Exam 57: Judith Jarvis Thomson

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -Thomson argues that one may not kill a person to save five if one can instead kill oneself to save the five.

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -Thomson concludes that it is permissible to turn the trolley so that it kills fewer people:

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -Thomson concludes that Foot's two principles are:

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -In Bystander's Three Options, Thomson modifies the case of the trolley by adding the option of:

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -According to Thomson, most people say it is permissible to turn the trolley so that it kills fewer people:

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -Thomson claims that she now accepts Foot's two principles. Does this imply that Thomson now rejects her view in "A Defense of Abortion"? If the fetus is a person, does one kill a person - i.e. become the agent of harm -when one has an abortion? Defend your answer.

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -What is Thomson's solution to the trolley problem? What is her argument for this solution? Do you think her argument is sound? Defend your answer.

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -Thomson claims that if a trolley driver refuses to steer the runaway trolley onto a side track, and because of this the trolley runs over five people, the driver merely lets the five die.

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -What two cases comprise the "trolley problem"? What verdicts do people typically give regarding these cases? Do you agree with these verdicts? Why or why not?

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -According to Foot's two principles, it is never permissible to kill an innocent person.

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -Thomson concludes that the trolley problem is in fact a nonproblem.

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -Thomson claims that it is permissible for a bystander to turn a runaway trolley so that it kills one innocent person instead of five.

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -What two principles did Foot propose in response to the trolley problem? What counterintuitive consequence of these principles does Thomson point out? Do you find the principles plausible? Why or why not?

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -Thomson claims that in the case of the fat man:

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -According to Thomson's Fourth Principle, A may let five die if the only permissible means he has of saving them is killing himself

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -Which of the following is not one of Bystander's Three Options:

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -Foot suggested that the difference in our verdicts about the Judge's Two Options case and the Driver's Two Options case can be explained by appeal to what Thomson calls:

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -What widespread intuition regarding the trolley problem does Thomson regard as mistaken? What is her explanation of why so many people have this intuition? Do you find her explanation convincing? Why or why not?

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -According to Thomson's Third Principle:

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -Thomson accepts Foot's second principle but rejects Foot's first principle.