Exam 58: Thomas Nagel

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -The problem of temporal asymmetry was pointed out by the philosopher:

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -Nagel claims that the value of life attaches to:

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -Nagel claims that it is a mistake to try to imagine what it is like to be dead.

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -In what sense does Nagel think that death is bad? What is his argument for this conclusion? Do you find the argument convincing? Why or why not?

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -Lucretius famously argued that because one is not bothered by the eternity of nonexistence that preceded one's birth, one should not be troubled by death. What does Nagel think is wrong with this argument? Whose view do you find more plausible and why?

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -Some people object that death cannot be bad for a person because after one's death there is simply no person to be harmed. How does Nagel respond to this objection? Do you find his response convincing? Why or why not?

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -Nagel claims that the main objection to death is that it involves long periods of nonexistence.

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -Nagel argues that death is an evil primarily because it:

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -Nagel claims that death cannot be a misfortune because there is no subject to whom that misfortune can be assigned.

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -Write an essay critically examining what you take to be the best argument for the conclusion that death is bad. State the argument in detail, and then discuss what you think is the strongest objection to this argument. Do you think the original argument is sound? Why or why not?

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -Nagel claims that when life contains more negative experiences than positive ones, it is not worth living.

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -According to Nagel, the goods and evils that can befall a person are restricted to nonrelational properties ascribable to him at particular times.

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -According to Nagel, some people find the view that death is bad simply because it deprives a person of the goods of life objectionable on the alleged grounds that:

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -According to Nagel, betrayal is bad because its discovery makes us unhappy.

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -How does Nagel respond to the objection that nothing can be good or bad for a person unless it is experienced as unpleasant? What are the broader implications of his response for the way we think about benefits and harms? Do you find his account plausible?

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -What is the asymmetry objection to the claim that death is bad for us? How does Nagel respond to this objection? Is his response successful in defusing the objection? Defend your answer.

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -According to Nagel, things that we do not experience:

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -According to Nagel, the badness of death is a product, not of its positive features, but of what it deprives us of.

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -Nagel claims that if we set aside the good and bad contents of one's experiences, life is:

Thomas Nagel: Death Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections. The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths. The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect. The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us. -According to Nagel, the time before one is born is time that one is __________, and the time after one's death is time that one is __________.