Exam 17: H.A.Prichard

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -In Prichard's view, intrinsic goodness of an action lies solely in its motive.

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -In Prichard's view, actions are only truly moral if they are performed from a sense of obligation.

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -Prichard claims that the view that we ought to perform actions because of the goodness that they bring about fails to correspond to our actual moral convictions.

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -According to Prichard, the word "ought" properly applies only to states of affairs, not to actions.

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -Prichard claims that when we say we doubt whether we know something, what we really mean is that we doubt:

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -What two types of answers does Prichard think can be given to the skeptical question "Why should I do the things I've always believed I ought to do?" What problems does he raise for each of these answers?

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -According to Prichard, acting from a sense of obligation:

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -According to utilitarianism, all of our obligations derive from one supreme moral principle: Do whatever brings about the greatest amount of happiness. What objections does Prichard raise to such a principle?

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -According to Prichard, all attempts to prove that we ought to do something invoke either:

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -According to Prichard, moral philosophy involves attempting to prove things that we have previously believed without proof.

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -Explain Prichard's analogy between Moral Philosophy and Theory of Knowledge. With what questions does he think each inquiry begins? What problems does Prichard claim each inquiry faces?

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -Prichard argues that moral knowledge is:

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -Why does Prichard object to the attempt to prove that you ought to do something on the grounds that it will be to your advantage to do so? Do you find his objection plausible?

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -If one were to prove that an action is in one's self-interest, Prichard would say that this would:

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -Prichard claims that a "motive" is what moves us to act.

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -According to Prichard, the claim that we ought to do that which will bring about a good outcome presupposes the idea that:

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -In Prichard's view, when we claim an action is "good," we do so in virtue of:

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -In Prichard's view, for an act to be virtuous, it must be performed:

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -If we doubt whether we have a particular moral obligation, Prichard recommends:

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -Prichard claims that a sense of obligation: