Exam 46: Philippa Foot

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -According to Foot, Thomson's violinist case establishes that abortion is permissible in cases of rape.

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -According to Foot, one is the agent of harm if and only if:

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -Foot claims that negative duties are:

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -Foot claims that turning off a respirator is:

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -Foot claims that there is always a difference of permissibility between cases of killing and cases of letting die.

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -What implications does Foot's view have for the morality of abortion? Do you find her verdict plausible? Defend your answer.

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -How does Foot respond to Rachels's case involving Smith and Jones? Do you think she succeeds in defusing Rachels's argument? Why or why not?

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -Foot claims that we can allow someone to die of whatever disaster threatens him if the cost of saving him is failing to save five; and hence it is permissible to drive over him in order to get to the five.

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -According to Foot, the crucial issue in deciding whether abortion is justified is:

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -Foot argues that it is permissible to run over one person if this is necessary to reach five others and save their lives.

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -Explain Foot's distinction between two types of rights, and the corresponding distinction between two types of duties. Which types of right and duties does she think are more stringent, and what role does this play in her argument concerning the killing and letting die distinction?

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -According to Foot, it needs to be explained why:

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -According to Foot, the violation of a negative duty involves:

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -Foot claims that in explaining the difference between killing and letting die, the distinction of importance is between:

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -Foot claims that in the Rescue cases:

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -Foot defines a negative duty as:

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -According to Foot, there are some cases in which a negative right is not overridden, but a positive right is overridden.

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -According to Foot, we may have to allow one person to die if saving him would mean that we could not save five others, but that does not mean that we could carve up one patient to save five.

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -According to Foot, being an agent of harm is always morally worse than simply allowing a harm to befall someone.

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -Foot claims that it is permissible to steer the trolley into one person to save five, because: