aggregative moral reasoning. For Scanlon, this is an appealing feature of contractualism because it rules out some of the intuitively implausible implications of utilitarianism, for example, that it is morally justified to impose severe harms on a few to produce relatively minor individual benefits if the beneficiaries are large enough in number. Scanlon, however, acknowledges that there are some cases where the right thing to do does seem to depend on the number of people affected. For example, in a situation where we must choose between saving either a larger or smaller group of people from serious injury or death, it seems clear that it would be wrong not to save the larger group. At first glance, it seems contractualism cannot accept a principle requiring us to save the larger group because the individual objections against such a principle would seem to be balanced evenly against the individual objections alternative principles would generate. But Scanlon argues that there is an objection any member of the larger group can make that effectively breaks this tie, namely, that any alternative to the proposed principle would not give positive moral weight to his or her life. -For contractualism, considerations of individual well-being are:

T.M. Scanlon: What We Owe to Each Other In this selection from What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon sketches an alternative moral theory to utilitarianism that he calls contractualism. For contractualism, the animating impulse of morality is not maximizing some good like human well-being, but a concern to treat others with the respect owed to them as rational subjects. We accomplish this, according to Scanlon, by conducting ourselves in ways we can justify to others. Right action, in Scanlon's view, is a matter of acting according to principles everyone can accept. Thus when a contractualist thinks about right and wrong, the central question is whether the principles we act on are ones that no one could reasonably reject. To decide whether a principle can be reasonably rejected, we must assess the principle from the individual perspective or standpoint of those persons in a position to be impacted by its application. More specifically, contractualism requires us to consider whether a principle burdens any individual person with costs more significant than the individual costs imposed by any alternative principle. If it does, then the principle under consideration can be reasonably rejected according to Scanlon. An important feature of this view, and one that distinguishes contractualism from utilitarianism, is that the costs associated with a given principle need not be understood in terms of well-being. On Scanlon's view, an individual may object to a principle on the grounds that it negatively impacts something valuable to her other than her personal well-being, such as fairness. The selection concludes with an extended discussion of another important feature of contractualism, namely, its rejection of aggregative moral reasoning. For Scanlon, this is an appealing feature of contractualism because it rules out some of the intuitively implausible implications of utilitarianism, for example, that it is morally justified to impose severe harms on a few to produce relatively minor individual benefits if the beneficiaries are large enough in number. Scanlon, however, acknowledges that there are some cases where the right thing to do does seem to depend on the number of people affected. For example, in a situation where we must choose between saving either a larger or smaller group of people from serious injury or death, it seems clear that it would be wrong not to save the larger group. At first glance, it seems contractualism cannot accept a principle requiring us to save the larger group because the individual objections against such a principle would seem to be balanced evenly against the individual objections alternative principles would generate. But Scanlon argues that there is an objection any member of the larger group can make that effectively breaks this tie, namely, that any alternative to the proposed principle would not give positive moral weight to his or her life. -Despite its rejection of aggregation, Scanlon claims that contractualism can nonetheless justify a principle requiring us to save the larger of two groups of people from serious injury in a situation where only one can be saved. What is Scanlon's argument for this claim? Is Scanlon's argument persuasive? Why or why not?

T.M. Scanlon: What We Owe to Each Other In this selection from What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon sketches an alternative moral theory to utilitarianism that he calls contractualism. For contractualism, the animating impulse of morality is not maximizing some good like human well-being, but a concern to treat others with the respect owed to them as rational subjects. We accomplish this, according to Scanlon, by conducting ourselves in ways we can justify to others. Right action, in Scanlon's view, is a matter of acting according to principles everyone can accept. Thus when a contractualist thinks about right and wrong, the central question is whether the principles we act on are ones that no one could reasonably reject. To decide whether a principle can be reasonably rejected, we must assess the principle from the individual perspective or standpoint of those persons in a position to be impacted by its application. More specifically, contractualism requires us to consider whether a principle burdens any individual person with costs more significant than the individual costs imposed by any alternative principle. If it does, then the principle under consideration can be reasonably rejected according to Scanlon. An important feature of this view, and one that distinguishes contractualism from utilitarianism, is that the costs associated with a given principle need not be understood in terms of well-being. On Scanlon's view, an individual may object to a principle on the grounds that it negatively impacts something valuable to her other than her personal well-being, such as fairness. The selection concludes with an extended discussion of another important feature of contractualism, namely, its rejection of aggregative moral reasoning. For Scanlon, this is an appealing feature of contractualism because it rules out some of the intuitively implausible implications of utilitarianism, for example, that it is morally justified to impose severe harms on a few to produce relatively minor individual benefits if the beneficiaries are large enough in number. Scanlon, however, acknowledges that there are some cases where the right thing to do does seem to depend on the number of people affected. For example, in a situation where we must choose between saving either a larger or smaller group of people from serious injury or death, it seems clear that it would be wrong not to save the larger group. At first glance, it seems contractualism cannot accept a principle requiring us to save the larger group because the individual objections against such a principle would seem to be balanced evenly against the individual objections alternative principles would generate. But Scanlon argues that there is an objection any member of the larger group can make that effectively breaks this tie, namely, that any alternative to the proposed principle would not give positive moral weight to his or her life. -Contractualism rejects considerations of personal well-being as the only grounds upon which a principle can reasonably be rejected. What other grounds can you think of?

T.M. Scanlon: What We Owe to Each Other In this selection from What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon sketches an alternative moral theory to utilitarianism that he calls contractualism. For contractualism, the animating impulse of morality is not maximizing some good like human well-being, but a concern to treat others with the respect owed to them as rational subjects. We accomplish this, according to Scanlon, by conducting ourselves in ways we can justify to others. Right action, in Scanlon's view, is a matter of acting according to principles everyone can accept. Thus when a contractualist thinks about right and wrong, the central question is whether the principles we act on are ones that no one could reasonably reject. To decide whether a principle can be reasonably rejected, we must assess the principle from the individual perspective or standpoint of those persons in a position to be impacted by its application. More specifically, contractualism requires us to consider whether a principle burdens any individual person with costs more significant than the individual costs imposed by any alternative principle. If it does, then the principle under consideration can be reasonably rejected according to Scanlon. An important feature of this view, and one that distinguishes contractualism from utilitarianism, is that the costs associated with a given principle need not be understood in terms of well-being. On Scanlon's view, an individual may object to a principle on the grounds that it negatively impacts something valuable to her other than her personal well-being, such as fairness. The selection concludes with an extended discussion of another important feature of contractualism, namely, its rejection of aggregative moral reasoning. For Scanlon, this is an appealing feature of contractualism because it rules out some of the intuitively implausible implications of utilitarianism, for example, that it is morally justified to impose severe harms on a few to produce relatively minor individual benefits if the beneficiaries are large enough in number. Scanlon, however, acknowledges that there are some cases where the right thing to do does seem to depend on the number of people affected. For example, in a situation where we must choose between saving either a larger or smaller group of people from serious injury or death, it seems clear that it would be wrong not to save the larger group. At first glance, it seems contractualism cannot accept a principle requiring us to save the larger group because the individual objections against such a principle would seem to be balanced evenly against the individual objections alternative principles would generate. But Scanlon argues that there is an objection any member of the larger group can make that effectively breaks this tie, namely, that any alternative to the proposed principle would not give positive moral weight to his or her life. -According to Scanlon, a principle that requires saving the larger of two groups of people from serious injury in situations where only one could be saved:

T.M. Scanlon: What We Owe to Each Other In this selection from What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon sketches an alternative moral theory to utilitarianism that he calls contractualism. For contractualism, the animating impulse of morality is not maximizing some good like human well-being, but a concern to treat others with the respect owed to them as rational subjects. We accomplish this, according to Scanlon, by conducting ourselves in ways we can justify to others. Right action, in Scanlon's view, is a matter of acting according to principles everyone can accept. Thus when a contractualist thinks about right and wrong, the central question is whether the principles we act on are ones that no one could reasonably reject. To decide whether a principle can be reasonably rejected, we must assess the principle from the individual perspective or standpoint of those persons in a position to be impacted by its application. More specifically, contractualism requires us to consider whether a principle burdens any individual person with costs more significant than the individual costs imposed by any alternative principle. If it does, then the principle under consideration can be reasonably rejected according to Scanlon. An important feature of this view, and one that distinguishes contractualism from utilitarianism, is that the costs associated with a given principle need not be understood in terms of well-being. On Scanlon's view, an individual may object to a principle on the grounds that it negatively impacts something valuable to her other than her personal well-being, such as fairness. The selection concludes with an extended discussion of another important feature of contractualism, namely, its rejection of aggregative moral reasoning. For Scanlon, this is an appealing feature of contractualism because it rules out some of the intuitively implausible implications of utilitarianism, for example, that it is morally justified to impose severe harms on a few to produce relatively minor individual benefits if the beneficiaries are large enough in number. Scanlon, however, acknowledges that there are some cases where the right thing to do does seem to depend on the number of people affected. For example, in a situation where we must choose between saving either a larger or smaller group of people from serious injury or death, it seems clear that it would be wrong not to save the larger group. At first glance, it seems contractualism cannot accept a principle requiring us to save the larger group because the individual objections against such a principle would seem to be balanced evenly against the individual objections alternative principles would generate. But Scanlon argues that there is an objection any member of the larger group can make that effectively breaks this tie, namely, that any alternative to the proposed principle would not give positive moral weight to his or her life. -In his analysis of the transmission room accident example, Scanlon argues that Jones should be rescued immediately because his pain is greater than the total amount of displeasure his rescue would cause for others.

T.M. Scanlon: What We Owe to Each Other In this selection from What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon sketches an alternative moral theory to utilitarianism that he calls contractualism. For contractualism, the animating impulse of morality is not maximizing some good like human well-being, but a concern to treat others with the respect owed to them as rational subjects. We accomplish this, according to Scanlon, by conducting ourselves in ways we can justify to others. Right action, in Scanlon's view, is a matter of acting according to principles everyone can accept. Thus when a contractualist thinks about right and wrong, the central question is whether the principles we act on are ones that no one could reasonably reject. To decide whether a principle can be reasonably rejected, we must assess the principle from the individual perspective or standpoint of those persons in a position to be impacted by its application. More specifically, contractualism requires us to consider whether a principle burdens any individual person with costs more significant than the individual costs imposed by any alternative principle. If it does, then the principle under consideration can be reasonably rejected according to Scanlon. An important feature of this view, and one that distinguishes contractualism from utilitarianism, is that the costs associated with a given principle need not be understood in terms of well-being. On Scanlon's view, an individual may object to a principle on the grounds that it negatively impacts something valuable to her other than her personal well-being, such as fairness. The selection concludes with an extended discussion of another important feature of contractualism, namely, its rejection of aggregative moral reasoning. For Scanlon, this is an appealing feature of contractualism because it rules out some of the intuitively implausible implications of utilitarianism, for example, that it is morally justified to impose severe harms on a few to produce relatively minor individual benefits if the beneficiaries are large enough in number. Scanlon, however, acknowledges that there are some cases where the right thing to do does seem to depend on the number of people affected. For example, in a situation where we must choose between saving either a larger or smaller group of people from serious injury or death, it seems clear that it would be wrong not to save the larger group. At first glance, it seems contractualism cannot accept a principle requiring us to save the larger group because the individual objections against such a principle would seem to be balanced evenly against the individual objections alternative principles would generate. But Scanlon argues that there is an objection any member of the larger group can make that effectively breaks this tie, namely, that any alternative to the proposed principle would not give positive moral weight to his or her life. -Some have claimed that contractualism is objectionably circular because it allows principles to be rejected for reasons other than considerations of individual well-being. How does this objection go exactly and what is Scanlon's response to it? Is Scanlon's response convincing? Why or why not?

T.M. Scanlon: What We Owe to Each Other In this selection from What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon sketches an alternative moral theory to utilitarianism that he calls contractualism. For contractualism, the animating impulse of morality is not maximizing some good like human well-being, but a concern to treat others with the respect owed to them as rational subjects. We accomplish this, according to Scanlon, by conducting ourselves in ways we can justify to others. Right action, in Scanlon's view, is a matter of acting according to principles everyone can accept. Thus when a contractualist thinks about right and wrong, the central question is whether the principles we act on are ones that no one could reasonably reject. To decide whether a principle can be reasonably rejected, we must assess the principle from the individual perspective or standpoint of those persons in a position to be impacted by its application. More specifically, contractualism requires us to consider whether a principle burdens any individual person with costs more significant than the individual costs imposed by any alternative principle. If it does, then the principle under consideration can be reasonably rejected according to Scanlon. An important feature of this view, and one that distinguishes contractualism from utilitarianism, is that the costs associated with a given principle need not be understood in terms of well-being. On Scanlon's view, an individual may object to a principle on the grounds that it negatively impacts something valuable to her other than her personal well-being, such as fairness. The selection concludes with an extended discussion of another important feature of contractualism, namely, its rejection of aggregative moral reasoning. For Scanlon, this is an appealing feature of contractualism because it rules out some of the intuitively implausible implications of utilitarianism, for example, that it is morally justified to impose severe harms on a few to produce relatively minor individual benefits if the beneficiaries are large enough in number. Scanlon, however, acknowledges that there are some cases where the right thing to do does seem to depend on the number of people affected. For example, in a situation where we must choose between saving either a larger or smaller group of people from serious injury or death, it seems clear that it would be wrong not to save the larger group. At first glance, it seems contractualism cannot accept a principle requiring us to save the larger group because the individual objections against such a principle would seem to be balanced evenly against the individual objections alternative principles would generate. But Scanlon argues that there is an objection any member of the larger group can make that effectively breaks this tie, namely, that any alternative to the proposed principle would not give positive moral weight to his or her life. -Unlike utilitarianism, contractualism denies that considerations of individual well-being are relevant to moral reasoning.

T.M. Scanlon: What We Owe to Each Other In this selection from What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon sketches an alternative moral theory to utilitarianism that he calls contractualism. For contractualism, the animating impulse of morality is not maximizing some good like human well-being, but a concern to treat others with the respect owed to them as rational subjects. We accomplish this, according to Scanlon, by conducting ourselves in ways we can justify to others. Right action, in Scanlon's view, is a matter of acting according to principles everyone can accept. Thus when a contractualist thinks about right and wrong, the central question is whether the principles we act on are ones that no one could reasonably reject. To decide whether a principle can be reasonably rejected, we must assess the principle from the individual perspective or standpoint of those persons in a position to be impacted by its application. More specifically, contractualism requires us to consider whether a principle burdens any individual person with costs more significant than the individual costs imposed by any alternative principle. If it does, then the principle under consideration can be reasonably rejected according to Scanlon. An important feature of this view, and one that distinguishes contractualism from utilitarianism, is that the costs associated with a given principle need not be understood in terms of well-being. On Scanlon's view, an individual may object to a principle on the grounds that it negatively impacts something valuable to her other than her personal well-being, such as fairness. The selection concludes with an extended discussion of another important feature of contractualism, namely, its rejection of aggregative moral reasoning. For Scanlon, this is an appealing feature of contractualism because it rules out some of the intuitively implausible implications of utilitarianism, for example, that it is morally justified to impose severe harms on a few to produce relatively minor individual benefits if the beneficiaries are large enough in number. Scanlon, however, acknowledges that there are some cases where the right thing to do does seem to depend on the number of people affected. For example, in a situation where we must choose between saving either a larger or smaller group of people from serious injury or death, it seems clear that it would be wrong not to save the larger group. At first glance, it seems contractualism cannot accept a principle requiring us to save the larger group because the individual objections against such a principle would seem to be balanced evenly against the individual objections alternative principles would generate. But Scanlon argues that there is an objection any member of the larger group can make that effectively breaks this tie, namely, that any alternative to the proposed principle would not give positive moral weight to his or her life. -Impersonal reasons, according to Scanlon, do not in themselves provide grounds for reasonably rejecting a principle.

T.M. Scanlon: What We Owe to Each Other In this selection from What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon sketches an alternative moral theory to utilitarianism that he calls contractualism. For contractualism, the animating impulse of morality is not maximizing some good like human well-being, but a concern to treat others with the respect owed to them as rational subjects. We accomplish this, according to Scanlon, by conducting ourselves in ways we can justify to others. Right action, in Scanlon's view, is a matter of acting according to principles everyone can accept. Thus when a contractualist thinks about right and wrong, the central question is whether the principles we act on are ones that no one could reasonably reject. To decide whether a principle can be reasonably rejected, we must assess the principle from the individual perspective or standpoint of those persons in a position to be impacted by its application. More specifically, contractualism requires us to consider whether a principle burdens any individual person with costs more significant than the individual costs imposed by any alternative principle. If it does, then the principle under consideration can be reasonably rejected according to Scanlon. An important feature of this view, and one that distinguishes contractualism from utilitarianism, is that the costs associated with a given principle need not be understood in terms of well-being. On Scanlon's view, an individual may object to a principle on the grounds that it negatively impacts something valuable to her other than her personal well-being, such as fairness. The selection concludes with an extended discussion of another important feature of contractualism, namely, its rejection of aggregative moral reasoning. For Scanlon, this is an appealing feature of contractualism because it rules out some of the intuitively implausible implications of utilitarianism, for example, that it is morally justified to impose severe harms on a few to produce relatively minor individual benefits if the beneficiaries are large enough in number. Scanlon, however, acknowledges that there are some cases where the right thing to do does seem to depend on the number of people affected. For example, in a situation where we must choose between saving either a larger or smaller group of people from serious injury or death, it seems clear that it would be wrong not to save the larger group. At first glance, it seems contractualism cannot accept a principle requiring us to save the larger group because the individual objections against such a principle would seem to be balanced evenly against the individual objections alternative principles would generate. But Scanlon argues that there is an objection any member of the larger group can make that effectively breaks this tie, namely, that any alternative to the proposed principle would not give positive moral weight to his or her life. -In contrast to utilitarianism, contractualism:

T.M. Scanlon: What We Owe to Each Other In this selection from What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon sketches an alternative moral theory to utilitarianism that he calls contractualism. For contractualism, the animating impulse of morality is not maximizing some good like human well-being, but a concern to treat others with the respect owed to them as rational subjects. We accomplish this, according to Scanlon, by conducting ourselves in ways we can justify to others. Right action, in Scanlon's view, is a matter of acting according to principles everyone can accept. Thus when a contractualist thinks about right and wrong, the central question is whether the principles we act on are ones that no one could reasonably reject. To decide whether a principle can be reasonably rejected, we must assess the principle from the individual perspective or standpoint of those persons in a position to be impacted by its application. More specifically, contractualism requires us to consider whether a principle burdens any individual person with costs more significant than the individual costs imposed by any alternative principle. If it does, then the principle under consideration can be reasonably rejected according to Scanlon. An important feature of this view, and one that distinguishes contractualism from utilitarianism, is that the costs associated with a given principle need not be understood in terms of well-being. On Scanlon's view, an individual may object to a principle on the grounds that it negatively impacts something valuable to her other than her personal well-being, such as fairness. The selection concludes with an extended discussion of another important feature of contractualism, namely, its rejection of aggregative moral reasoning. For Scanlon, this is an appealing feature of contractualism because it rules out some of the intuitively implausible implications of utilitarianism, for example, that it is morally justified to impose severe harms on a few to produce relatively minor individual benefits if the beneficiaries are large enough in number. Scanlon, however, acknowledges that there are some cases where the right thing to do does seem to depend on the number of people affected. For example, in a situation where we must choose between saving either a larger or smaller group of people from serious injury or death, it seems clear that it would be wrong not to save the larger group. At first glance, it seems contractualism cannot accept a principle requiring us to save the larger group because the individual objections against such a principle would seem to be balanced evenly against the individual objections alternative principles would generate. But Scanlon argues that there is an objection any member of the larger group can make that effectively breaks this tie, namely, that any alternative to the proposed principle would not give positive moral weight to his or her life. -For Scanlon, the terms "rational" and "reasonable" are not interchangeable.

T.M. Scanlon: What We Owe to Each Other In this selection from What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon sketches an alternative moral theory to utilitarianism that he calls contractualism. For contractualism, the animating impulse of morality is not maximizing some good like human well-being, but a concern to treat others with the respect owed to them as rational subjects. We accomplish this, according to Scanlon, by conducting ourselves in ways we can justify to others. Right action, in Scanlon's view, is a matter of acting according to principles everyone can accept. Thus when a contractualist thinks about right and wrong, the central question is whether the principles we act on are ones that no one could reasonably reject. To decide whether a principle can be reasonably rejected, we must assess the principle from the individual perspective or standpoint of those persons in a position to be impacted by its application. More specifically, contractualism requires us to consider whether a principle burdens any individual person with costs more significant than the individual costs imposed by any alternative principle. If it does, then the principle under consideration can be reasonably rejected according to Scanlon. An important feature of this view, and one that distinguishes contractualism from utilitarianism, is that the costs associated with a given principle need not be understood in terms of well-being. On Scanlon's view, an individual may object to a principle on the grounds that it negatively impacts something valuable to her other than her personal well-being, such as fairness. The selection concludes with an extended discussion of another important feature of contractualism, namely, its rejection of aggregative moral reasoning. For Scanlon, this is an appealing feature of contractualism because it rules out some of the intuitively implausible implications of utilitarianism, for example, that it is morally justified to impose severe harms on a few to produce relatively minor individual benefits if the beneficiaries are large enough in number. Scanlon, however, acknowledges that there are some cases where the right thing to do does seem to depend on the number of people affected. For example, in a situation where we must choose between saving either a larger or smaller group of people from serious injury or death, it seems clear that it would be wrong not to save the larger group. At first glance, it seems contractualism cannot accept a principle requiring us to save the larger group because the individual objections against such a principle would seem to be balanced evenly against the individual objections alternative principles would generate. But Scanlon argues that there is an objection any member of the larger group can make that effectively breaks this tie, namely, that any alternative to the proposed principle would not give positive moral weight to his or her life. -To decide whether there are reasonable grounds to reject a principle, Scanlon argues that we must consider the burdens that would be imposed on people if it were rejected in favor of an alternative principle. Scanlon calls these burdens:

T.M. Scanlon: What We Owe to Each Other In this selection from What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon sketches an alternative moral theory to utilitarianism that he calls contractualism. For contractualism, the animating impulse of morality is not maximizing some good like human well-being, but a concern to treat others with the respect owed to them as rational subjects. We accomplish this, according to Scanlon, by conducting ourselves in ways we can justify to others. Right action, in Scanlon's view, is a matter of acting according to principles everyone can accept. Thus when a contractualist thinks about right and wrong, the central question is whether the principles we act on are ones that no one could reasonably reject. To decide whether a principle can be reasonably rejected, we must assess the principle from the individual perspective or standpoint of those persons in a position to be impacted by its application. More specifically, contractualism requires us to consider whether a principle burdens any individual person with costs more significant than the individual costs imposed by any alternative principle. If it does, then the principle under consideration can be reasonably rejected according to Scanlon. An important feature of this view, and one that distinguishes contractualism from utilitarianism, is that the costs associated with a given principle need not be understood in terms of well-being. On Scanlon's view, an individual may object to a principle on the grounds that it negatively impacts something valuable to her other than her personal well-being, such as fairness. The selection concludes with an extended discussion of another important feature of contractualism, namely, its rejection of aggregative moral reasoning. For Scanlon, this is an appealing feature of contractualism because it rules out some of the intuitively implausible implications of utilitarianism, for example, that it is morally justified to impose severe harms on a few to produce relatively minor individual benefits if the beneficiaries are large enough in number. Scanlon, however, acknowledges that there are some cases where the right thing to do does seem to depend on the number of people affected. For example, in a situation where we must choose between saving either a larger or smaller group of people from serious injury or death, it seems clear that it would be wrong not to save the larger group. At first glance, it seems contractualism cannot accept a principle requiring us to save the larger group because the individual objections against such a principle would seem to be balanced evenly against the individual objections alternative principles would generate. But Scanlon argues that there is an objection any member of the larger group can make that effectively breaks this tie, namely, that any alternative to the proposed principle would not give positive moral weight to his or her life. -Scanlon's conceives of contractualism as a general theory that covers all aspects of morality.

T.M. Scanlon: What We Owe to Each Other In this selection from What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon sketches an alternative moral theory to utilitarianism that he calls contractualism. For contractualism, the animating impulse of morality is not maximizing some good like human well-being, but a concern to treat others with the respect owed to them as rational subjects. We accomplish this, according to Scanlon, by conducting ourselves in ways we can justify to others. Right action, in Scanlon's view, is a matter of acting according to principles everyone can accept. Thus when a contractualist thinks about right and wrong, the central question is whether the principles we act on are ones that no one could reasonably reject. To decide whether a principle can be reasonably rejected, we must assess the principle from the individual perspective or standpoint of those persons in a position to be impacted by its application. More specifically, contractualism requires us to consider whether a principle burdens any individual person with costs more significant than the individual costs imposed by any alternative principle. If it does, then the principle under consideration can be reasonably rejected according to Scanlon. An important feature of this view, and one that distinguishes contractualism from utilitarianism, is that the costs associated with a given principle need not be understood in terms of well-being. On Scanlon's view, an individual may object to a principle on the grounds that it negatively impacts something valuable to her other than her personal well-being, such as fairness. The selection concludes with an extended discussion of another important feature of contractualism, namely, its rejection of aggregative moral reasoning. For Scanlon, this is an appealing feature of contractualism because it rules out some of the intuitively implausible implications of utilitarianism, for example, that it is morally justified to impose severe harms on a few to produce relatively minor individual benefits if the beneficiaries are large enough in number. Scanlon, however, acknowledges that there are some cases where the right thing to do does seem to depend on the number of people affected. For example, in a situation where we must choose between saving either a larger or smaller group of people from serious injury or death, it seems clear that it would be wrong not to save the larger group. At first glance, it seems contractualism cannot accept a principle requiring us to save the larger group because the individual objections against such a principle would seem to be balanced evenly against the individual objections alternative principles would generate. But Scanlon argues that there is an objection any member of the larger group can make that effectively breaks this tie, namely, that any alternative to the proposed principle would not give positive moral weight to his or her life. -A central feature of contractualism is that principles are assessed from the standpoint of:

T.M. Scanlon: What We Owe to Each Other In this selection from What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon sketches an alternative moral theory to utilitarianism that he calls contractualism. For contractualism, the animating impulse of morality is not maximizing some good like human well-being, but a concern to treat others with the respect owed to them as rational subjects. We accomplish this, according to Scanlon, by conducting ourselves in ways we can justify to others. Right action, in Scanlon's view, is a matter of acting according to principles everyone can accept. Thus when a contractualist thinks about right and wrong, the central question is whether the principles we act on are ones that no one could reasonably reject. To decide whether a principle can be reasonably rejected, we must assess the principle from the individual perspective or standpoint of those persons in a position to be impacted by its application. More specifically, contractualism requires us to consider whether a principle burdens any individual person with costs more significant than the individual costs imposed by any alternative principle. If it does, then the principle under consideration can be reasonably rejected according to Scanlon. An important feature of this view, and one that distinguishes contractualism from utilitarianism, is that the costs associated with a given principle need not be understood in terms of well-being. On Scanlon's view, an individual may object to a principle on the grounds that it negatively impacts something valuable to her other than her personal well-being, such as fairness. The selection concludes with an extended discussion of another important feature of contractualism, namely, its rejection of aggregative moral reasoning. For Scanlon, this is an appealing feature of contractualism because it rules out some of the intuitively implausible implications of utilitarianism, for example, that it is morally justified to impose severe harms on a few to produce relatively minor individual benefits if the beneficiaries are large enough in number. Scanlon, however, acknowledges that there are some cases where the right thing to do does seem to depend on the number of people affected. For example, in a situation where we must choose between saving either a larger or smaller group of people from serious injury or death, it seems clear that it would be wrong not to save the larger group. At first glance, it seems contractualism cannot accept a principle requiring us to save the larger group because the individual objections against such a principle would seem to be balanced evenly against the individual objections alternative principles would generate. But Scanlon argues that there is an objection any member of the larger group can make that effectively breaks this tie, namely, that any alternative to the proposed principle would not give positive moral weight to his or her life. -Scanlon envisions contractualism as an alternative primarily to:

T.M. Scanlon: What We Owe to Each Other In this selection from What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon sketches an alternative moral theory to utilitarianism that he calls contractualism. For contractualism, the animating impulse of morality is not maximizing some good like human well-being, but a concern to treat others with the respect owed to them as rational subjects. We accomplish this, according to Scanlon, by conducting ourselves in ways we can justify to others. Right action, in Scanlon's view, is a matter of acting according to principles everyone can accept. Thus when a contractualist thinks about right and wrong, the central question is whether the principles we act on are ones that no one could reasonably reject. To decide whether a principle can be reasonably rejected, we must assess the principle from the individual perspective or standpoint of those persons in a position to be impacted by its application. More specifically, contractualism requires us to consider whether a principle burdens any individual person with costs more significant than the individual costs imposed by any alternative principle. If it does, then the principle under consideration can be reasonably rejected according to Scanlon. An important feature of this view, and one that distinguishes contractualism from utilitarianism, is that the costs associated with a given principle need not be understood in terms of well-being. On Scanlon's view, an individual may object to a principle on the grounds that it negatively impacts something valuable to her other than her personal well-being, such as fairness. The selection concludes with an extended discussion of another important feature of contractualism, namely, its rejection of aggregative moral reasoning. For Scanlon, this is an appealing feature of contractualism because it rules out some of the intuitively implausible implications of utilitarianism, for example, that it is morally justified to impose severe harms on a few to produce relatively minor individual benefits if the beneficiaries are large enough in number. Scanlon, however, acknowledges that there are some cases where the right thing to do does seem to depend on the number of people affected. For example, in a situation where we must choose between saving either a larger or smaller group of people from serious injury or death, it seems clear that it would be wrong not to save the larger group. At first glance, it seems contractualism cannot accept a principle requiring us to save the larger group because the individual objections against such a principle would seem to be balanced evenly against the individual objections alternative principles would generate. But Scanlon argues that there is an objection any member of the larger group can make that effectively breaks this tie, namely, that any alternative to the proposed principle would not give positive moral weight to his or her life. -When thinking about questions of right and wrong, contractualists consider whether the principles we act on:

T.M. Scanlon: What We Owe to Each Other In this selection from What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon sketches an alternative moral theory to utilitarianism that he calls contractualism. For contractualism, the animating impulse of morality is not maximizing some good like human well-being, but a concern to treat others with the respect owed to them as rational subjects. We accomplish this, according to Scanlon, by conducting ourselves in ways we can justify to others. Right action, in Scanlon's view, is a matter of acting according to principles everyone can accept. Thus when a contractualist thinks about right and wrong, the central question is whether the principles we act on are ones that no one could reasonably reject. To decide whether a principle can be reasonably rejected, we must assess the principle from the individual perspective or standpoint of those persons in a position to be impacted by its application. More specifically, contractualism requires us to consider whether a principle burdens any individual person with costs more significant than the individual costs imposed by any alternative principle. If it does, then the principle under consideration can be reasonably rejected according to Scanlon. An important feature of this view, and one that distinguishes contractualism from utilitarianism, is that the costs associated with a given principle need not be understood in terms of well-being. On Scanlon's view, an individual may object to a principle on the grounds that it negatively impacts something valuable to her other than her personal well-being, such as fairness. The selection concludes with an extended discussion of another important feature of contractualism, namely, its rejection of aggregative moral reasoning. For Scanlon, this is an appealing feature of contractualism because it rules out some of the intuitively implausible implications of utilitarianism, for example, that it is morally justified to impose severe harms on a few to produce relatively minor individual benefits if the beneficiaries are large enough in number. Scanlon, however, acknowledges that there are some cases where the right thing to do does seem to depend on the number of people affected. For example, in a situation where we must choose between saving either a larger or smaller group of people from serious injury or death, it seems clear that it would be wrong not to save the larger group. At first glance, it seems contractualism cannot accept a principle requiring us to save the larger group because the individual objections against such a principle would seem to be balanced evenly against the individual objections alternative principles would generate. But Scanlon argues that there is an objection any member of the larger group can make that effectively breaks this tie, namely, that any alternative to the proposed principle would not give positive moral weight to his or her life. -According to Scanlon, a principle may reasonably be rejected on grounds having to do with: