Exam 38: Gilbert Harman

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -What does it mean to give a reduction of one kind of fact to another? Give an example of a plausible reduction. Do you think moral facts are reducible to natural facts? Why or why not?

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -Harman claims a "concept" is what it is by virtue of:

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -According to Harman, mathematics:

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -According to redefinitional naturalism:

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -Harman claims that when we judge something good relative to interests, roles, or functions, such judgments are:

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -Moderate nihilists hold that.:

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -According to moderate nihilism, naturalism misconstrues the function of moral judgment.

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -Harman claims that morality, unlike science, is cut off from observation.

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -Harman claims that observations in science are __________, and that observations in ethics are __________.

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -Harman claims that to explain a particular scientific judgment, we do not need to assume anything about any scientific facts.

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -What is ethical naturalism? How would a functionalist view of moral facts vindicate ethical naturalism? Do you think such a view can succeed? Why or why not?

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -Ethical naturalism is the view that:

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -Explain Harman's two cases of the physicist in the cloud chamber, and the person who discovers hoodlums lighting a cat on fire. In what respects does Harman think the two cases are similar? In what respects does he claim they differ? Do you agree with his assessment?

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -Harman claims that facts about the average American citizen are not reducible to other facts.

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -Harman claims that ethics and science are similar:

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -According to Harman, if we accept naturalism in general we must also accept ethical naturalism.

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -According to Harman, some observations are "theory laden" and others are "pure."

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -According to Harman, it is a factual question whether a particular thing fulfills its function.

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -Harman defines observation as:

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -What is the Open Question Argument, and what does it try to show? What objections does Harman raise to the argument? Do you think Harman's objections are successful? Defend your answer.