Exam 21: R.M.Hare

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -In Hare's view, moral judgments are deducible from factual statements about people's inclinations.

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -Hare argues that a moral argument cannot proceed unless the facts of the case are given.

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -Hare defines ethics as:

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -According to Hare, moral judgments are essentially prescriptive.

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -Hare refers to people who endorse ideals without regard for whether people's interests are pursued by them as:

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -Hare maintains that morality provides protection for those who refrain from making moral judgments.

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -Hare claims that the two essential features of the logic of moral judgments are:

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -Hare claims that philosophical ethics is morally neutral in that it does not entail any substantial moral judgments.

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -What similarities does Hare find between scientific investigation and moral inquiry? What differences does he see between the two? Do you find his account of the relationship between science and ethics plausible?

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -Hare claims that one must be prepared to give weight to another's inclinations as if they were:

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -According to Hare, if one were to use "ought" in a way that was not prescriptive, then:

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -Hare claims that it is logically impossible to sincerely endorse genocide.

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -Hare asserts that ethics and science are similar in that:

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -Hare claims that ethics and science are different in that:

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -Hare argues that in order to succeed in rejecting an evaluative proposition, a moral argument necessarily requires:

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -Hare claims that one who refuses to make any positive moral judgments:

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -Hare claims that it is logically possible to want anything.

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -In Hare's example of the debtors, B cannot accept the judgment that he ought to put A in prison because:

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -Hare claims that moral arguments would have no force against a "completely apathetic person." Why is this a consequence of his theory? Do you agree with this claim?

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -According to Hare, if one were to use "ought" in a way that is not universalizable, then: