Exam 38: Gilbert Harman

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -Harman claims that the open question argument is invalid.

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -Harman claims that ethics is distinctive in that:

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -Some people have claimed that moral standards are in some ways analogous to mathematical facts. What similarities might one point to between the two? What difference does Harman cite between them? Might moral facts be vindicated in the same way that mathematical facts are?

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -According to Harman, any reduction of moral facts to natural facts would have to be complex, vague, and difficult to specify.

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -Harman claims that extreme nihilism is difficult to accept because it implies that:

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -Extreme nihilists hold that:

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -According to Harman, whether an object is a good thing of its kind depends on:

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -Harman argues that we have indirect observational evidence for mathematics.

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -What is moral nihilism? What two versions of nihilism does Harman distinguish? Which do you think is preferable and why?

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -Harman claims the functions of artifacts are determined by:

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -What key difference between ethics and science does Harman claim to have shown? Do you agree that ethics and science are disanalogous in this respect? If so, what implications does this have for ethics?

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims. Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic. -Harman claims that the Open Question Argument: