Exam 14: Henry Sidgwick

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -Following Bentham, Sidwick calls the pleasures consequent to obeying moral rules and the pains consequent to violating them:

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -Sidwick argues that internal sanctions are insufficient to make immoral behavior always imprudent because:

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -Although Sidwick acknowledges that self-evident principles do exist, he claims that they:

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -Sidwick claims that moral terms like "right" and "ought" are:

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -Sidwick suggests that utilitarians should extend their moral concern to all beings capable of feeling pleasure and pain as well as to future generations. Do you think this is correct? Why or why not?

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -Sidwick claims that the existence of external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee that moral conduct will produce the greatest balance of personal happiness for an individual. What is Sidwick's argument for this claim? Is his argument convincing? Why or why not?

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -On Sidwick's view, moral judgments simply affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of behaviors.

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -According to Sidwick, utilitarians must confront the paradoxical conclusion that:

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -According to Sidwick, external and internal sanctions are sufficient to make immoral behavior imprudent in some cases.

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -Of the various methods of ethics considered, the one Sidwick finds most promising is:

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -Regarding commonsense moral rules, Sidwick claims that utilitarianism:

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms. Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases. Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism. -Sidwick claims that moral judgments cannot be understood as expressing nothing more than the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of actions. What is Sidwick's argument for this claim? Is his argument convincing? Why or why not?