Exam 30: Christine Korsgaard

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason. Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter. -According to Korsgaard, being practically rational requires the ability to:

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason. Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter. -Korsgaard claims that the internalism requirement:

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason. Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter. -What is the difference between internalist and externalist moral theories? Which does Korsgaard endorse, and why? Which do you think is preferable?

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason. Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter. -What is true irrationality? Do you think that people are ever truly irrational, in Korsgaard's sense? If so, give an example. If not, why not?

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason. Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter. -Korsgaard's "internalist requirement" states that:

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason. Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter. -According to Korsgaard, what is the relationship between content skepticism and motivational skepticism? Which of these theses does she argue against? Do you think she succeeds?

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason. Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter. -Explain Korsgaard's internalist requirement. Do you think it identifies a plausible constraint on practical reasons? Why or why not?

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason. Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter. -According to Kant's approach to moral philosophy, ethics is based on:

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason. Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter. -According to Korsgaard, intuitionists do not believe in:

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason. Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter. -Korsgaard maintains that the appeal of Kant's approach to ethics comes from:

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason. Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter. -As Korsgaard defines it, content skepticism involves doubts about:

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason. Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter. -Korsgaard claims that there exist some reasons for action that are not capable of motivating rational persons.

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason. Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter. -Korsgaard claims to have shown:

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason. Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter. -In Mill's view, the "ultimate sanction" of the principle of utility is that it is in accordance with our natural social feelings.

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason. Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter. -Korsgaard claims that motivational skepticism involves doubts about:

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason. Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter. -According to Korsgaard, Hume's motivational skepticism is entirely dependent on his content skepticism.

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason. Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter. -Korsgaard claims that on Hume's view, true irrationality is impossible.

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason. Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter. -Explain Williams's distinction between internal and external reasons. Does Korsgaard think that practical reasons are internal or external? Do you agree with her?

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason. Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter. -According to Korsgaard, one possible way of being irrational involves being indifferent to rational considerations when they are pointed out.

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason. Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter. -According to externalist theories of ethics: