Exam 47: Peter Singer

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral. Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion. -Singer claims that his principle:

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral. Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion. -What do you think is the strongest objection to Singer's argument? Do you think this objection can be overcome? Defend your answer.

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral. Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion. -According to Singer, compliance with his principle requires:

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral. Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion. -Singer invokes the principle that we morally ought to prevent bad things from happening, if it is in our power and:

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral. Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion. -One objection to Singer's theory that he considers is that it:

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral. Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion. -Singer claims we cannot discriminate against someone merely because he is far away from us, if:

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral. Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion. -Singer argues that charitable actions are supererogatory.

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral. Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion. -According to Singer, governments:

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral. Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion. -What practical problems does Singer claim his argument faces? How does he respond to these problems? Is his response adequate?

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral. Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion. -According to Singer, what factors does his principle not take into account in determining what we should do? Is this an attractive feature of his principle, or not? Defend your answer.

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral. Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion. -Singer argues that population control efforts are immoral.

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral. Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion. -What effect does Singer think that the acceptance of his principle would have on our moral conceptual scheme? What effects does he think this would have on society? Are these effects desirable? Defend your answer.

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral. Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion. -Singer claims that given the way our world is, it follows from his principle that:

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral. Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion. -Singer claims that his principle is unprecedented in the history of Western philosophy.

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral. Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion. -Singer claims that he introduces the weak version of his principle:

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral. Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion. -According to Singer, the result of everyone doing what he ought to do can be worse than the result of everyone doing less than he ought to do.

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral. Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion. -In response to the argument that famine relief is counterproductive because it leads to overpopulation, Singer claims that:

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral. Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion. -Giving up to marginal utility means:

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral. Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion. -According to Singer, governments as well as individuals should be giving much more money to famine relief.

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral. Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion. -Singer claims that we are required to give money to famine relief: