Exam 41: Mary Midgley

Mary Midgley: Trying Out One's New Sword Midgley argues against a view she calls moral isolationism, which holds that we cannot understand cultures other than our own well enough to make moral judgments about them. Many people, Midgley notes, accept moral isolationism on grounds of respect and tolerance. But, according to Midgley, not only is this wrong it is entirely wrongheaded. To test moral isolationism, Midgley introduces a custom from ancient Japanese culture. Needing to test if their newly crafted swords could cut through a person in a single blow, samurai would slice wayfarers in half. The moral isolationist is committed to holding that, given our lack of understanding of ancient Japanese culture, respect and tolerance demand we refrain from judging the samurai's testing practices. But this verdict is, Midgley argues, mistaken on a number of fronts. First, to respect people we have to know enough about them to make a favorable judgment. Hence, Midgley maintains, the moral isolationist cannot ground her isolationism on both a lack of understanding and respect. Moreover, understanding occurs gradually; it is not all or nothing. Second, moral isolationism, Midgley claims, would undercut moral reasoning as such. For if we cannot judge other cultures, we cannot judge our own. Other societies provide the range of relevant comparison. Our moral reasoning, Midgley maintains, is made possible by looking to the practices of others. Accordingly, moral isolationism leads to a kind of moral mental suicide. Abandoning moral isolationism, however, does not come at a high cost. We already, Midgley notes, try to justify the behavior of those we only barely understand. For example, many people's initial reaction is to try and justify the samurai's behavior. But attempting this kind of justification is an implicit denial of moral isolationism. In addition, nearly every culture is a hodgepodge of different influences, and we nonetheless morally engage with our own culture. In short, Midgley concludes that moral isolationism is untenable and the costs of giving it up are not high. -Midgley claims moral reasoning requires the possibility of judging the practices of other societies. What argument does Midgley supply to justify this claim? Do you find her argument plausible? Defend your answer.

Mary Midgley: Trying Out One's New Sword Midgley argues against a view she calls moral isolationism, which holds that we cannot understand cultures other than our own well enough to make moral judgments about them. Many people, Midgley notes, accept moral isolationism on grounds of respect and tolerance. But, according to Midgley, not only is this wrong it is entirely wrongheaded. To test moral isolationism, Midgley introduces a custom from ancient Japanese culture. Needing to test if their newly crafted swords could cut through a person in a single blow, samurai would slice wayfarers in half. The moral isolationist is committed to holding that, given our lack of understanding of ancient Japanese culture, respect and tolerance demand we refrain from judging the samurai's testing practices. But this verdict is, Midgley argues, mistaken on a number of fronts. First, to respect people we have to know enough about them to make a favorable judgment. Hence, Midgley maintains, the moral isolationist cannot ground her isolationism on both a lack of understanding and respect. Moreover, understanding occurs gradually; it is not all or nothing. Second, moral isolationism, Midgley claims, would undercut moral reasoning as such. For if we cannot judge other cultures, we cannot judge our own. Other societies provide the range of relevant comparison. Our moral reasoning, Midgley maintains, is made possible by looking to the practices of others. Accordingly, moral isolationism leads to a kind of moral mental suicide. Abandoning moral isolationism, however, does not come at a high cost. We already, Midgley notes, try to justify the behavior of those we only barely understand. For example, many people's initial reaction is to try and justify the samurai's behavior. But attempting this kind of justification is an implicit denial of moral isolationism. In addition, nearly every culture is a hodgepodge of different influences, and we nonetheless morally engage with our own culture. In short, Midgley concludes that moral isolationism is untenable and the costs of giving it up are not high. -In Midgley's view, we may need to praise things which we do not fully understand.

Mary Midgley: Trying Out One's New Sword Midgley argues against a view she calls moral isolationism, which holds that we cannot understand cultures other than our own well enough to make moral judgments about them. Many people, Midgley notes, accept moral isolationism on grounds of respect and tolerance. But, according to Midgley, not only is this wrong it is entirely wrongheaded. To test moral isolationism, Midgley introduces a custom from ancient Japanese culture. Needing to test if their newly crafted swords could cut through a person in a single blow, samurai would slice wayfarers in half. The moral isolationist is committed to holding that, given our lack of understanding of ancient Japanese culture, respect and tolerance demand we refrain from judging the samurai's testing practices. But this verdict is, Midgley argues, mistaken on a number of fronts. First, to respect people we have to know enough about them to make a favorable judgment. Hence, Midgley maintains, the moral isolationist cannot ground her isolationism on both a lack of understanding and respect. Moreover, understanding occurs gradually; it is not all or nothing. Second, moral isolationism, Midgley claims, would undercut moral reasoning as such. For if we cannot judge other cultures, we cannot judge our own. Other societies provide the range of relevant comparison. Our moral reasoning, Midgley maintains, is made possible by looking to the practices of others. Accordingly, moral isolationism leads to a kind of moral mental suicide. Abandoning moral isolationism, however, does not come at a high cost. We already, Midgley notes, try to justify the behavior of those we only barely understand. For example, many people's initial reaction is to try and justify the samurai's behavior. But attempting this kind of justification is an implicit denial of moral isolationism. In addition, nearly every culture is a hodgepodge of different influences, and we nonetheless morally engage with our own culture. In short, Midgley concludes that moral isolationism is untenable and the costs of giving it up are not high. -Midgley holds that "judging" means:

Mary Midgley: Trying Out One's New Sword Midgley argues against a view she calls moral isolationism, which holds that we cannot understand cultures other than our own well enough to make moral judgments about them. Many people, Midgley notes, accept moral isolationism on grounds of respect and tolerance. But, according to Midgley, not only is this wrong it is entirely wrongheaded. To test moral isolationism, Midgley introduces a custom from ancient Japanese culture. Needing to test if their newly crafted swords could cut through a person in a single blow, samurai would slice wayfarers in half. The moral isolationist is committed to holding that, given our lack of understanding of ancient Japanese culture, respect and tolerance demand we refrain from judging the samurai's testing practices. But this verdict is, Midgley argues, mistaken on a number of fronts. First, to respect people we have to know enough about them to make a favorable judgment. Hence, Midgley maintains, the moral isolationist cannot ground her isolationism on both a lack of understanding and respect. Moreover, understanding occurs gradually; it is not all or nothing. Second, moral isolationism, Midgley claims, would undercut moral reasoning as such. For if we cannot judge other cultures, we cannot judge our own. Other societies provide the range of relevant comparison. Our moral reasoning, Midgley maintains, is made possible by looking to the practices of others. Accordingly, moral isolationism leads to a kind of moral mental suicide. Abandoning moral isolationism, however, does not come at a high cost. We already, Midgley notes, try to justify the behavior of those we only barely understand. For example, many people's initial reaction is to try and justify the samurai's behavior. But attempting this kind of justification is an implicit denial of moral isolationism. In addition, nearly every culture is a hodgepodge of different influences, and we nonetheless morally engage with our own culture. In short, Midgley concludes that moral isolationism is untenable and the costs of giving it up are not high. -Midgley asserts that if we cannot judge other cultures, we cannot judge our own. What reasons does she provide to support this assertion? Do you find these reasons plausible? Why or why not?

Mary Midgley: Trying Out One's New Sword Midgley argues against a view she calls moral isolationism, which holds that we cannot understand cultures other than our own well enough to make moral judgments about them. Many people, Midgley notes, accept moral isolationism on grounds of respect and tolerance. But, according to Midgley, not only is this wrong it is entirely wrongheaded. To test moral isolationism, Midgley introduces a custom from ancient Japanese culture. Needing to test if their newly crafted swords could cut through a person in a single blow, samurai would slice wayfarers in half. The moral isolationist is committed to holding that, given our lack of understanding of ancient Japanese culture, respect and tolerance demand we refrain from judging the samurai's testing practices. But this verdict is, Midgley argues, mistaken on a number of fronts. First, to respect people we have to know enough about them to make a favorable judgment. Hence, Midgley maintains, the moral isolationist cannot ground her isolationism on both a lack of understanding and respect. Moreover, understanding occurs gradually; it is not all or nothing. Second, moral isolationism, Midgley claims, would undercut moral reasoning as such. For if we cannot judge other cultures, we cannot judge our own. Other societies provide the range of relevant comparison. Our moral reasoning, Midgley maintains, is made possible by looking to the practices of others. Accordingly, moral isolationism leads to a kind of moral mental suicide. Abandoning moral isolationism, however, does not come at a high cost. We already, Midgley notes, try to justify the behavior of those we only barely understand. For example, many people's initial reaction is to try and justify the samurai's behavior. But attempting this kind of justification is an implicit denial of moral isolationism. In addition, nearly every culture is a hodgepodge of different influences, and we nonetheless morally engage with our own culture. In short, Midgley concludes that moral isolationism is untenable and the costs of giving it up are not high. -According to Midgley, to respect people we have to know enough about them to make a favorable judgment. Do you think this claim is correct? Why or why not?

Mary Midgley: Trying Out One's New Sword Midgley argues against a view she calls moral isolationism, which holds that we cannot understand cultures other than our own well enough to make moral judgments about them. Many people, Midgley notes, accept moral isolationism on grounds of respect and tolerance. But, according to Midgley, not only is this wrong it is entirely wrongheaded. To test moral isolationism, Midgley introduces a custom from ancient Japanese culture. Needing to test if their newly crafted swords could cut through a person in a single blow, samurai would slice wayfarers in half. The moral isolationist is committed to holding that, given our lack of understanding of ancient Japanese culture, respect and tolerance demand we refrain from judging the samurai's testing practices. But this verdict is, Midgley argues, mistaken on a number of fronts. First, to respect people we have to know enough about them to make a favorable judgment. Hence, Midgley maintains, the moral isolationist cannot ground her isolationism on both a lack of understanding and respect. Moreover, understanding occurs gradually; it is not all or nothing. Second, moral isolationism, Midgley claims, would undercut moral reasoning as such. For if we cannot judge other cultures, we cannot judge our own. Other societies provide the range of relevant comparison. Our moral reasoning, Midgley maintains, is made possible by looking to the practices of others. Accordingly, moral isolationism leads to a kind of moral mental suicide. Abandoning moral isolationism, however, does not come at a high cost. We already, Midgley notes, try to justify the behavior of those we only barely understand. For example, many people's initial reaction is to try and justify the samurai's behavior. But attempting this kind of justification is an implicit denial of moral isolationism. In addition, nearly every culture is a hodgepodge of different influences, and we nonetheless morally engage with our own culture. In short, Midgley concludes that moral isolationism is untenable and the costs of giving it up are not high. -According to Midgley, moral isolationism robs us of the chance of profiting by other people's insights or mistakes.

Mary Midgley: Trying Out One's New Sword Midgley argues against a view she calls moral isolationism, which holds that we cannot understand cultures other than our own well enough to make moral judgments about them. Many people, Midgley notes, accept moral isolationism on grounds of respect and tolerance. But, according to Midgley, not only is this wrong it is entirely wrongheaded. To test moral isolationism, Midgley introduces a custom from ancient Japanese culture. Needing to test if their newly crafted swords could cut through a person in a single blow, samurai would slice wayfarers in half. The moral isolationist is committed to holding that, given our lack of understanding of ancient Japanese culture, respect and tolerance demand we refrain from judging the samurai's testing practices. But this verdict is, Midgley argues, mistaken on a number of fronts. First, to respect people we have to know enough about them to make a favorable judgment. Hence, Midgley maintains, the moral isolationist cannot ground her isolationism on both a lack of understanding and respect. Moreover, understanding occurs gradually; it is not all or nothing. Second, moral isolationism, Midgley claims, would undercut moral reasoning as such. For if we cannot judge other cultures, we cannot judge our own. Other societies provide the range of relevant comparison. Our moral reasoning, Midgley maintains, is made possible by looking to the practices of others. Accordingly, moral isolationism leads to a kind of moral mental suicide. Abandoning moral isolationism, however, does not come at a high cost. We already, Midgley notes, try to justify the behavior of those we only barely understand. For example, many people's initial reaction is to try and justify the samurai's behavior. But attempting this kind of justification is an implicit denial of moral isolationism. In addition, nearly every culture is a hodgepodge of different influences, and we nonetheless morally engage with our own culture. In short, Midgley concludes that moral isolationism is untenable and the costs of giving it up are not high. -Midgley holds that we are rightly angry with those who:

Mary Midgley: Trying Out One's New Sword Midgley argues against a view she calls moral isolationism, which holds that we cannot understand cultures other than our own well enough to make moral judgments about them. Many people, Midgley notes, accept moral isolationism on grounds of respect and tolerance. But, according to Midgley, not only is this wrong it is entirely wrongheaded. To test moral isolationism, Midgley introduces a custom from ancient Japanese culture. Needing to test if their newly crafted swords could cut through a person in a single blow, samurai would slice wayfarers in half. The moral isolationist is committed to holding that, given our lack of understanding of ancient Japanese culture, respect and tolerance demand we refrain from judging the samurai's testing practices. But this verdict is, Midgley argues, mistaken on a number of fronts. First, to respect people we have to know enough about them to make a favorable judgment. Hence, Midgley maintains, the moral isolationist cannot ground her isolationism on both a lack of understanding and respect. Moreover, understanding occurs gradually; it is not all or nothing. Second, moral isolationism, Midgley claims, would undercut moral reasoning as such. For if we cannot judge other cultures, we cannot judge our own. Other societies provide the range of relevant comparison. Our moral reasoning, Midgley maintains, is made possible by looking to the practices of others. Accordingly, moral isolationism leads to a kind of moral mental suicide. Abandoning moral isolationism, however, does not come at a high cost. We already, Midgley notes, try to justify the behavior of those we only barely understand. For example, many people's initial reaction is to try and justify the samurai's behavior. But attempting this kind of justification is an implicit denial of moral isolationism. In addition, nearly every culture is a hodgepodge of different influences, and we nonetheless morally engage with our own culture. In short, Midgley concludes that moral isolationism is untenable and the costs of giving it up are not high. -Midgley notes that nearly all cultures are the product of a number of different influences. Does this claim call into question moral isolationism? Even if a moral isolationist grants this claim, might she still maintain her position?

Mary Midgley: Trying Out One's New Sword Midgley argues against a view she calls moral isolationism, which holds that we cannot understand cultures other than our own well enough to make moral judgments about them. Many people, Midgley notes, accept moral isolationism on grounds of respect and tolerance. But, according to Midgley, not only is this wrong it is entirely wrongheaded. To test moral isolationism, Midgley introduces a custom from ancient Japanese culture. Needing to test if their newly crafted swords could cut through a person in a single blow, samurai would slice wayfarers in half. The moral isolationist is committed to holding that, given our lack of understanding of ancient Japanese culture, respect and tolerance demand we refrain from judging the samurai's testing practices. But this verdict is, Midgley argues, mistaken on a number of fronts. First, to respect people we have to know enough about them to make a favorable judgment. Hence, Midgley maintains, the moral isolationist cannot ground her isolationism on both a lack of understanding and respect. Moreover, understanding occurs gradually; it is not all or nothing. Second, moral isolationism, Midgley claims, would undercut moral reasoning as such. For if we cannot judge other cultures, we cannot judge our own. Other societies provide the range of relevant comparison. Our moral reasoning, Midgley maintains, is made possible by looking to the practices of others. Accordingly, moral isolationism leads to a kind of moral mental suicide. Abandoning moral isolationism, however, does not come at a high cost. We already, Midgley notes, try to justify the behavior of those we only barely understand. For example, many people's initial reaction is to try and justify the samurai's behavior. But attempting this kind of justification is an implicit denial of moral isolationism. In addition, nearly every culture is a hodgepodge of different influences, and we nonetheless morally engage with our own culture. In short, Midgley concludes that moral isolationism is untenable and the costs of giving it up are not high. -Midgley claims that moral skepticism could lead only to our losing all interest in moral questions, most of all in those which concern other societies.

Mary Midgley: Trying Out One's New Sword Midgley argues against a view she calls moral isolationism, which holds that we cannot understand cultures other than our own well enough to make moral judgments about them. Many people, Midgley notes, accept moral isolationism on grounds of respect and tolerance. But, according to Midgley, not only is this wrong it is entirely wrongheaded. To test moral isolationism, Midgley introduces a custom from ancient Japanese culture. Needing to test if their newly crafted swords could cut through a person in a single blow, samurai would slice wayfarers in half. The moral isolationist is committed to holding that, given our lack of understanding of ancient Japanese culture, respect and tolerance demand we refrain from judging the samurai's testing practices. But this verdict is, Midgley argues, mistaken on a number of fronts. First, to respect people we have to know enough about them to make a favorable judgment. Hence, Midgley maintains, the moral isolationist cannot ground her isolationism on both a lack of understanding and respect. Moreover, understanding occurs gradually; it is not all or nothing. Second, moral isolationism, Midgley claims, would undercut moral reasoning as such. For if we cannot judge other cultures, we cannot judge our own. Other societies provide the range of relevant comparison. Our moral reasoning, Midgley maintains, is made possible by looking to the practices of others. Accordingly, moral isolationism leads to a kind of moral mental suicide. Abandoning moral isolationism, however, does not come at a high cost. We already, Midgley notes, try to justify the behavior of those we only barely understand. For example, many people's initial reaction is to try and justify the samurai's behavior. But attempting this kind of justification is an implicit denial of moral isolationism. In addition, nearly every culture is a hodgepodge of different influences, and we nonetheless morally engage with our own culture. In short, Midgley concludes that moral isolationism is untenable and the costs of giving it up are not high. -What, according to Midgley, is moral isolationism? What are the merits of moral isolationism? Do you think a version of this position is immune to Midgley's attacks? Explain your answer.

Mary Midgley: Trying Out One's New Sword Midgley argues against a view she calls moral isolationism, which holds that we cannot understand cultures other than our own well enough to make moral judgments about them. Many people, Midgley notes, accept moral isolationism on grounds of respect and tolerance. But, according to Midgley, not only is this wrong it is entirely wrongheaded. To test moral isolationism, Midgley introduces a custom from ancient Japanese culture. Needing to test if their newly crafted swords could cut through a person in a single blow, samurai would slice wayfarers in half. The moral isolationist is committed to holding that, given our lack of understanding of ancient Japanese culture, respect and tolerance demand we refrain from judging the samurai's testing practices. But this verdict is, Midgley argues, mistaken on a number of fronts. First, to respect people we have to know enough about them to make a favorable judgment. Hence, Midgley maintains, the moral isolationist cannot ground her isolationism on both a lack of understanding and respect. Moreover, understanding occurs gradually; it is not all or nothing. Second, moral isolationism, Midgley claims, would undercut moral reasoning as such. For if we cannot judge other cultures, we cannot judge our own. Other societies provide the range of relevant comparison. Our moral reasoning, Midgley maintains, is made possible by looking to the practices of others. Accordingly, moral isolationism leads to a kind of moral mental suicide. Abandoning moral isolationism, however, does not come at a high cost. We already, Midgley notes, try to justify the behavior of those we only barely understand. For example, many people's initial reaction is to try and justify the samurai's behavior. But attempting this kind of justification is an implicit denial of moral isolationism. In addition, nearly every culture is a hodgepodge of different influences, and we nonetheless morally engage with our own culture. In short, Midgley concludes that moral isolationism is untenable and the costs of giving it up are not high. -According to Midgley, we can come to see other societies better by:

Mary Midgley: Trying Out One's New Sword Midgley argues against a view she calls moral isolationism, which holds that we cannot understand cultures other than our own well enough to make moral judgments about them. Many people, Midgley notes, accept moral isolationism on grounds of respect and tolerance. But, according to Midgley, not only is this wrong it is entirely wrongheaded. To test moral isolationism, Midgley introduces a custom from ancient Japanese culture. Needing to test if their newly crafted swords could cut through a person in a single blow, samurai would slice wayfarers in half. The moral isolationist is committed to holding that, given our lack of understanding of ancient Japanese culture, respect and tolerance demand we refrain from judging the samurai's testing practices. But this verdict is, Midgley argues, mistaken on a number of fronts. First, to respect people we have to know enough about them to make a favorable judgment. Hence, Midgley maintains, the moral isolationist cannot ground her isolationism on both a lack of understanding and respect. Moreover, understanding occurs gradually; it is not all or nothing. Second, moral isolationism, Midgley claims, would undercut moral reasoning as such. For if we cannot judge other cultures, we cannot judge our own. Other societies provide the range of relevant comparison. Our moral reasoning, Midgley maintains, is made possible by looking to the practices of others. Accordingly, moral isolationism leads to a kind of moral mental suicide. Abandoning moral isolationism, however, does not come at a high cost. We already, Midgley notes, try to justify the behavior of those we only barely understand. For example, many people's initial reaction is to try and justify the samurai's behavior. But attempting this kind of justification is an implicit denial of moral isolationism. In addition, nearly every culture is a hodgepodge of different influences, and we nonetheless morally engage with our own culture. In short, Midgley concludes that moral isolationism is untenable and the costs of giving it up are not high. -Midgley maintains that if we accept something as a serious moral truth about one culture:

Mary Midgley: Trying Out One's New Sword Midgley argues against a view she calls moral isolationism, which holds that we cannot understand cultures other than our own well enough to make moral judgments about them. Many people, Midgley notes, accept moral isolationism on grounds of respect and tolerance. But, according to Midgley, not only is this wrong it is entirely wrongheaded. To test moral isolationism, Midgley introduces a custom from ancient Japanese culture. Needing to test if their newly crafted swords could cut through a person in a single blow, samurai would slice wayfarers in half. The moral isolationist is committed to holding that, given our lack of understanding of ancient Japanese culture, respect and tolerance demand we refrain from judging the samurai's testing practices. But this verdict is, Midgley argues, mistaken on a number of fronts. First, to respect people we have to know enough about them to make a favorable judgment. Hence, Midgley maintains, the moral isolationist cannot ground her isolationism on both a lack of understanding and respect. Moreover, understanding occurs gradually; it is not all or nothing. Second, moral isolationism, Midgley claims, would undercut moral reasoning as such. For if we cannot judge other cultures, we cannot judge our own. Other societies provide the range of relevant comparison. Our moral reasoning, Midgley maintains, is made possible by looking to the practices of others. Accordingly, moral isolationism leads to a kind of moral mental suicide. Abandoning moral isolationism, however, does not come at a high cost. We already, Midgley notes, try to justify the behavior of those we only barely understand. For example, many people's initial reaction is to try and justify the samurai's behavior. But attempting this kind of justification is an implicit denial of moral isolationism. In addition, nearly every culture is a hodgepodge of different influences, and we nonetheless morally engage with our own culture. In short, Midgley concludes that moral isolationism is untenable and the costs of giving it up are not high. -Midgley asserts that moral isolationism flows from apathy.

Mary Midgley: Trying Out One's New Sword Midgley argues against a view she calls moral isolationism, which holds that we cannot understand cultures other than our own well enough to make moral judgments about them. Many people, Midgley notes, accept moral isolationism on grounds of respect and tolerance. But, according to Midgley, not only is this wrong it is entirely wrongheaded. To test moral isolationism, Midgley introduces a custom from ancient Japanese culture. Needing to test if their newly crafted swords could cut through a person in a single blow, samurai would slice wayfarers in half. The moral isolationist is committed to holding that, given our lack of understanding of ancient Japanese culture, respect and tolerance demand we refrain from judging the samurai's testing practices. But this verdict is, Midgley argues, mistaken on a number of fronts. First, to respect people we have to know enough about them to make a favorable judgment. Hence, Midgley maintains, the moral isolationist cannot ground her isolationism on both a lack of understanding and respect. Moreover, understanding occurs gradually; it is not all or nothing. Second, moral isolationism, Midgley claims, would undercut moral reasoning as such. For if we cannot judge other cultures, we cannot judge our own. Other societies provide the range of relevant comparison. Our moral reasoning, Midgley maintains, is made possible by looking to the practices of others. Accordingly, moral isolationism leads to a kind of moral mental suicide. Abandoning moral isolationism, however, does not come at a high cost. We already, Midgley notes, try to justify the behavior of those we only barely understand. For example, many people's initial reaction is to try and justify the samurai's behavior. But attempting this kind of justification is an implicit denial of moral isolationism. In addition, nearly every culture is a hodgepodge of different influences, and we nonetheless morally engage with our own culture. In short, Midgley concludes that moral isolationism is untenable and the costs of giving it up are not high. -Midgley claims that when we judge something to be bad or good, better or worse than something else:

Mary Midgley: Trying Out One's New Sword Midgley argues against a view she calls moral isolationism, which holds that we cannot understand cultures other than our own well enough to make moral judgments about them. Many people, Midgley notes, accept moral isolationism on grounds of respect and tolerance. But, according to Midgley, not only is this wrong it is entirely wrongheaded. To test moral isolationism, Midgley introduces a custom from ancient Japanese culture. Needing to test if their newly crafted swords could cut through a person in a single blow, samurai would slice wayfarers in half. The moral isolationist is committed to holding that, given our lack of understanding of ancient Japanese culture, respect and tolerance demand we refrain from judging the samurai's testing practices. But this verdict is, Midgley argues, mistaken on a number of fronts. First, to respect people we have to know enough about them to make a favorable judgment. Hence, Midgley maintains, the moral isolationist cannot ground her isolationism on both a lack of understanding and respect. Moreover, understanding occurs gradually; it is not all or nothing. Second, moral isolationism, Midgley claims, would undercut moral reasoning as such. For if we cannot judge other cultures, we cannot judge our own. Other societies provide the range of relevant comparison. Our moral reasoning, Midgley maintains, is made possible by looking to the practices of others. Accordingly, moral isolationism leads to a kind of moral mental suicide. Abandoning moral isolationism, however, does not come at a high cost. We already, Midgley notes, try to justify the behavior of those we only barely understand. For example, many people's initial reaction is to try and justify the samurai's behavior. But attempting this kind of justification is an implicit denial of moral isolationism. In addition, nearly every culture is a hodgepodge of different influences, and we nonetheless morally engage with our own culture. In short, Midgley concludes that moral isolationism is untenable and the costs of giving it up are not high. -According to Midgley, we could not condemn insolence if we thought that:

Mary Midgley: Trying Out One's New Sword Midgley argues against a view she calls moral isolationism, which holds that we cannot understand cultures other than our own well enough to make moral judgments about them. Many people, Midgley notes, accept moral isolationism on grounds of respect and tolerance. But, according to Midgley, not only is this wrong it is entirely wrongheaded. To test moral isolationism, Midgley introduces a custom from ancient Japanese culture. Needing to test if their newly crafted swords could cut through a person in a single blow, samurai would slice wayfarers in half. The moral isolationist is committed to holding that, given our lack of understanding of ancient Japanese culture, respect and tolerance demand we refrain from judging the samurai's testing practices. But this verdict is, Midgley argues, mistaken on a number of fronts. First, to respect people we have to know enough about them to make a favorable judgment. Hence, Midgley maintains, the moral isolationist cannot ground her isolationism on both a lack of understanding and respect. Moreover, understanding occurs gradually; it is not all or nothing. Second, moral isolationism, Midgley claims, would undercut moral reasoning as such. For if we cannot judge other cultures, we cannot judge our own. Other societies provide the range of relevant comparison. Our moral reasoning, Midgley maintains, is made possible by looking to the practices of others. Accordingly, moral isolationism leads to a kind of moral mental suicide. Abandoning moral isolationism, however, does not come at a high cost. We already, Midgley notes, try to justify the behavior of those we only barely understand. For example, many people's initial reaction is to try and justify the samurai's behavior. But attempting this kind of justification is an implicit denial of moral isolationism. In addition, nearly every culture is a hodgepodge of different influences, and we nonetheless morally engage with our own culture. In short, Midgley concludes that moral isolationism is untenable and the costs of giving it up are not high. -Midgley claims that we fully understand our own culture

Mary Midgley: Trying Out One's New Sword Midgley argues against a view she calls moral isolationism, which holds that we cannot understand cultures other than our own well enough to make moral judgments about them. Many people, Midgley notes, accept moral isolationism on grounds of respect and tolerance. But, according to Midgley, not only is this wrong it is entirely wrongheaded. To test moral isolationism, Midgley introduces a custom from ancient Japanese culture. Needing to test if their newly crafted swords could cut through a person in a single blow, samurai would slice wayfarers in half. The moral isolationist is committed to holding that, given our lack of understanding of ancient Japanese culture, respect and tolerance demand we refrain from judging the samurai's testing practices. But this verdict is, Midgley argues, mistaken on a number of fronts. First, to respect people we have to know enough about them to make a favorable judgment. Hence, Midgley maintains, the moral isolationist cannot ground her isolationism on both a lack of understanding and respect. Moreover, understanding occurs gradually; it is not all or nothing. Second, moral isolationism, Midgley claims, would undercut moral reasoning as such. For if we cannot judge other cultures, we cannot judge our own. Other societies provide the range of relevant comparison. Our moral reasoning, Midgley maintains, is made possible by looking to the practices of others. Accordingly, moral isolationism leads to a kind of moral mental suicide. Abandoning moral isolationism, however, does not come at a high cost. We already, Midgley notes, try to justify the behavior of those we only barely understand. For example, many people's initial reaction is to try and justify the samurai's behavior. But attempting this kind of justification is an implicit denial of moral isolationism. In addition, nearly every culture is a hodgepodge of different influences, and we nonetheless morally engage with our own culture. In short, Midgley concludes that moral isolationism is untenable and the costs of giving it up are not high. -According to Midgley, people normally adopt moral isolationism because they think it is a respectful attitude to other cultures.

Mary Midgley: Trying Out One's New Sword Midgley argues against a view she calls moral isolationism, which holds that we cannot understand cultures other than our own well enough to make moral judgments about them. Many people, Midgley notes, accept moral isolationism on grounds of respect and tolerance. But, according to Midgley, not only is this wrong it is entirely wrongheaded. To test moral isolationism, Midgley introduces a custom from ancient Japanese culture. Needing to test if their newly crafted swords could cut through a person in a single blow, samurai would slice wayfarers in half. The moral isolationist is committed to holding that, given our lack of understanding of ancient Japanese culture, respect and tolerance demand we refrain from judging the samurai's testing practices. But this verdict is, Midgley argues, mistaken on a number of fronts. First, to respect people we have to know enough about them to make a favorable judgment. Hence, Midgley maintains, the moral isolationist cannot ground her isolationism on both a lack of understanding and respect. Moreover, understanding occurs gradually; it is not all or nothing. Second, moral isolationism, Midgley claims, would undercut moral reasoning as such. For if we cannot judge other cultures, we cannot judge our own. Other societies provide the range of relevant comparison. Our moral reasoning, Midgley maintains, is made possible by looking to the practices of others. Accordingly, moral isolationism leads to a kind of moral mental suicide. Abandoning moral isolationism, however, does not come at a high cost. We already, Midgley notes, try to justify the behavior of those we only barely understand. For example, many people's initial reaction is to try and justify the samurai's behavior. But attempting this kind of justification is an implicit denial of moral isolationism. In addition, nearly every culture is a hodgepodge of different influences, and we nonetheless morally engage with our own culture. In short, Midgley concludes that moral isolationism is untenable and the costs of giving it up are not high. -Midgley defines "moral isolationism" as the view that:

Mary Midgley: Trying Out One's New Sword Midgley argues against a view she calls moral isolationism, which holds that we cannot understand cultures other than our own well enough to make moral judgments about them. Many people, Midgley notes, accept moral isolationism on grounds of respect and tolerance. But, according to Midgley, not only is this wrong it is entirely wrongheaded. To test moral isolationism, Midgley introduces a custom from ancient Japanese culture. Needing to test if their newly crafted swords could cut through a person in a single blow, samurai would slice wayfarers in half. The moral isolationist is committed to holding that, given our lack of understanding of ancient Japanese culture, respect and tolerance demand we refrain from judging the samurai's testing practices. But this verdict is, Midgley argues, mistaken on a number of fronts. First, to respect people we have to know enough about them to make a favorable judgment. Hence, Midgley maintains, the moral isolationist cannot ground her isolationism on both a lack of understanding and respect. Moreover, understanding occurs gradually; it is not all or nothing. Second, moral isolationism, Midgley claims, would undercut moral reasoning as such. For if we cannot judge other cultures, we cannot judge our own. Other societies provide the range of relevant comparison. Our moral reasoning, Midgley maintains, is made possible by looking to the practices of others. Accordingly, moral isolationism leads to a kind of moral mental suicide. Abandoning moral isolationism, however, does not come at a high cost. We already, Midgley notes, try to justify the behavior of those we only barely understand. For example, many people's initial reaction is to try and justify the samurai's behavior. But attempting this kind of justification is an implicit denial of moral isolationism. In addition, nearly every culture is a hodgepodge of different influences, and we nonetheless morally engage with our own culture. In short, Midgley concludes that moral isolationism is untenable and the costs of giving it up are not high. -Midgley maintains that moral isolationism would lay down a general ban on:

Mary Midgley: Trying Out One's New Sword Midgley argues against a view she calls moral isolationism, which holds that we cannot understand cultures other than our own well enough to make moral judgments about them. Many people, Midgley notes, accept moral isolationism on grounds of respect and tolerance. But, according to Midgley, not only is this wrong it is entirely wrongheaded. To test moral isolationism, Midgley introduces a custom from ancient Japanese culture. Needing to test if their newly crafted swords could cut through a person in a single blow, samurai would slice wayfarers in half. The moral isolationist is committed to holding that, given our lack of understanding of ancient Japanese culture, respect and tolerance demand we refrain from judging the samurai's testing practices. But this verdict is, Midgley argues, mistaken on a number of fronts. First, to respect people we have to know enough about them to make a favorable judgment. Hence, Midgley maintains, the moral isolationist cannot ground her isolationism on both a lack of understanding and respect. Moreover, understanding occurs gradually; it is not all or nothing. Second, moral isolationism, Midgley claims, would undercut moral reasoning as such. For if we cannot judge other cultures, we cannot judge our own. Other societies provide the range of relevant comparison. Our moral reasoning, Midgley maintains, is made possible by looking to the practices of others. Accordingly, moral isolationism leads to a kind of moral mental suicide. Abandoning moral isolationism, however, does not come at a high cost. We already, Midgley notes, try to justify the behavior of those we only barely understand. For example, many people's initial reaction is to try and justify the samurai's behavior. But attempting this kind of justification is an implicit denial of moral isolationism. In addition, nearly every culture is a hodgepodge of different influences, and we nonetheless morally engage with our own culture. In short, Midgley concludes that moral isolationism is untenable and the costs of giving it up are not high. -Midgley claims that nobody can respect what is entirely unintelligible to them.