Exam 32: Susan Wolf

Susan Wolf: Moral Saints A moral saint, as Wolf defines it, is someone who is as morally good as possible. Although such an ideal might seem worth striving for, Wolf argues that moral sainthood is in fact not an attractive ideal. She maintains that any moral saint would necessarily live a life dominated by the commitment to improving the welfare of others. Wolf distinguishes between two different models of moral sainthood. The Loving Saint is someone whose happiness consists in the happiness of others. The Rational Saint also pays little attention to her own happiness, instead attaching overriding importance to the concerns of morality. The Rational Saint is committed to doing her moral duty for the sake of her duty. She retains some non-moral and even selfish desires, but, out of duty, does not act on them. Although these different models will appeal to different thinkers-utilitarians will be attracted to the Loving Saint, while Kantians to the Rational Saint-she claims that neither of them presents us with a desirable ideal. What's wrong with moral sainthood? Wolf argues that there are many nonmoral goods in which moral saints would not be willing or able to partake. Moral saints would spend the large majority of their time improving the lives of others, and thus would have little time to read interesting books, or to create or appreciate art, cuisine, or music. Furthermore, as moral saints would take great care not to cause offense, they would be unlikely to have a dry, sarcastic wit, and will hence be rather bland. By passing up on so much, either out of lack of interest or simply an iron will, moral saints seem to miss out on developing "an identifiable, personal self." Wolf claims that although an acceptable moral theory should render the idea of a moral saint coherent, moral sainthood turns out to be a life not worth striving for. Given that we would not wish moral sainthood for our friends, our children, or ourselves, Wolf concludes that morality should play only a limited role in our lives. -Wolf argues that the desire to be as moral as possible tends to:

Susan Wolf: Moral Saints A moral saint, as Wolf defines it, is someone who is as morally good as possible. Although such an ideal might seem worth striving for, Wolf argues that moral sainthood is in fact not an attractive ideal. She maintains that any moral saint would necessarily live a life dominated by the commitment to improving the welfare of others. Wolf distinguishes between two different models of moral sainthood. The Loving Saint is someone whose happiness consists in the happiness of others. The Rational Saint also pays little attention to her own happiness, instead attaching overriding importance to the concerns of morality. The Rational Saint is committed to doing her moral duty for the sake of her duty. She retains some non-moral and even selfish desires, but, out of duty, does not act on them. Although these different models will appeal to different thinkers-utilitarians will be attracted to the Loving Saint, while Kantians to the Rational Saint-she claims that neither of them presents us with a desirable ideal. What's wrong with moral sainthood? Wolf argues that there are many nonmoral goods in which moral saints would not be willing or able to partake. Moral saints would spend the large majority of their time improving the lives of others, and thus would have little time to read interesting books, or to create or appreciate art, cuisine, or music. Furthermore, as moral saints would take great care not to cause offense, they would be unlikely to have a dry, sarcastic wit, and will hence be rather bland. By passing up on so much, either out of lack of interest or simply an iron will, moral saints seem to miss out on developing "an identifiable, personal self." Wolf claims that although an acceptable moral theory should render the idea of a moral saint coherent, moral sainthood turns out to be a life not worth striving for. Given that we would not wish moral sainthood for our friends, our children, or ourselves, Wolf concludes that morality should play only a limited role in our lives. -Wolf claims that interpreting Kant's ethics so that it consists of a finite set of constraints:

Susan Wolf: Moral Saints A moral saint, as Wolf defines it, is someone who is as morally good as possible. Although such an ideal might seem worth striving for, Wolf argues that moral sainthood is in fact not an attractive ideal. She maintains that any moral saint would necessarily live a life dominated by the commitment to improving the welfare of others. Wolf distinguishes between two different models of moral sainthood. The Loving Saint is someone whose happiness consists in the happiness of others. The Rational Saint also pays little attention to her own happiness, instead attaching overriding importance to the concerns of morality. The Rational Saint is committed to doing her moral duty for the sake of her duty. She retains some non-moral and even selfish desires, but, out of duty, does not act on them. Although these different models will appeal to different thinkers-utilitarians will be attracted to the Loving Saint, while Kantians to the Rational Saint-she claims that neither of them presents us with a desirable ideal. What's wrong with moral sainthood? Wolf argues that there are many nonmoral goods in which moral saints would not be willing or able to partake. Moral saints would spend the large majority of their time improving the lives of others, and thus would have little time to read interesting books, or to create or appreciate art, cuisine, or music. Furthermore, as moral saints would take great care not to cause offense, they would be unlikely to have a dry, sarcastic wit, and will hence be rather bland. By passing up on so much, either out of lack of interest or simply an iron will, moral saints seem to miss out on developing "an identifiable, personal self." Wolf claims that although an acceptable moral theory should render the idea of a moral saint coherent, moral sainthood turns out to be a life not worth striving for. Given that we would not wish moral sainthood for our friends, our children, or ourselves, Wolf concludes that morality should play only a limited role in our lives. -According to Wolf, a moral theory that does not contain the seeds of an all-consuming ideal of moral sainthood:

Susan Wolf: Moral Saints A moral saint, as Wolf defines it, is someone who is as morally good as possible. Although such an ideal might seem worth striving for, Wolf argues that moral sainthood is in fact not an attractive ideal. She maintains that any moral saint would necessarily live a life dominated by the commitment to improving the welfare of others. Wolf distinguishes between two different models of moral sainthood. The Loving Saint is someone whose happiness consists in the happiness of others. The Rational Saint also pays little attention to her own happiness, instead attaching overriding importance to the concerns of morality. The Rational Saint is committed to doing her moral duty for the sake of her duty. She retains some non-moral and even selfish desires, but, out of duty, does not act on them. Although these different models will appeal to different thinkers-utilitarians will be attracted to the Loving Saint, while Kantians to the Rational Saint-she claims that neither of them presents us with a desirable ideal. What's wrong with moral sainthood? Wolf argues that there are many nonmoral goods in which moral saints would not be willing or able to partake. Moral saints would spend the large majority of their time improving the lives of others, and thus would have little time to read interesting books, or to create or appreciate art, cuisine, or music. Furthermore, as moral saints would take great care not to cause offense, they would be unlikely to have a dry, sarcastic wit, and will hence be rather bland. By passing up on so much, either out of lack of interest or simply an iron will, moral saints seem to miss out on developing "an identifiable, personal self." Wolf claims that although an acceptable moral theory should render the idea of a moral saint coherent, moral sainthood turns out to be a life not worth striving for. Given that we would not wish moral sainthood for our friends, our children, or ourselves, Wolf concludes that morality should play only a limited role in our lives. -Wolf refers to the point of view from which we consider what kinds of lives are good lives, and what kinds of persons it would be good for ourselves and others to be:

Susan Wolf: Moral Saints A moral saint, as Wolf defines it, is someone who is as morally good as possible. Although such an ideal might seem worth striving for, Wolf argues that moral sainthood is in fact not an attractive ideal. She maintains that any moral saint would necessarily live a life dominated by the commitment to improving the welfare of others. Wolf distinguishes between two different models of moral sainthood. The Loving Saint is someone whose happiness consists in the happiness of others. The Rational Saint also pays little attention to her own happiness, instead attaching overriding importance to the concerns of morality. The Rational Saint is committed to doing her moral duty for the sake of her duty. She retains some non-moral and even selfish desires, but, out of duty, does not act on them. Although these different models will appeal to different thinkers-utilitarians will be attracted to the Loving Saint, while Kantians to the Rational Saint-she claims that neither of them presents us with a desirable ideal. What's wrong with moral sainthood? Wolf argues that there are many nonmoral goods in which moral saints would not be willing or able to partake. Moral saints would spend the large majority of their time improving the lives of others, and thus would have little time to read interesting books, or to create or appreciate art, cuisine, or music. Furthermore, as moral saints would take great care not to cause offense, they would be unlikely to have a dry, sarcastic wit, and will hence be rather bland. By passing up on so much, either out of lack of interest or simply an iron will, moral saints seem to miss out on developing "an identifiable, personal self." Wolf claims that although an acceptable moral theory should render the idea of a moral saint coherent, moral sainthood turns out to be a life not worth striving for. Given that we would not wish moral sainthood for our friends, our children, or ourselves, Wolf concludes that morality should play only a limited role in our lives. -According to Wolf, the moral point of view and the point of view of individual perfection converge.

Susan Wolf: Moral Saints A moral saint, as Wolf defines it, is someone who is as morally good as possible. Although such an ideal might seem worth striving for, Wolf argues that moral sainthood is in fact not an attractive ideal. She maintains that any moral saint would necessarily live a life dominated by the commitment to improving the welfare of others. Wolf distinguishes between two different models of moral sainthood. The Loving Saint is someone whose happiness consists in the happiness of others. The Rational Saint also pays little attention to her own happiness, instead attaching overriding importance to the concerns of morality. The Rational Saint is committed to doing her moral duty for the sake of her duty. She retains some non-moral and even selfish desires, but, out of duty, does not act on them. Although these different models will appeal to different thinkers-utilitarians will be attracted to the Loving Saint, while Kantians to the Rational Saint-she claims that neither of them presents us with a desirable ideal. What's wrong with moral sainthood? Wolf argues that there are many nonmoral goods in which moral saints would not be willing or able to partake. Moral saints would spend the large majority of their time improving the lives of others, and thus would have little time to read interesting books, or to create or appreciate art, cuisine, or music. Furthermore, as moral saints would take great care not to cause offense, they would be unlikely to have a dry, sarcastic wit, and will hence be rather bland. By passing up on so much, either out of lack of interest or simply an iron will, moral saints seem to miss out on developing "an identifiable, personal self." Wolf claims that although an acceptable moral theory should render the idea of a moral saint coherent, moral sainthood turns out to be a life not worth striving for. Given that we would not wish moral sainthood for our friends, our children, or ourselves, Wolf concludes that morality should play only a limited role in our lives. -What lessons for moral philosophy does Wolf draw from her conclusion that moral sainthood is an unattractive ideal? What ideal does she substitute in its place? Do you agree with her?

Susan Wolf: Moral Saints A moral saint, as Wolf defines it, is someone who is as morally good as possible. Although such an ideal might seem worth striving for, Wolf argues that moral sainthood is in fact not an attractive ideal. She maintains that any moral saint would necessarily live a life dominated by the commitment to improving the welfare of others. Wolf distinguishes between two different models of moral sainthood. The Loving Saint is someone whose happiness consists in the happiness of others. The Rational Saint also pays little attention to her own happiness, instead attaching overriding importance to the concerns of morality. The Rational Saint is committed to doing her moral duty for the sake of her duty. She retains some non-moral and even selfish desires, but, out of duty, does not act on them. Although these different models will appeal to different thinkers-utilitarians will be attracted to the Loving Saint, while Kantians to the Rational Saint-she claims that neither of them presents us with a desirable ideal. What's wrong with moral sainthood? Wolf argues that there are many nonmoral goods in which moral saints would not be willing or able to partake. Moral saints would spend the large majority of their time improving the lives of others, and thus would have little time to read interesting books, or to create or appreciate art, cuisine, or music. Furthermore, as moral saints would take great care not to cause offense, they would be unlikely to have a dry, sarcastic wit, and will hence be rather bland. By passing up on so much, either out of lack of interest or simply an iron will, moral saints seem to miss out on developing "an identifiable, personal self." Wolf claims that although an acceptable moral theory should render the idea of a moral saint coherent, moral sainthood turns out to be a life not worth striving for. Given that we would not wish moral sainthood for our friends, our children, or ourselves, Wolf concludes that morality should play only a limited role in our lives. -According to Wolf, a moral saint would not be able to develop a cynical or sarcastic wit.

Susan Wolf: Moral Saints A moral saint, as Wolf defines it, is someone who is as morally good as possible. Although such an ideal might seem worth striving for, Wolf argues that moral sainthood is in fact not an attractive ideal. She maintains that any moral saint would necessarily live a life dominated by the commitment to improving the welfare of others. Wolf distinguishes between two different models of moral sainthood. The Loving Saint is someone whose happiness consists in the happiness of others. The Rational Saint also pays little attention to her own happiness, instead attaching overriding importance to the concerns of morality. The Rational Saint is committed to doing her moral duty for the sake of her duty. She retains some non-moral and even selfish desires, but, out of duty, does not act on them. Although these different models will appeal to different thinkers-utilitarians will be attracted to the Loving Saint, while Kantians to the Rational Saint-she claims that neither of them presents us with a desirable ideal. What's wrong with moral sainthood? Wolf argues that there are many nonmoral goods in which moral saints would not be willing or able to partake. Moral saints would spend the large majority of their time improving the lives of others, and thus would have little time to read interesting books, or to create or appreciate art, cuisine, or music. Furthermore, as moral saints would take great care not to cause offense, they would be unlikely to have a dry, sarcastic wit, and will hence be rather bland. By passing up on so much, either out of lack of interest or simply an iron will, moral saints seem to miss out on developing "an identifiable, personal self." Wolf claims that although an acceptable moral theory should render the idea of a moral saint coherent, moral sainthood turns out to be a life not worth striving for. Given that we would not wish moral sainthood for our friends, our children, or ourselves, Wolf concludes that morality should play only a limited role in our lives. -What would moral sainthood look like for a utilitarian? What objections does Wolf raise to this as an ideal? Do you find her objections compelling? Defend your answer.

Susan Wolf: Moral Saints A moral saint, as Wolf defines it, is someone who is as morally good as possible. Although such an ideal might seem worth striving for, Wolf argues that moral sainthood is in fact not an attractive ideal. She maintains that any moral saint would necessarily live a life dominated by the commitment to improving the welfare of others. Wolf distinguishes between two different models of moral sainthood. The Loving Saint is someone whose happiness consists in the happiness of others. The Rational Saint also pays little attention to her own happiness, instead attaching overriding importance to the concerns of morality. The Rational Saint is committed to doing her moral duty for the sake of her duty. She retains some non-moral and even selfish desires, but, out of duty, does not act on them. Although these different models will appeal to different thinkers-utilitarians will be attracted to the Loving Saint, while Kantians to the Rational Saint-she claims that neither of them presents us with a desirable ideal. What's wrong with moral sainthood? Wolf argues that there are many nonmoral goods in which moral saints would not be willing or able to partake. Moral saints would spend the large majority of their time improving the lives of others, and thus would have little time to read interesting books, or to create or appreciate art, cuisine, or music. Furthermore, as moral saints would take great care not to cause offense, they would be unlikely to have a dry, sarcastic wit, and will hence be rather bland. By passing up on so much, either out of lack of interest or simply an iron will, moral saints seem to miss out on developing "an identifiable, personal self." Wolf claims that although an acceptable moral theory should render the idea of a moral saint coherent, moral sainthood turns out to be a life not worth striving for. Given that we would not wish moral sainthood for our friends, our children, or ourselves, Wolf concludes that morality should play only a limited role in our lives. -What is "the point of view of individual perfection"? What role would morality play in a life that is perfect from this point of view, according to Wolf? Do you agree with her assessment? Why or why not?

Susan Wolf: Moral Saints A moral saint, as Wolf defines it, is someone who is as morally good as possible. Although such an ideal might seem worth striving for, Wolf argues that moral sainthood is in fact not an attractive ideal. She maintains that any moral saint would necessarily live a life dominated by the commitment to improving the welfare of others. Wolf distinguishes between two different models of moral sainthood. The Loving Saint is someone whose happiness consists in the happiness of others. The Rational Saint also pays little attention to her own happiness, instead attaching overriding importance to the concerns of morality. The Rational Saint is committed to doing her moral duty for the sake of her duty. She retains some non-moral and even selfish desires, but, out of duty, does not act on them. Although these different models will appeal to different thinkers-utilitarians will be attracted to the Loving Saint, while Kantians to the Rational Saint-she claims that neither of them presents us with a desirable ideal. What's wrong with moral sainthood? Wolf argues that there are many nonmoral goods in which moral saints would not be willing or able to partake. Moral saints would spend the large majority of their time improving the lives of others, and thus would have little time to read interesting books, or to create or appreciate art, cuisine, or music. Furthermore, as moral saints would take great care not to cause offense, they would be unlikely to have a dry, sarcastic wit, and will hence be rather bland. By passing up on so much, either out of lack of interest or simply an iron will, moral saints seem to miss out on developing "an identifiable, personal self." Wolf claims that although an acceptable moral theory should render the idea of a moral saint coherent, moral sainthood turns out to be a life not worth striving for. Given that we would not wish moral sainthood for our friends, our children, or ourselves, Wolf concludes that morality should play only a limited role in our lives. -Wolf claims that a necessary condition of moral sainthood would be that one's life be dominated by a commitment to the utilitarian principle of promoting the greatest good for the greatest number.

Susan Wolf: Moral Saints A moral saint, as Wolf defines it, is someone who is as morally good as possible. Although such an ideal might seem worth striving for, Wolf argues that moral sainthood is in fact not an attractive ideal. She maintains that any moral saint would necessarily live a life dominated by the commitment to improving the welfare of others. Wolf distinguishes between two different models of moral sainthood. The Loving Saint is someone whose happiness consists in the happiness of others. The Rational Saint also pays little attention to her own happiness, instead attaching overriding importance to the concerns of morality. The Rational Saint is committed to doing her moral duty for the sake of her duty. She retains some non-moral and even selfish desires, but, out of duty, does not act on them. Although these different models will appeal to different thinkers-utilitarians will be attracted to the Loving Saint, while Kantians to the Rational Saint-she claims that neither of them presents us with a desirable ideal. What's wrong with moral sainthood? Wolf argues that there are many nonmoral goods in which moral saints would not be willing or able to partake. Moral saints would spend the large majority of their time improving the lives of others, and thus would have little time to read interesting books, or to create or appreciate art, cuisine, or music. Furthermore, as moral saints would take great care not to cause offense, they would be unlikely to have a dry, sarcastic wit, and will hence be rather bland. By passing up on so much, either out of lack of interest or simply an iron will, moral saints seem to miss out on developing "an identifiable, personal self." Wolf claims that although an acceptable moral theory should render the idea of a moral saint coherent, moral sainthood turns out to be a life not worth striving for. Given that we would not wish moral sainthood for our friends, our children, or ourselves, Wolf concludes that morality should play only a limited role in our lives. -According to Wolf, the utilitarian's manner of valuing the not explicitly moral aspects of his life:

Susan Wolf: Moral Saints A moral saint, as Wolf defines it, is someone who is as morally good as possible. Although such an ideal might seem worth striving for, Wolf argues that moral sainthood is in fact not an attractive ideal. She maintains that any moral saint would necessarily live a life dominated by the commitment to improving the welfare of others. Wolf distinguishes between two different models of moral sainthood. The Loving Saint is someone whose happiness consists in the happiness of others. The Rational Saint also pays little attention to her own happiness, instead attaching overriding importance to the concerns of morality. The Rational Saint is committed to doing her moral duty for the sake of her duty. She retains some non-moral and even selfish desires, but, out of duty, does not act on them. Although these different models will appeal to different thinkers-utilitarians will be attracted to the Loving Saint, while Kantians to the Rational Saint-she claims that neither of them presents us with a desirable ideal. What's wrong with moral sainthood? Wolf argues that there are many nonmoral goods in which moral saints would not be willing or able to partake. Moral saints would spend the large majority of their time improving the lives of others, and thus would have little time to read interesting books, or to create or appreciate art, cuisine, or music. Furthermore, as moral saints would take great care not to cause offense, they would be unlikely to have a dry, sarcastic wit, and will hence be rather bland. By passing up on so much, either out of lack of interest or simply an iron will, moral saints seem to miss out on developing "an identifiable, personal self." Wolf claims that although an acceptable moral theory should render the idea of a moral saint coherent, moral sainthood turns out to be a life not worth striving for. Given that we would not wish moral sainthood for our friends, our children, or ourselves, Wolf concludes that morality should play only a limited role in our lives. -What would moral sainthood look like for a Kantian? What objections does Wolf raise to this as an ideal? Do you find her objections compelling? Defend your answer.

Susan Wolf: Moral Saints A moral saint, as Wolf defines it, is someone who is as morally good as possible. Although such an ideal might seem worth striving for, Wolf argues that moral sainthood is in fact not an attractive ideal. She maintains that any moral saint would necessarily live a life dominated by the commitment to improving the welfare of others. Wolf distinguishes between two different models of moral sainthood. The Loving Saint is someone whose happiness consists in the happiness of others. The Rational Saint also pays little attention to her own happiness, instead attaching overriding importance to the concerns of morality. The Rational Saint is committed to doing her moral duty for the sake of her duty. She retains some non-moral and even selfish desires, but, out of duty, does not act on them. Although these different models will appeal to different thinkers-utilitarians will be attracted to the Loving Saint, while Kantians to the Rational Saint-she claims that neither of them presents us with a desirable ideal. What's wrong with moral sainthood? Wolf argues that there are many nonmoral goods in which moral saints would not be willing or able to partake. Moral saints would spend the large majority of their time improving the lives of others, and thus would have little time to read interesting books, or to create or appreciate art, cuisine, or music. Furthermore, as moral saints would take great care not to cause offense, they would be unlikely to have a dry, sarcastic wit, and will hence be rather bland. By passing up on so much, either out of lack of interest or simply an iron will, moral saints seem to miss out on developing "an identifiable, personal self." Wolf claims that although an acceptable moral theory should render the idea of a moral saint coherent, moral sainthood turns out to be a life not worth striving for. Given that we would not wish moral sainthood for our friends, our children, or ourselves, Wolf concludes that morality should play only a limited role in our lives. -Wolf claims that moral sainthood requires either the lack or the denial of the existence of an identifiable, personal self.

Susan Wolf: Moral Saints A moral saint, as Wolf defines it, is someone who is as morally good as possible. Although such an ideal might seem worth striving for, Wolf argues that moral sainthood is in fact not an attractive ideal. She maintains that any moral saint would necessarily live a life dominated by the commitment to improving the welfare of others. Wolf distinguishes between two different models of moral sainthood. The Loving Saint is someone whose happiness consists in the happiness of others. The Rational Saint also pays little attention to her own happiness, instead attaching overriding importance to the concerns of morality. The Rational Saint is committed to doing her moral duty for the sake of her duty. She retains some non-moral and even selfish desires, but, out of duty, does not act on them. Although these different models will appeal to different thinkers-utilitarians will be attracted to the Loving Saint, while Kantians to the Rational Saint-she claims that neither of them presents us with a desirable ideal. What's wrong with moral sainthood? Wolf argues that there are many nonmoral goods in which moral saints would not be willing or able to partake. Moral saints would spend the large majority of their time improving the lives of others, and thus would have little time to read interesting books, or to create or appreciate art, cuisine, or music. Furthermore, as moral saints would take great care not to cause offense, they would be unlikely to have a dry, sarcastic wit, and will hence be rather bland. By passing up on so much, either out of lack of interest or simply an iron will, moral saints seem to miss out on developing "an identifiable, personal self." Wolf claims that although an acceptable moral theory should render the idea of a moral saint coherent, moral sainthood turns out to be a life not worth striving for. Given that we would not wish moral sainthood for our friends, our children, or ourselves, Wolf concludes that morality should play only a limited role in our lives. -According to Wolf, the unattractiveness of a utilitarian moral saint provides a good reason to abandon utilitarianism.

Susan Wolf: Moral Saints A moral saint, as Wolf defines it, is someone who is as morally good as possible. Although such an ideal might seem worth striving for, Wolf argues that moral sainthood is in fact not an attractive ideal. She maintains that any moral saint would necessarily live a life dominated by the commitment to improving the welfare of others. Wolf distinguishes between two different models of moral sainthood. The Loving Saint is someone whose happiness consists in the happiness of others. The Rational Saint also pays little attention to her own happiness, instead attaching overriding importance to the concerns of morality. The Rational Saint is committed to doing her moral duty for the sake of her duty. She retains some non-moral and even selfish desires, but, out of duty, does not act on them. Although these different models will appeal to different thinkers-utilitarians will be attracted to the Loving Saint, while Kantians to the Rational Saint-she claims that neither of them presents us with a desirable ideal. What's wrong with moral sainthood? Wolf argues that there are many nonmoral goods in which moral saints would not be willing or able to partake. Moral saints would spend the large majority of their time improving the lives of others, and thus would have little time to read interesting books, or to create or appreciate art, cuisine, or music. Furthermore, as moral saints would take great care not to cause offense, they would be unlikely to have a dry, sarcastic wit, and will hence be rather bland. By passing up on so much, either out of lack of interest or simply an iron will, moral saints seem to miss out on developing "an identifiable, personal self." Wolf claims that although an acceptable moral theory should render the idea of a moral saint coherent, moral sainthood turns out to be a life not worth striving for. Given that we would not wish moral sainthood for our friends, our children, or ourselves, Wolf concludes that morality should play only a limited role in our lives. -Wolf argues that moral sainthood does not constitute a model of personal well-being toward which:

Susan Wolf: Moral Saints A moral saint, as Wolf defines it, is someone who is as morally good as possible. Although such an ideal might seem worth striving for, Wolf argues that moral sainthood is in fact not an attractive ideal. She maintains that any moral saint would necessarily live a life dominated by the commitment to improving the welfare of others. Wolf distinguishes between two different models of moral sainthood. The Loving Saint is someone whose happiness consists in the happiness of others. The Rational Saint also pays little attention to her own happiness, instead attaching overriding importance to the concerns of morality. The Rational Saint is committed to doing her moral duty for the sake of her duty. She retains some non-moral and even selfish desires, but, out of duty, does not act on them. Although these different models will appeal to different thinkers-utilitarians will be attracted to the Loving Saint, while Kantians to the Rational Saint-she claims that neither of them presents us with a desirable ideal. What's wrong with moral sainthood? Wolf argues that there are many nonmoral goods in which moral saints would not be willing or able to partake. Moral saints would spend the large majority of their time improving the lives of others, and thus would have little time to read interesting books, or to create or appreciate art, cuisine, or music. Furthermore, as moral saints would take great care not to cause offense, they would be unlikely to have a dry, sarcastic wit, and will hence be rather bland. By passing up on so much, either out of lack of interest or simply an iron will, moral saints seem to miss out on developing "an identifiable, personal self." Wolf claims that although an acceptable moral theory should render the idea of a moral saint coherent, moral sainthood turns out to be a life not worth striving for. Given that we would not wish moral sainthood for our friends, our children, or ourselves, Wolf concludes that morality should play only a limited role in our lives. -According to Wolf, the life of a moral saint would necessarily be dominated by a commitment to:

Susan Wolf: Moral Saints A moral saint, as Wolf defines it, is someone who is as morally good as possible. Although such an ideal might seem worth striving for, Wolf argues that moral sainthood is in fact not an attractive ideal. She maintains that any moral saint would necessarily live a life dominated by the commitment to improving the welfare of others. Wolf distinguishes between two different models of moral sainthood. The Loving Saint is someone whose happiness consists in the happiness of others. The Rational Saint also pays little attention to her own happiness, instead attaching overriding importance to the concerns of morality. The Rational Saint is committed to doing her moral duty for the sake of her duty. She retains some non-moral and even selfish desires, but, out of duty, does not act on them. Although these different models will appeal to different thinkers-utilitarians will be attracted to the Loving Saint, while Kantians to the Rational Saint-she claims that neither of them presents us with a desirable ideal. What's wrong with moral sainthood? Wolf argues that there are many nonmoral goods in which moral saints would not be willing or able to partake. Moral saints would spend the large majority of their time improving the lives of others, and thus would have little time to read interesting books, or to create or appreciate art, cuisine, or music. Furthermore, as moral saints would take great care not to cause offense, they would be unlikely to have a dry, sarcastic wit, and will hence be rather bland. By passing up on so much, either out of lack of interest or simply an iron will, moral saints seem to miss out on developing "an identifiable, personal self." Wolf claims that although an acceptable moral theory should render the idea of a moral saint coherent, moral sainthood turns out to be a life not worth striving for. Given that we would not wish moral sainthood for our friends, our children, or ourselves, Wolf concludes that morality should play only a limited role in our lives. -Wolf claims that it is a fact about our world that each of us has endless opportunities to promote moral interests.

Susan Wolf: Moral Saints A moral saint, as Wolf defines it, is someone who is as morally good as possible. Although such an ideal might seem worth striving for, Wolf argues that moral sainthood is in fact not an attractive ideal. She maintains that any moral saint would necessarily live a life dominated by the commitment to improving the welfare of others. Wolf distinguishes between two different models of moral sainthood. The Loving Saint is someone whose happiness consists in the happiness of others. The Rational Saint also pays little attention to her own happiness, instead attaching overriding importance to the concerns of morality. The Rational Saint is committed to doing her moral duty for the sake of her duty. She retains some non-moral and even selfish desires, but, out of duty, does not act on them. Although these different models will appeal to different thinkers-utilitarians will be attracted to the Loving Saint, while Kantians to the Rational Saint-she claims that neither of them presents us with a desirable ideal. What's wrong with moral sainthood? Wolf argues that there are many nonmoral goods in which moral saints would not be willing or able to partake. Moral saints would spend the large majority of their time improving the lives of others, and thus would have little time to read interesting books, or to create or appreciate art, cuisine, or music. Furthermore, as moral saints would take great care not to cause offense, they would be unlikely to have a dry, sarcastic wit, and will hence be rather bland. By passing up on so much, either out of lack of interest or simply an iron will, moral saints seem to miss out on developing "an identifiable, personal self." Wolf claims that although an acceptable moral theory should render the idea of a moral saint coherent, moral sainthood turns out to be a life not worth striving for. Given that we would not wish moral sainthood for our friends, our children, or ourselves, Wolf concludes that morality should play only a limited role in our lives. -What two models of moral sainthood does Wolf distinguish? To whom does she think each would appeal, and why? Do you find one model more attractive than the other? Defend your answer.

Susan Wolf: Moral Saints A moral saint, as Wolf defines it, is someone who is as morally good as possible. Although such an ideal might seem worth striving for, Wolf argues that moral sainthood is in fact not an attractive ideal. She maintains that any moral saint would necessarily live a life dominated by the commitment to improving the welfare of others. Wolf distinguishes between two different models of moral sainthood. The Loving Saint is someone whose happiness consists in the happiness of others. The Rational Saint also pays little attention to her own happiness, instead attaching overriding importance to the concerns of morality. The Rational Saint is committed to doing her moral duty for the sake of her duty. She retains some non-moral and even selfish desires, but, out of duty, does not act on them. Although these different models will appeal to different thinkers-utilitarians will be attracted to the Loving Saint, while Kantians to the Rational Saint-she claims that neither of them presents us with a desirable ideal. What's wrong with moral sainthood? Wolf argues that there are many nonmoral goods in which moral saints would not be willing or able to partake. Moral saints would spend the large majority of their time improving the lives of others, and thus would have little time to read interesting books, or to create or appreciate art, cuisine, or music. Furthermore, as moral saints would take great care not to cause offense, they would be unlikely to have a dry, sarcastic wit, and will hence be rather bland. By passing up on so much, either out of lack of interest or simply an iron will, moral saints seem to miss out on developing "an identifiable, personal self." Wolf claims that although an acceptable moral theory should render the idea of a moral saint coherent, moral sainthood turns out to be a life not worth striving for. Given that we would not wish moral sainthood for our friends, our children, or ourselves, Wolf concludes that morality should play only a limited role in our lives. -What nonmoral ideals does Wolf endorse, and why does she think they are valuable? How important do you think these are to living a good life?

Susan Wolf: Moral Saints A moral saint, as Wolf defines it, is someone who is as morally good as possible. Although such an ideal might seem worth striving for, Wolf argues that moral sainthood is in fact not an attractive ideal. She maintains that any moral saint would necessarily live a life dominated by the commitment to improving the welfare of others. Wolf distinguishes between two different models of moral sainthood. The Loving Saint is someone whose happiness consists in the happiness of others. The Rational Saint also pays little attention to her own happiness, instead attaching overriding importance to the concerns of morality. The Rational Saint is committed to doing her moral duty for the sake of her duty. She retains some non-moral and even selfish desires, but, out of duty, does not act on them. Although these different models will appeal to different thinkers-utilitarians will be attracted to the Loving Saint, while Kantians to the Rational Saint-she claims that neither of them presents us with a desirable ideal. What's wrong with moral sainthood? Wolf argues that there are many nonmoral goods in which moral saints would not be willing or able to partake. Moral saints would spend the large majority of their time improving the lives of others, and thus would have little time to read interesting books, or to create or appreciate art, cuisine, or music. Furthermore, as moral saints would take great care not to cause offense, they would be unlikely to have a dry, sarcastic wit, and will hence be rather bland. By passing up on so much, either out of lack of interest or simply an iron will, moral saints seem to miss out on developing "an identifiable, personal self." Wolf claims that although an acceptable moral theory should render the idea of a moral saint coherent, moral sainthood turns out to be a life not worth striving for. Given that we would not wish moral sainthood for our friends, our children, or ourselves, Wolf concludes that morality should play only a limited role in our lives. -Wolf claims that when someone devotes his life to moral commitments, we tend to find his slight moral shortcomings and idiosyncrasies: