Exam 28: Barbara Herman

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -Herman claims that the class of actions that follow from the inclination to help others:

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -What is Kant's conception of motives and how does it differ from empiricist accounts of motives? What roles does Kant's theory of motives in Herman's argument?

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -According to Herman's interpretation of Kant, overdetermined actions can have moral worth.

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -Herman claims that for Kant, merely permissible actions cannot have moral worth.

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -What is the "motive of duty"? How does Kant think the motive of duty relates to moral worth? Why has his view been controversial?

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -Herman claims that an action can have moral worth if it is overdetermined with respect to:

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -In Kant's view, moral worth is a property of:

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -Explain the "fitness report" and "battle citation" models of moral worth. What problems does Herman raise for these models? How serious are these problems for the views?

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -According to the "battle citation" model of moral worth, a dutiful act has moral worth:

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -What does it mean to say that the motive of duty functions as a "limiting condition"? Can actions on which the motive of duty serves as a limiting condition have moral worth, on Kant's view? Why or why not?

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -In Herman's view, for a motive to be a moral motive, it must provide the agent with an interest in the moral rightness of his or her action.

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view. Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy. But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth. Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them. -Herman believes that Kant accepts: