Exam 48: Travis Timmerman

Travis Timmerman: A Reply to Singer In "A Reply to Singer," Travis Timmerman examines Peter's Singer argument for the claim that we are morally obligated to donate most of our expendable income to aid organizations. Timmerman focuses on the second premise of Singer's argument (which states that if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable importance, we ought, morally, to do it), and argues (i) that Singer fails to justify the truth of this premise and (ii) that there are positive reasons to reject it. Singer's defense of his second premise rests on the famous "Drowning Child" thought experiment. According to Singer, our intuitive moral reaction to this thought experiment-that it is wrong not to save the life of a drowning child at the expense of new clothes-shows that we already accept the truth of his premise, at least implicitly. Timmerman disagrees. Because we rarely, if ever, find ourselves in the position Singer describes, our intuitive reaction to the "Drowning Child" case is informed, according to Timmerman, by the implicit assumption that it describes an anomalous, one-off event. Timmerman then points out that an intuitive conviction that it is wrong not to make a single, one-time monetary sacrifice to save the life of a child is not the same as, nor does it entail, the belief that we are obligated to spend our entire lives repeatedly making similar sacrifices, as Singer's premise requires of people in situations like ours. Singer's attempt to justify his second premise-by showing that our moral intuitions reveal we already accept it-therefore fails on Timmerman's view. Timmerman next argues that if we consider a more relevant analogy ("Drowning Children"), in which a person is in a position to save many drowning children everyday over the course of her entire life at comparably insignificant personal cost, our moral intuitions actually conflict with Singer's second premise. Timmerman therefore concludes that not only do our commonsense moral intuitions fail to support Singer's second premise, they also reveal that people positively reject the truth of the premise. -Timmerman admits that according to __________ the "Drowning Children" case may support Singer's second premise.

Travis Timmerman: A Reply to Singer In "A Reply to Singer," Travis Timmerman examines Peter's Singer argument for the claim that we are morally obligated to donate most of our expendable income to aid organizations. Timmerman focuses on the second premise of Singer's argument (which states that if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable importance, we ought, morally, to do it), and argues (i) that Singer fails to justify the truth of this premise and (ii) that there are positive reasons to reject it. Singer's defense of his second premise rests on the famous "Drowning Child" thought experiment. According to Singer, our intuitive moral reaction to this thought experiment-that it is wrong not to save the life of a drowning child at the expense of new clothes-shows that we already accept the truth of his premise, at least implicitly. Timmerman disagrees. Because we rarely, if ever, find ourselves in the position Singer describes, our intuitive reaction to the "Drowning Child" case is informed, according to Timmerman, by the implicit assumption that it describes an anomalous, one-off event. Timmerman then points out that an intuitive conviction that it is wrong not to make a single, one-time monetary sacrifice to save the life of a child is not the same as, nor does it entail, the belief that we are obligated to spend our entire lives repeatedly making similar sacrifices, as Singer's premise requires of people in situations like ours. Singer's attempt to justify his second premise-by showing that our moral intuitions reveal we already accept it-therefore fails on Timmerman's view. Timmerman next argues that if we consider a more relevant analogy ("Drowning Children"), in which a person is in a position to save many drowning children everyday over the course of her entire life at comparably insignificant personal cost, our moral intuitions actually conflict with Singer's second premise. Timmerman therefore concludes that not only do our commonsense moral intuitions fail to support Singer's second premise, they also reveal that people positively reject the truth of the premise. -According to Timmerman, there is reason to believe Singer's second premise is false.

Travis Timmerman: A Reply to Singer In "A Reply to Singer," Travis Timmerman examines Peter's Singer argument for the claim that we are morally obligated to donate most of our expendable income to aid organizations. Timmerman focuses on the second premise of Singer's argument (which states that if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable importance, we ought, morally, to do it), and argues (i) that Singer fails to justify the truth of this premise and (ii) that there are positive reasons to reject it. Singer's defense of his second premise rests on the famous "Drowning Child" thought experiment. According to Singer, our intuitive moral reaction to this thought experiment-that it is wrong not to save the life of a drowning child at the expense of new clothes-shows that we already accept the truth of his premise, at least implicitly. Timmerman disagrees. Because we rarely, if ever, find ourselves in the position Singer describes, our intuitive reaction to the "Drowning Child" case is informed, according to Timmerman, by the implicit assumption that it describes an anomalous, one-off event. Timmerman then points out that an intuitive conviction that it is wrong not to make a single, one-time monetary sacrifice to save the life of a child is not the same as, nor does it entail, the belief that we are obligated to spend our entire lives repeatedly making similar sacrifices, as Singer's premise requires of people in situations like ours. Singer's attempt to justify his second premise-by showing that our moral intuitions reveal we already accept it-therefore fails on Timmerman's view. Timmerman next argues that if we consider a more relevant analogy ("Drowning Children"), in which a person is in a position to save many drowning children everyday over the course of her entire life at comparably insignificant personal cost, our moral intuitions actually conflict with Singer's second premise. Timmerman therefore concludes that not only do our commonsense moral intuitions fail to support Singer's second premise, they also reveal that people positively reject the truth of the premise. -Timmerman agrees with Singer that:

Travis Timmerman: A Reply to Singer In "A Reply to Singer," Travis Timmerman examines Peter's Singer argument for the claim that we are morally obligated to donate most of our expendable income to aid organizations. Timmerman focuses on the second premise of Singer's argument (which states that if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable importance, we ought, morally, to do it), and argues (i) that Singer fails to justify the truth of this premise and (ii) that there are positive reasons to reject it. Singer's defense of his second premise rests on the famous "Drowning Child" thought experiment. According to Singer, our intuitive moral reaction to this thought experiment-that it is wrong not to save the life of a drowning child at the expense of new clothes-shows that we already accept the truth of his premise, at least implicitly. Timmerman disagrees. Because we rarely, if ever, find ourselves in the position Singer describes, our intuitive reaction to the "Drowning Child" case is informed, according to Timmerman, by the implicit assumption that it describes an anomalous, one-off event. Timmerman then points out that an intuitive conviction that it is wrong not to make a single, one-time monetary sacrifice to save the life of a child is not the same as, nor does it entail, the belief that we are obligated to spend our entire lives repeatedly making similar sacrifices, as Singer's premise requires of people in situations like ours. Singer's attempt to justify his second premise-by showing that our moral intuitions reveal we already accept it-therefore fails on Timmerman's view. Timmerman next argues that if we consider a more relevant analogy ("Drowning Children"), in which a person is in a position to save many drowning children everyday over the course of her entire life at comparably insignificant personal cost, our moral intuitions actually conflict with Singer's second premise. Timmerman therefore concludes that not only do our commonsense moral intuitions fail to support Singer's second premise, they also reveal that people positively reject the truth of the premise. -Singer defends the second premise of his argument by appeal to:

Travis Timmerman: A Reply to Singer In "A Reply to Singer," Travis Timmerman examines Peter's Singer argument for the claim that we are morally obligated to donate most of our expendable income to aid organizations. Timmerman focuses on the second premise of Singer's argument (which states that if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable importance, we ought, morally, to do it), and argues (i) that Singer fails to justify the truth of this premise and (ii) that there are positive reasons to reject it. Singer's defense of his second premise rests on the famous "Drowning Child" thought experiment. According to Singer, our intuitive moral reaction to this thought experiment-that it is wrong not to save the life of a drowning child at the expense of new clothes-shows that we already accept the truth of his premise, at least implicitly. Timmerman disagrees. Because we rarely, if ever, find ourselves in the position Singer describes, our intuitive reaction to the "Drowning Child" case is informed, according to Timmerman, by the implicit assumption that it describes an anomalous, one-off event. Timmerman then points out that an intuitive conviction that it is wrong not to make a single, one-time monetary sacrifice to save the life of a child is not the same as, nor does it entail, the belief that we are obligated to spend our entire lives repeatedly making similar sacrifices, as Singer's premise requires of people in situations like ours. Singer's attempt to justify his second premise-by showing that our moral intuitions reveal we already accept it-therefore fails on Timmerman's view. Timmerman next argues that if we consider a more relevant analogy ("Drowning Children"), in which a person is in a position to save many drowning children everyday over the course of her entire life at comparably insignificant personal cost, our moral intuitions actually conflict with Singer's second premise. Timmerman therefore concludes that not only do our commonsense moral intuitions fail to support Singer's second premise, they also reveal that people positively reject the truth of the premise. -Timmerman considers two objections to his argument that could be made on Singer's behalf. Can you think of any other objections Singer might make to Timmerman? What are they?

Travis Timmerman: A Reply to Singer In "A Reply to Singer," Travis Timmerman examines Peter's Singer argument for the claim that we are morally obligated to donate most of our expendable income to aid organizations. Timmerman focuses on the second premise of Singer's argument (which states that if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable importance, we ought, morally, to do it), and argues (i) that Singer fails to justify the truth of this premise and (ii) that there are positive reasons to reject it. Singer's defense of his second premise rests on the famous "Drowning Child" thought experiment. According to Singer, our intuitive moral reaction to this thought experiment-that it is wrong not to save the life of a drowning child at the expense of new clothes-shows that we already accept the truth of his premise, at least implicitly. Timmerman disagrees. Because we rarely, if ever, find ourselves in the position Singer describes, our intuitive reaction to the "Drowning Child" case is informed, according to Timmerman, by the implicit assumption that it describes an anomalous, one-off event. Timmerman then points out that an intuitive conviction that it is wrong not to make a single, one-time monetary sacrifice to save the life of a child is not the same as, nor does it entail, the belief that we are obligated to spend our entire lives repeatedly making similar sacrifices, as Singer's premise requires of people in situations like ours. Singer's attempt to justify his second premise-by showing that our moral intuitions reveal we already accept it-therefore fails on Timmerman's view. Timmerman next argues that if we consider a more relevant analogy ("Drowning Children"), in which a person is in a position to save many drowning children everyday over the course of her entire life at comparably insignificant personal cost, our moral intuitions actually conflict with Singer's second premise. Timmerman therefore concludes that not only do our commonsense moral intuitions fail to support Singer's second premise, they also reveal that people positively reject the truth of the premise. -According to Timmerman, Singer's argument may be convincing to an impartial consequentialist.

Travis Timmerman: A Reply to Singer In "A Reply to Singer," Travis Timmerman examines Peter's Singer argument for the claim that we are morally obligated to donate most of our expendable income to aid organizations. Timmerman focuses on the second premise of Singer's argument (which states that if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable importance, we ought, morally, to do it), and argues (i) that Singer fails to justify the truth of this premise and (ii) that there are positive reasons to reject it. Singer's defense of his second premise rests on the famous "Drowning Child" thought experiment. According to Singer, our intuitive moral reaction to this thought experiment-that it is wrong not to save the life of a drowning child at the expense of new clothes-shows that we already accept the truth of his premise, at least implicitly. Timmerman disagrees. Because we rarely, if ever, find ourselves in the position Singer describes, our intuitive reaction to the "Drowning Child" case is informed, according to Timmerman, by the implicit assumption that it describes an anomalous, one-off event. Timmerman then points out that an intuitive conviction that it is wrong not to make a single, one-time monetary sacrifice to save the life of a child is not the same as, nor does it entail, the belief that we are obligated to spend our entire lives repeatedly making similar sacrifices, as Singer's premise requires of people in situations like ours. Singer's attempt to justify his second premise-by showing that our moral intuitions reveal we already accept it-therefore fails on Timmerman's view. Timmerman next argues that if we consider a more relevant analogy ("Drowning Children"), in which a person is in a position to save many drowning children everyday over the course of her entire life at comparably insignificant personal cost, our moral intuitions actually conflict with Singer's second premise. Timmerman therefore concludes that not only do our commonsense moral intuitions fail to support Singer's second premise, they also reveal that people positively reject the truth of the premise. -If the situation described in Singer's "Drowning Child" case were not an anomalous, one-off event, would that change your intuitive reaction to it? Why or why not?

Travis Timmerman: A Reply to Singer In "A Reply to Singer," Travis Timmerman examines Peter's Singer argument for the claim that we are morally obligated to donate most of our expendable income to aid organizations. Timmerman focuses on the second premise of Singer's argument (which states that if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable importance, we ought, morally, to do it), and argues (i) that Singer fails to justify the truth of this premise and (ii) that there are positive reasons to reject it. Singer's defense of his second premise rests on the famous "Drowning Child" thought experiment. According to Singer, our intuitive moral reaction to this thought experiment-that it is wrong not to save the life of a drowning child at the expense of new clothes-shows that we already accept the truth of his premise, at least implicitly. Timmerman disagrees. Because we rarely, if ever, find ourselves in the position Singer describes, our intuitive reaction to the "Drowning Child" case is informed, according to Timmerman, by the implicit assumption that it describes an anomalous, one-off event. Timmerman then points out that an intuitive conviction that it is wrong not to make a single, one-time monetary sacrifice to save the life of a child is not the same as, nor does it entail, the belief that we are obligated to spend our entire lives repeatedly making similar sacrifices, as Singer's premise requires of people in situations like ours. Singer's attempt to justify his second premise-by showing that our moral intuitions reveal we already accept it-therefore fails on Timmerman's view. Timmerman next argues that if we consider a more relevant analogy ("Drowning Children"), in which a person is in a position to save many drowning children everyday over the course of her entire life at comparably insignificant personal cost, our moral intuitions actually conflict with Singer's second premise. Timmerman therefore concludes that not only do our commonsense moral intuitions fail to support Singer's second premise, they also reveal that people positively reject the truth of the premise. -According to Timmerman, commonsense morality permits us, at least sometimes, to forgo preventing something bad from happening in order to enjoy something that is, by comparison, morally insignificant. How does Timmerman defend this claim? Are you convinced by his defense? Why or why not?

Travis Timmerman: A Reply to Singer In "A Reply to Singer," Travis Timmerman examines Peter's Singer argument for the claim that we are morally obligated to donate most of our expendable income to aid organizations. Timmerman focuses on the second premise of Singer's argument (which states that if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable importance, we ought, morally, to do it), and argues (i) that Singer fails to justify the truth of this premise and (ii) that there are positive reasons to reject it. Singer's defense of his second premise rests on the famous "Drowning Child" thought experiment. According to Singer, our intuitive moral reaction to this thought experiment-that it is wrong not to save the life of a drowning child at the expense of new clothes-shows that we already accept the truth of his premise, at least implicitly. Timmerman disagrees. Because we rarely, if ever, find ourselves in the position Singer describes, our intuitive reaction to the "Drowning Child" case is informed, according to Timmerman, by the implicit assumption that it describes an anomalous, one-off event. Timmerman then points out that an intuitive conviction that it is wrong not to make a single, one-time monetary sacrifice to save the life of a child is not the same as, nor does it entail, the belief that we are obligated to spend our entire lives repeatedly making similar sacrifices, as Singer's premise requires of people in situations like ours. Singer's attempt to justify his second premise-by showing that our moral intuitions reveal we already accept it-therefore fails on Timmerman's view. Timmerman next argues that if we consider a more relevant analogy ("Drowning Children"), in which a person is in a position to save many drowning children everyday over the course of her entire life at comparably insignificant personal cost, our moral intuitions actually conflict with Singer's second premise. Timmerman therefore concludes that not only do our commonsense moral intuitions fail to support Singer's second premise, they also reveal that people positively reject the truth of the premise. -Timmerman claims that commonsense morality would not require saving as many children as possible in the "Drowning Child" case. Do you agree with Timmerman about that? Why or why not?

Travis Timmerman: A Reply to Singer In "A Reply to Singer," Travis Timmerman examines Peter's Singer argument for the claim that we are morally obligated to donate most of our expendable income to aid organizations. Timmerman focuses on the second premise of Singer's argument (which states that if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable importance, we ought, morally, to do it), and argues (i) that Singer fails to justify the truth of this premise and (ii) that there are positive reasons to reject it. Singer's defense of his second premise rests on the famous "Drowning Child" thought experiment. According to Singer, our intuitive moral reaction to this thought experiment-that it is wrong not to save the life of a drowning child at the expense of new clothes-shows that we already accept the truth of his premise, at least implicitly. Timmerman disagrees. Because we rarely, if ever, find ourselves in the position Singer describes, our intuitive reaction to the "Drowning Child" case is informed, according to Timmerman, by the implicit assumption that it describes an anomalous, one-off event. Timmerman then points out that an intuitive conviction that it is wrong not to make a single, one-time monetary sacrifice to save the life of a child is not the same as, nor does it entail, the belief that we are obligated to spend our entire lives repeatedly making similar sacrifices, as Singer's premise requires of people in situations like ours. Singer's attempt to justify his second premise-by showing that our moral intuitions reveal we already accept it-therefore fails on Timmerman's view. Timmerman next argues that if we consider a more relevant analogy ("Drowning Children"), in which a person is in a position to save many drowning children everyday over the course of her entire life at comparably insignificant personal cost, our moral intuitions actually conflict with Singer's second premise. Timmerman therefore concludes that not only do our commonsense moral intuitions fail to support Singer's second premise, they also reveal that people positively reject the truth of the premise. -According to Timmerman, Singer's argument is unsound.

Travis Timmerman: A Reply to Singer In "A Reply to Singer," Travis Timmerman examines Peter's Singer argument for the claim that we are morally obligated to donate most of our expendable income to aid organizations. Timmerman focuses on the second premise of Singer's argument (which states that if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable importance, we ought, morally, to do it), and argues (i) that Singer fails to justify the truth of this premise and (ii) that there are positive reasons to reject it. Singer's defense of his second premise rests on the famous "Drowning Child" thought experiment. According to Singer, our intuitive moral reaction to this thought experiment-that it is wrong not to save the life of a drowning child at the expense of new clothes-shows that we already accept the truth of his premise, at least implicitly. Timmerman disagrees. Because we rarely, if ever, find ourselves in the position Singer describes, our intuitive reaction to the "Drowning Child" case is informed, according to Timmerman, by the implicit assumption that it describes an anomalous, one-off event. Timmerman then points out that an intuitive conviction that it is wrong not to make a single, one-time monetary sacrifice to save the life of a child is not the same as, nor does it entail, the belief that we are obligated to spend our entire lives repeatedly making similar sacrifices, as Singer's premise requires of people in situations like ours. Singer's attempt to justify his second premise-by showing that our moral intuitions reveal we already accept it-therefore fails on Timmerman's view. Timmerman next argues that if we consider a more relevant analogy ("Drowning Children"), in which a person is in a position to save many drowning children everyday over the course of her entire life at comparably insignificant personal cost, our moral intuitions actually conflict with Singer's second premise. Timmerman therefore concludes that not only do our commonsense moral intuitions fail to support Singer's second premise, they also reveal that people positively reject the truth of the premise. -At the conclusion of his article, Timmerman considers two objections to his criticism of Singer. Does Timmerman respond to these objections convincingly? Why or why not?

Travis Timmerman: A Reply to Singer In "A Reply to Singer," Travis Timmerman examines Peter's Singer argument for the claim that we are morally obligated to donate most of our expendable income to aid organizations. Timmerman focuses on the second premise of Singer's argument (which states that if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable importance, we ought, morally, to do it), and argues (i) that Singer fails to justify the truth of this premise and (ii) that there are positive reasons to reject it. Singer's defense of his second premise rests on the famous "Drowning Child" thought experiment. According to Singer, our intuitive moral reaction to this thought experiment-that it is wrong not to save the life of a drowning child at the expense of new clothes-shows that we already accept the truth of his premise, at least implicitly. Timmerman disagrees. Because we rarely, if ever, find ourselves in the position Singer describes, our intuitive reaction to the "Drowning Child" case is informed, according to Timmerman, by the implicit assumption that it describes an anomalous, one-off event. Timmerman then points out that an intuitive conviction that it is wrong not to make a single, one-time monetary sacrifice to save the life of a child is not the same as, nor does it entail, the belief that we are obligated to spend our entire lives repeatedly making similar sacrifices, as Singer's premise requires of people in situations like ours. Singer's attempt to justify his second premise-by showing that our moral intuitions reveal we already accept it-therefore fails on Timmerman's view. Timmerman next argues that if we consider a more relevant analogy ("Drowning Children"), in which a person is in a position to save many drowning children everyday over the course of her entire life at comparably insignificant personal cost, our moral intuitions actually conflict with Singer's second premise. Timmerman therefore concludes that not only do our commonsense moral intuitions fail to support Singer's second premise, they also reveal that people positively reject the truth of the premise. -Timmerman argues that his "Drowning Children" case presents a much more realistic scenario than Singer's "Drowning Child" case.

Travis Timmerman: A Reply to Singer In "A Reply to Singer," Travis Timmerman examines Peter's Singer argument for the claim that we are morally obligated to donate most of our expendable income to aid organizations. Timmerman focuses on the second premise of Singer's argument (which states that if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable importance, we ought, morally, to do it), and argues (i) that Singer fails to justify the truth of this premise and (ii) that there are positive reasons to reject it. Singer's defense of his second premise rests on the famous "Drowning Child" thought experiment. According to Singer, our intuitive moral reaction to this thought experiment-that it is wrong not to save the life of a drowning child at the expense of new clothes-shows that we already accept the truth of his premise, at least implicitly. Timmerman disagrees. Because we rarely, if ever, find ourselves in the position Singer describes, our intuitive reaction to the "Drowning Child" case is informed, according to Timmerman, by the implicit assumption that it describes an anomalous, one-off event. Timmerman then points out that an intuitive conviction that it is wrong not to make a single, one-time monetary sacrifice to save the life of a child is not the same as, nor does it entail, the belief that we are obligated to spend our entire lives repeatedly making similar sacrifices, as Singer's premise requires of people in situations like ours. Singer's attempt to justify his second premise-by showing that our moral intuitions reveal we already accept it-therefore fails on Timmerman's view. Timmerman next argues that if we consider a more relevant analogy ("Drowning Children"), in which a person is in a position to save many drowning children everyday over the course of her entire life at comparably insignificant personal cost, our moral intuitions actually conflict with Singer's second premise. Timmerman therefore concludes that not only do our commonsense moral intuitions fail to support Singer's second premise, they also reveal that people positively reject the truth of the premise. -Timmerman claims that Singer fails to provide an adequate justification for his second premise. How does Timmerman argue for this claim? Is his argument convincing? Why or why not?

Travis Timmerman: A Reply to Singer In "A Reply to Singer," Travis Timmerman examines Peter's Singer argument for the claim that we are morally obligated to donate most of our expendable income to aid organizations. Timmerman focuses on the second premise of Singer's argument (which states that if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable importance, we ought, morally, to do it), and argues (i) that Singer fails to justify the truth of this premise and (ii) that there are positive reasons to reject it. Singer's defense of his second premise rests on the famous "Drowning Child" thought experiment. According to Singer, our intuitive moral reaction to this thought experiment-that it is wrong not to save the life of a drowning child at the expense of new clothes-shows that we already accept the truth of his premise, at least implicitly. Timmerman disagrees. Because we rarely, if ever, find ourselves in the position Singer describes, our intuitive reaction to the "Drowning Child" case is informed, according to Timmerman, by the implicit assumption that it describes an anomalous, one-off event. Timmerman then points out that an intuitive conviction that it is wrong not to make a single, one-time monetary sacrifice to save the life of a child is not the same as, nor does it entail, the belief that we are obligated to spend our entire lives repeatedly making similar sacrifices, as Singer's premise requires of people in situations like ours. Singer's attempt to justify his second premise-by showing that our moral intuitions reveal we already accept it-therefore fails on Timmerman's view. Timmerman next argues that if we consider a more relevant analogy ("Drowning Children"), in which a person is in a position to save many drowning children everyday over the course of her entire life at comparably insignificant personal cost, our moral intuitions actually conflict with Singer's second premise. Timmerman therefore concludes that not only do our commonsense moral intuitions fail to support Singer's second premise, they also reveal that people positively reject the truth of the premise. -According to Timmerman, the problem with Singer's "Drowning Child" case is that it:

Travis Timmerman: A Reply to Singer In "A Reply to Singer," Travis Timmerman examines Peter's Singer argument for the claim that we are morally obligated to donate most of our expendable income to aid organizations. Timmerman focuses on the second premise of Singer's argument (which states that if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable importance, we ought, morally, to do it), and argues (i) that Singer fails to justify the truth of this premise and (ii) that there are positive reasons to reject it. Singer's defense of his second premise rests on the famous "Drowning Child" thought experiment. According to Singer, our intuitive moral reaction to this thought experiment-that it is wrong not to save the life of a drowning child at the expense of new clothes-shows that we already accept the truth of his premise, at least implicitly. Timmerman disagrees. Because we rarely, if ever, find ourselves in the position Singer describes, our intuitive reaction to the "Drowning Child" case is informed, according to Timmerman, by the implicit assumption that it describes an anomalous, one-off event. Timmerman then points out that an intuitive conviction that it is wrong not to make a single, one-time monetary sacrifice to save the life of a child is not the same as, nor does it entail, the belief that we are obligated to spend our entire lives repeatedly making similar sacrifices, as Singer's premise requires of people in situations like ours. Singer's attempt to justify his second premise-by showing that our moral intuitions reveal we already accept it-therefore fails on Timmerman's view. Timmerman next argues that if we consider a more relevant analogy ("Drowning Children"), in which a person is in a position to save many drowning children everyday over the course of her entire life at comparably insignificant personal cost, our moral intuitions actually conflict with Singer's second premise. Timmerman therefore concludes that not only do our commonsense moral intuitions fail to support Singer's second premise, they also reveal that people positively reject the truth of the premise. -Timmerman claims that there is reason to believe Singer's second premise is false. How does Timmerman argue for this claim? Is his argument convincing? Why or why not?

Travis Timmerman: A Reply to Singer In "A Reply to Singer," Travis Timmerman examines Peter's Singer argument for the claim that we are morally obligated to donate most of our expendable income to aid organizations. Timmerman focuses on the second premise of Singer's argument (which states that if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable importance, we ought, morally, to do it), and argues (i) that Singer fails to justify the truth of this premise and (ii) that there are positive reasons to reject it. Singer's defense of his second premise rests on the famous "Drowning Child" thought experiment. According to Singer, our intuitive moral reaction to this thought experiment-that it is wrong not to save the life of a drowning child at the expense of new clothes-shows that we already accept the truth of his premise, at least implicitly. Timmerman disagrees. Because we rarely, if ever, find ourselves in the position Singer describes, our intuitive reaction to the "Drowning Child" case is informed, according to Timmerman, by the implicit assumption that it describes an anomalous, one-off event. Timmerman then points out that an intuitive conviction that it is wrong not to make a single, one-time monetary sacrifice to save the life of a child is not the same as, nor does it entail, the belief that we are obligated to spend our entire lives repeatedly making similar sacrifices, as Singer's premise requires of people in situations like ours. Singer's attempt to justify his second premise-by showing that our moral intuitions reveal we already accept it-therefore fails on Timmerman's view. Timmerman next argues that if we consider a more relevant analogy ("Drowning Children"), in which a person is in a position to save many drowning children everyday over the course of her entire life at comparably insignificant personal cost, our moral intuitions actually conflict with Singer's second premise. Timmerman therefore concludes that not only do our commonsense moral intuitions fail to support Singer's second premise, they also reveal that people positively reject the truth of the premise. -According to Timmerman, the "Drowning Children" case is more __________ than Singer's "Drowning Child" case.

Travis Timmerman: A Reply to Singer In "A Reply to Singer," Travis Timmerman examines Peter's Singer argument for the claim that we are morally obligated to donate most of our expendable income to aid organizations. Timmerman focuses on the second premise of Singer's argument (which states that if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable importance, we ought, morally, to do it), and argues (i) that Singer fails to justify the truth of this premise and (ii) that there are positive reasons to reject it. Singer's defense of his second premise rests on the famous "Drowning Child" thought experiment. According to Singer, our intuitive moral reaction to this thought experiment-that it is wrong not to save the life of a drowning child at the expense of new clothes-shows that we already accept the truth of his premise, at least implicitly. Timmerman disagrees. Because we rarely, if ever, find ourselves in the position Singer describes, our intuitive reaction to the "Drowning Child" case is informed, according to Timmerman, by the implicit assumption that it describes an anomalous, one-off event. Timmerman then points out that an intuitive conviction that it is wrong not to make a single, one-time monetary sacrifice to save the life of a child is not the same as, nor does it entail, the belief that we are obligated to spend our entire lives repeatedly making similar sacrifices, as Singer's premise requires of people in situations like ours. Singer's attempt to justify his second premise-by showing that our moral intuitions reveal we already accept it-therefore fails on Timmerman's view. Timmerman next argues that if we consider a more relevant analogy ("Drowning Children"), in which a person is in a position to save many drowning children everyday over the course of her entire life at comparably insignificant personal cost, our moral intuitions actually conflict with Singer's second premise. Timmerman therefore concludes that not only do our commonsense moral intuitions fail to support Singer's second premise, they also reveal that people positively reject the truth of the premise. -According to Singer's view, the "Drowning Child" case shows that:

Travis Timmerman: A Reply to Singer In "A Reply to Singer," Travis Timmerman examines Peter's Singer argument for the claim that we are morally obligated to donate most of our expendable income to aid organizations. Timmerman focuses on the second premise of Singer's argument (which states that if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable importance, we ought, morally, to do it), and argues (i) that Singer fails to justify the truth of this premise and (ii) that there are positive reasons to reject it. Singer's defense of his second premise rests on the famous "Drowning Child" thought experiment. According to Singer, our intuitive moral reaction to this thought experiment-that it is wrong not to save the life of a drowning child at the expense of new clothes-shows that we already accept the truth of his premise, at least implicitly. Timmerman disagrees. Because we rarely, if ever, find ourselves in the position Singer describes, our intuitive reaction to the "Drowning Child" case is informed, according to Timmerman, by the implicit assumption that it describes an anomalous, one-off event. Timmerman then points out that an intuitive conviction that it is wrong not to make a single, one-time monetary sacrifice to save the life of a child is not the same as, nor does it entail, the belief that we are obligated to spend our entire lives repeatedly making similar sacrifices, as Singer's premise requires of people in situations like ours. Singer's attempt to justify his second premise-by showing that our moral intuitions reveal we already accept it-therefore fails on Timmerman's view. Timmerman next argues that if we consider a more relevant analogy ("Drowning Children"), in which a person is in a position to save many drowning children everyday over the course of her entire life at comparably insignificant personal cost, our moral intuitions actually conflict with Singer's second premise. Timmerman therefore concludes that not only do our commonsense moral intuitions fail to support Singer's second premise, they also reveal that people positively reject the truth of the premise. -In Timmerman's view, donating most of our income to aid agencies is:

Travis Timmerman: A Reply to Singer In "A Reply to Singer," Travis Timmerman examines Peter's Singer argument for the claim that we are morally obligated to donate most of our expendable income to aid organizations. Timmerman focuses on the second premise of Singer's argument (which states that if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable importance, we ought, morally, to do it), and argues (i) that Singer fails to justify the truth of this premise and (ii) that there are positive reasons to reject it. Singer's defense of his second premise rests on the famous "Drowning Child" thought experiment. According to Singer, our intuitive moral reaction to this thought experiment-that it is wrong not to save the life of a drowning child at the expense of new clothes-shows that we already accept the truth of his premise, at least implicitly. Timmerman disagrees. Because we rarely, if ever, find ourselves in the position Singer describes, our intuitive reaction to the "Drowning Child" case is informed, according to Timmerman, by the implicit assumption that it describes an anomalous, one-off event. Timmerman then points out that an intuitive conviction that it is wrong not to make a single, one-time monetary sacrifice to save the life of a child is not the same as, nor does it entail, the belief that we are obligated to spend our entire lives repeatedly making similar sacrifices, as Singer's premise requires of people in situations like ours. Singer's attempt to justify his second premise-by showing that our moral intuitions reveal we already accept it-therefore fails on Timmerman's view. Timmerman next argues that if we consider a more relevant analogy ("Drowning Children"), in which a person is in a position to save many drowning children everyday over the course of her entire life at comparably insignificant personal cost, our moral intuitions actually conflict with Singer's second premise. Timmerman therefore concludes that not only do our commonsense moral intuitions fail to support Singer's second premise, they also reveal that people positively reject the truth of the premise. -Timmerman disagrees with Singer that:

Travis Timmerman: A Reply to Singer In "A Reply to Singer," Travis Timmerman examines Peter's Singer argument for the claim that we are morally obligated to donate most of our expendable income to aid organizations. Timmerman focuses on the second premise of Singer's argument (which states that if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable importance, we ought, morally, to do it), and argues (i) that Singer fails to justify the truth of this premise and (ii) that there are positive reasons to reject it. Singer's defense of his second premise rests on the famous "Drowning Child" thought experiment. According to Singer, our intuitive moral reaction to this thought experiment-that it is wrong not to save the life of a drowning child at the expense of new clothes-shows that we already accept the truth of his premise, at least implicitly. Timmerman disagrees. Because we rarely, if ever, find ourselves in the position Singer describes, our intuitive reaction to the "Drowning Child" case is informed, according to Timmerman, by the implicit assumption that it describes an anomalous, one-off event. Timmerman then points out that an intuitive conviction that it is wrong not to make a single, one-time monetary sacrifice to save the life of a child is not the same as, nor does it entail, the belief that we are obligated to spend our entire lives repeatedly making similar sacrifices, as Singer's premise requires of people in situations like ours. Singer's attempt to justify his second premise-by showing that our moral intuitions reveal we already accept it-therefore fails on Timmerman's view. Timmerman next argues that if we consider a more relevant analogy ("Drowning Children"), in which a person is in a position to save many drowning children everyday over the course of her entire life at comparably insignificant personal cost, our moral intuitions actually conflict with Singer's second premise. Timmerman therefore concludes that not only do our commonsense moral intuitions fail to support Singer's second premise, they also reveal that people positively reject the truth of the premise. -Timmerman believes our moral intuitions are necessarily reliable.