Exam 47: Peter Singer

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral. Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion. -Singer argues that we all ought to be preventing as much suffering as we can without sacrificing something else of comparable moral importance.

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral. Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion. -Singer claims that affluent people are morally required to give large amounts of money to famine relief. But if everyone were to give large amounts to famine relief, this would generate far more in contributions than necessary, and the results would be worse than if all were to give less. How does Singer deal with this apparent paradox? Do you find his response to be adequate?

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral. Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion. -Singer argues that the correct, strong version of his principle requires giving up our recourses to the point of marginal utility.

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral. Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion. -By "without sacrificing anything of comparable importance" Singer means:

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral. Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion. -Singer claims that proximity does not make any moral difference.

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral. Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion. -What moral principle does Singer invoke to support his argument? What grounds does he give in support of this principle? Do you find the principle to be a plausible one? Why or why not?

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral. Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion. -What two versions of his main moral principle does Singer distinguish? Which version does he think is correct? Which do you think is preferable, and why?