Exam 28: Barbara Herman

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -Herman claims that in Kant's view, when we act from the motive of duty we are:

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -Herman claims that nonmoral motives can produce moral dutiful actions only fortuitously.

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -Herman claims that when we are considering actions that are permissible but not obligatory, the motive of duty can serve as:

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -Herman claims that if the motive of duty is effective and motivating, then the presence of a nonmoral inclination:

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -Can overdetermined actions have moral worth or not? Explain your answer.

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -As Kant sees it, moral deliberation characteristically begins with:

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -What objections does Herman raise to the idea that actions performed from entirely nonmoral motives can have moral worth? Do you find these objections convincing? Why or why not?

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -Kant claims that an act has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty.

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -According to Kant, under what circumstances does an action have moral worth? What implications of this view have people found troubling? Do you find Kant's view plausible? Why or why not?

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -According to Kant, the good will is good because of the effects it produces.

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -Herman claims that if an agent does not have an effective and motivating moral interest in an action, there remains a dependence on interests that compromises the agent's ability to act morally.

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -Kant introduces the concept of moral worth as part of the account of:

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -According to Herman, Kant's cases of good willing are set up as cases:

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -According to the "fitness report" model of moral worth, a dutiful act has moral worth:

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -According to Herman's interpretation of Kant, the only actions that can have moral worth are those that are:

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -According to Herman's interpretation of Kant, an action can be done from the motive of duty even if the agent has a nonmoral desire to perform it.

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -According to Herman, even sympathetic readers of Kant have been troubled by:

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -In Kant's shopkeeper example, Kant believes that the shopkeeper's action has moral worth.

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -Herman claims that in Kant's view, motives are best understood as:

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -According to Herman's interpretation of Kant, the mere presence of a nonmoral motivation is sufficient to indicate a lack of moral worth.