Exam 14: Henry Sidgwick

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -According to Sidwick, utilitarians generally agree that our moral concern should extend to the happiness of all beings capable of feeling pleasure and pain.

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -Although Sidwick does not think utilitarianism can be proven in the ordinary sense of the term, he nonetheless claims there are reasons that can lead someone to accept it. What are these reasons? Are they convincing in your view? Why or why not?

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -Sidwick claims that utilitarianism can address the limitations of commonsense morality.

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -According to Sidwick, utilitarians need not extend their moral concern to future generations.

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -Sidwick claims that utilitarianism largely conflicts with commonsense morality.

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -Sidwick calls the faculty of moral cognition:

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -According to Sidwick, Reason aims to discover principles that are:

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -According to Sidwick, moral terms like "right" and "ought" cannot be defined.

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -According to Sidwick, utilitarians often ignore:

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -According to Sidwick moral judgments express:

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -According to Sidwick, the strict impartiality of utilitarianism forbids giving special treatment to our family and friends.

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -According to Sidiwick, utilitarians should impartially consider the happiness of:

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -According to Sidwick, it may be wrong, on utilitarian grounds, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -Sidwick argues that the principle of utility is the only self-evidence moral principle.

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -Sidwick claims that moral notions like "right" and "ought" cannot be defined. Do you think this is true? Why or why not? If not, how do you think these terms might be defined?

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -Sidwick raises the important question of whether the utilitarian should aim at producing the greatest total amount happiness on the whole or the greatest average happiness per person. Which do you think is correct and why?

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -Sidwick argues that despite its insistence on impartiality, utilitarianism can still defend the special treatment we often think it is justified toward our special relations like family and friends. Is Sidwick's argument convincing? Why or why not?

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -According to Sidwick, the special treatment we show to our special relations like family and friends is:

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -One example Sidwick gives of a self-evident moral principle is:

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -Sidwick argues that legal sanctions are insufficient to make immoral behavior always imprudent because: