Exam 10: David Hume

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -Explain Hume's remarks about the relationship between "is" claims and "ought" claims. What implications do Hume's observations have for moral philosophy?

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -Hume claims that reason is sometimes sufficient to produce moral blame or approbation.

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -In Hume's view, morality is ultimately determined by sentiment.

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -According to Hume, reason:

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -According to Hume, utility is pleasing to us because of our sympathy for others.

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -What does it mean, in Hume's view, to say that an action is wrong, or that a person is virtuous? What does Hume think ultimately grounds our judgments of morality? Does he provide a plausible foundation for morality? Defend your answer.

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -In the Inquiry, Hume claims that our final verdicts on moral matters are derived from:

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -According to Hume, individuals are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to the dictates of reason.

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -Hume claims that moral judgments are not the verdicts of reason. What is his argument for this claim? What do you think is the strongest objection to this argument? Do you think Hume's argument is sound? Why or why not?

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -Hume claims that of all human traits, the most praised is:

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -According to Hume, human sympathy:

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." -Hume states that moral distinctions are the offspring of reason.