Exam 31: Thomas Nagel

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -Resultant luck concerns:

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -Explain in detail one of the four kinds of moral luck that Nagel distinguishes, providing some examples to illustrate. Do you find the existence of this kind of moral luck problematic?

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -What is Nagel's explanation of why the phenomenon of moral luck arises? Do you find it convincing? Why or why not?

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -Nagel claims that moral luck is a fundamental problem about moral responsibility to which we possess no satisfactory solution, because:

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -Nagel claims that almost nothing about what person does seems to be under his control.

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -The control condition claims:

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -What is Nagel's explanation of why we can't help but to morally judge others even in cases where we know that the control condition is not satisfied? Do you find his explanation compelling? Defend your answer.

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -According to Nagel, we tend to feel that moral assessment is undermined when we discover that an action is not under a person's control.

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -Nagel claims that prior to reflection, it seems that people cannot be morally assessed for:

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -Nagel claims that the actual results of an action do not affect one's culpability in performing it.

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -Constitutive luck concerns:

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control. Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver. When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view -What four kinds of moral luck does Nagel distinguish? Do you agree that these all generate instances of moral luck?