Exam 34: G.E.M.Anscombe

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -According to Anscombe, the concept of moral obligation:

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -Anscombe claims that Aristotelian ethics deals with borderline cases:

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -Anscombe criticizes as absurd Kant's idea of:

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -Anscombe claims that the ethics of Christianity is based on the idea of:

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -According to Anscombe, "moral obligation" currently signifies:

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -According to Anscombe, it would be a great improvement if we replaced "morally wrong" with:

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -Anscombe argues that our conscience is a reliable guide to our moral obligations.

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -According to Anscombe, an adequate philosophy of psychology would include analyses of concepts such as action, intention, and virtue.

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -What objection does Anscombe raise to the notion of moral obligation? Do you find her objection convincing? Why or why not?

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -According to Anscombe, someone who thinks it might be permissible to execute an innocent person to bring about the greater good:

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -According to Anscombe, Aristotelian ethics contrasts with modern moral philosophy because Aristotle seems to lack a concept of:

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -Anscombe claims that the notion of moral obligation is derived from the concept of:

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -In Anscombe's terminology, the facts I ordered potatoes and you supplied them and sent me a bill are brute relative to the fact that I owe you money.

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -Why does Anscombe claim that "it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy"? What does she think would be required before we would be able to do so?

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -Anscombe claims that consequentialism is:

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -Anscombe argues that there are few if any important differences between the views of the various English moral philosophers that have written since Sidgwick.

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -According to Anscombe, the concept of moral obligation only makes sense within a law conception of ethics.

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -According to Anscombe, we will not be able to do moral philosophy profitably "until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology." What would this involve? Do you agree that having an adequate philosophy of psychology is necessary to do moral philosophy well? Why or why not?

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -Aristotle's ethics revolves around the idea of:

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -Anscombe claims that in the absence of a law conception of ethics: