Exam 10: David Hume

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -What is the relationship between reason and morality, according to Hume? Does Hume think we can know our moral obligations based on reason? Do you think he is correct about this? Why or why not?

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -Hume holds that justice is valuable only because it contributes to utility.

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -Hume claims that our natural sentiments of sympathy extend equally to all people.

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -What is the ultimate source of morality, according to Hume? What are the advantages and disadvantages of such a view? Do you agree with his position? Defend your answer.

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -According to Hume, morality is ultimately based on:

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -Hume claims it is inexplicable how one could infer:

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -Hume claims that virtue is natural, whereas vice is unnatural.

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -Hume claims that reason alone:

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -According to Hume, our passions can be unreasonable only when they are founded on false suppositions.

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -According to Hume:

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -According to Hume, justice:

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -What does Hume mean by sympathy, and what role does this notion play in his moral theory? Does sympathy actually have the moral importance that Hume suggests it has?

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -Hume divides our perceptions into two categories:

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -According to Hume, whatever is produced by a man's industry ought to be secured to him as property.

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -Hume describes artificial virtues as:

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -Hume claims that nothing can oppose the impulse of a passion except:

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -According to Hume, reason can only have an influence on our actions by:

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -Hume defines virtue as:

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -Hume claims that a person who is unaffected by images of human happiness or misery will also be indifferent to:

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -Write an essay critically examining Hume's account of justice. In what circumstances does Hume think justice is relevant? Why does he think justice is valuable? Do you find his account plausible?