Exam 22: J.J.C.Smart

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not. Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred. -Describe Smart's watering gardens case. Does extreme or restricted utilitarianism yield the more plausible verdict? Explain your answer.

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not. Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred. -Smart maintains that either restricted utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship, or it collapses into extreme utilitarianism.

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not. Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred. -According to Smart, the extreme utilitarian would apply the hypothetical form of the universalization principle.

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not. Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred. -Smart claims that, for the extreme utilitarian, moral rules are:

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not. Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred. -How, according to Smart, does the extreme utilitarian rely on rules? Does this push the extreme utilitarian toward restricted utilitarianism? Use Smart's example of the rules of the road in explaining your answer.

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not. Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred. -Smart argues that if we continue to follow a rule when we know that in this instance to break it will have better results:

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not. Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred. -Smart claims that when we perform the right action:

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not. Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred. -What is the main divide between extreme and restricted utilitarianism? What are strengths and weaknesses of each position? Does one of the views of a clear theoretical advantage? Why or why not?

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not. Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred. -According to Smart, the restricted utilitarian relies on acts:

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not. Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred. -According to Smart, there is a distinction between the utility of the action and the utility of the praise of it. What does Smart mean by this claim, and what are its implications? Do you think this distinction is sustainable?

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not. Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred. -According to Smart, an extreme utilitarian may praise actions which he knows to be wrong.

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not. Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred. -Smart claims that the reason to obey the rule to drive on a particular side of the road is:

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not. Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred. -Smart conceives of ethics as:

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not. Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred. -Smart argues that if a rule to act-optimifically were added to the set of rules endorsed by restricted utilitarianism, restricted utilitarianism would collapse into extreme utilitarianism. Is Smart right about this? Defend your answer.

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not. Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred. -Describe the case of the desert-island promise that Smart presents. Does extreme or restricted utilitarianism yield the more plausible verdict about whether to keep the promise? Explain your answer.

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not. Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred. -Smart relies on "the common moral consciousness" to decide between extreme and restricted utilitarianism.

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not. Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred. -Smart claims that restricted utilitarianism:

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not. Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred. -Smart claims that hedonistic utilitarianism holds that the goodness of the consequences of an action is a function only of its pleasurableness.

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not. Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred. -According to Smart, we should break the desert-island promise.

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not. Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred. -Smart argues that people will probably most often act in an extreme utilitarian way if they do not try to think as extreme utilitarians.