Exam 31: Thomas Nagel

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -Nagel claims that if the control condition were consistently applied:

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -Nagel claims that we often morally judge people for what they would have done if circumstances were different.

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -Circumstantial luck concerns:

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -Nagel claims that the problem of moral luck is closely connected to the problem of:

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -According to Nagel, our beliefs are always ultimately due to factors outside our control.

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -Nagel argues most believe that two people ought not to be assessed in morally different ways if the only differences between them are factors beyond their control.

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -According to Nagel, the problem of moral luck arises because:

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -Nagel claims that the idea of agency is incompatible with actions being events.

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -Nagel compares the paradox of moral luck to the situation in another branch of philosophy:

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -What is the "control condition" on moral responsibility? Why might someone believe it to be true? Do you believe it? Why or why not?

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -Moral luck is when:

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -According to Nagel, when it comes to the causes of an agent's actions:

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -Nagel claims that most skeptical arguments:

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -Nagel claims that the primary object of moral judgment is:

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -One example of bad constitutive moral luck would be:

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -Kant believed that luck, whether good or bad, should have no influence on the moral assessment of persons and actions.

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -According to Nagel, the American Revolution was a case of circumstantial luck.

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -What is moral luck? Why didn't Kant think that moral luck exists? Do you think there are genuine cases of moral luck? Why or why not?

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -What would it mean to deny that there are any genuine cases of moral luck? Is such a position defensible? Why or why not?

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -According to Nagel, we are unable to view ourselves simply through an external evaluative perspective.