Exam 21: R.M.Hare

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -What is a "fanatic," in Hare's terminology? To what extent does Hare think it is possible to argue with fanatics?

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -What four "necessary ingredients" does Hare think are required for a moral argument to proceed? Explain each ingredient.

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -Hare claims that once two people agree on the meaning of the term "ought":

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -Describe the case of the debtor that Hare presents, and explain the kind of moral reasoning that goes on in this case. What method does Hare think we ought to use to reason about ethics, generally?

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -Hare claims that moral principles that suggest themselves to us by our:

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -What two alleged features of moral language does Hare claim provide the "logical framework" within which ethical inquiry takes place? Do you agree that moral language has these two features? Why or why not?

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -Hare claims that for there to be genuine moral disagreement the parties must differ over some universal principle about what ought to be done.

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -According to Hare, moral argument is impossible against someone who refuses to make any moral judgments.

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -According to Hare, people with eccentric desires:

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -Hare argues that moral principles can be rationally rejected only on the basis of observation.

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -Hare claims that all moral arguments are:

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x." Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor. In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations. -What does Hare mean when he says that "all moral arguments are ad hominem"? Why is this a consequence of his theory?