Exam 16: G.E.Moore

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -What does Moore claim is "the most fundamental question in all Ethics"? What is his answer to this question and how does he argue for it? Do you find his position to be plausible? Why or why not?

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Question 1

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G. E. Moore claims that the most fundamental question in all Ethics is the question of what goodness is. His answer to this question is that goodness is a simple, indefinable quality that cannot be reduced to any natural property, such as happiness or pleasure. Moore argues for this position by using the open question argument, which demonstrates that any proposed definition of goodness can always be questioned, showing that goodness cannot be identical to any natural property.

Moore's position is plausible in that it challenges the assumption that goodness can be reduced to something else, such as pleasure or desire. His argument that goodness is a simple, unanalyzable concept is compelling, as it aligns with our intuitive understanding of the nature of goodness. Additionally, the open question argument effectively demonstrates the limitations of defining goodness in terms of natural properties.

However, some may find Moore's position to be problematic in that it leaves the concept of goodness somewhat mysterious and unexplainable. Without a clear definition of goodness, it may be difficult to make moral judgments or provide a foundation for ethical theories. Additionally, Moore's rejection of naturalistic definitions of goodness may limit the scope of ethical inquiry and overlook the potential connections between goodness and natural properties.

Overall, while Moore's position on the nature of goodness is thought-provoking and challenges traditional assumptions, it may also raise questions about the practical implications and limitations of his view.

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -According to Moore, what do "good" and "yellow" have in common? How do they differ from other concepts, like "horse"? Do you agree with Moore about this?

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Question 2

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G. E. Moore's "Principia Ethica" is a seminal work in moral philosophy, particularly known for its rigorous analysis of the concept of "good." According to Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to understand the nature of goodness. However, Moore argues that "good" is a unique kind of concept that resists the kind of definition that can be applied to most other terms.

Moore suggests that "good" is a simple, indefinable quality. He likens it to the concept of "yellow" in that both are simple concepts that cannot be broken down into component parts. When we try to explain what "yellow" is to someone, we cannot do so by defining it in terms of other colors; instead, we can only point to examples of yellow things or experiences of seeing yellow. Similarly, "good" is a basic concept that one understands through acquaintance rather than through a definition that refers to other concepts.

The commonality between "good" and "yellow," according to Moore, is that they are both simple and indefinable. They are understood through direct experience rather than through a composite of other qualities. This is in contrast to concepts like "horse," which can be defined by pointing to a set of characteristics that horses typically possess, such as being a four-legged mammal with a specific shape, size, and so on.

Moore's distinction between "good" and other concepts is crucial to his argument against what he calls the naturalistic fallacy. This fallacy occurs when philosophers attempt to define "good" in terms of natural properties, such as pleasure or desire. Moore's open question argument is designed to show that any attempt to equate "good" with a natural property fails because it is always an open question whether that property is indeed good. For example, if someone defines "good" as "what is pleasurable," we can still sensibly ask, "Is what is pleasurable always good?" This indicates that "good" and "pleasure" are not identical, as the former cannot be reduced to the latter.

In contrast, "horse" does not share this indefinability. If we define "horse" as a certain kind of animal, it is not an open question whether a horse is that kind of animal; it is a closed question because the definition captures the essence of what a horse is.

Whether one agrees with Moore's analysis depends on one's philosophical perspective. Some may argue that Moore's insistence on the indefinability of "good" is too strict and that moral properties can be understood in terms of natural or psychological properties. Others may find Moore's approach compelling, as it preserves the special status of moral discourse and acknowledges the intuitive sense that moral qualities are not reducible to other types of facts.

In conclusion, Moore's "Principia Ethica" presents a challenging view of moral philosophy that has had a lasting impact on the field. His analysis of "good" as a simple, indefinable concept sets it apart from other concepts that can be defined through their characteristics, and his open question argument remains a significant contribution to discussions on the nature of moral properties.

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -Explain Moore's argument against the view that goodness is the same thing as pleasure. Do you find the argument compelling? Why or why not?

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Question 3

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Moore's argument against the view that goodness is the same thing as pleasure is based on his open question argument. He claims that for any proposed definition of good, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For example, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing.

I find Moore's argument compelling because it highlights the distinction between the concept of goodness and natural properties such as pleasure. The open question argument demonstrates that there is a fundamental difference between the concept of goodness and the properties that we typically associate with it. It shows that goodness cannot be reduced to any natural property, and therefore, the view that goodness is the same thing as pleasure is not tenable.

Overall, Moore's argument provides a strong case for the idea that goodness is a unique and irreducible concept, separate from natural properties like pleasure. His open question argument effectively challenges the naturalistic fallacy and supports the notion that goodness cannot be defined in terms of any specific natural property.

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -According to Moore, to claim that goodness is identical to any other observable property is to commit the naturalistic fallacy.

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Question 4

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -Moore holds that 'pleasure' is:

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Question 5

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -Moore defines the naturalistic fallacy as the view that:

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Question 6

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -What is the naturalistic fallacy? Why does Moore think it is important? Do you agree that the naturalistic fallacy is really a fallacy? Defend your answer.

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Question 7

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -Moore claims that all definitions will ultimately make reference to things that are themselves indefinable.

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Question 8

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -Moore claims that good is:

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Question 9

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -Moore claims that there is no meaning in saying that pleasure is good, unless:

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Question 10

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -What are the different senses of "definition" that Moore distinguishes? Which kind of definition does Moore think is most important? Can every concept be given a definition of this sort? Why or why not?

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Question 11

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -Suppose someone were to define "good" as "that which we desire to desire." How would Moore argue against such a proposed definition? Do you find his argument to be compelling?

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Question 12

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -Moore would agree that "Pleasure is good" means the same thing as "Pleasure is pleasure."

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Question 13

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -Moore argues that until the definition of "good" is known it will be impossible to lead an ethically good life.

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Question 14

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -When Moore talks about "the good," he is talking about:

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Question 15

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -According to Moore, we are thinking about good whenever we think about:

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Question 16

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -According to Moore, the most fundamental question in all of ethics is:

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 17

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -According to Moore, what is the difference between "good" and "the good"? Which of these does Moore think can be defined, and why?

(Essay)

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Question 18

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -Which of the following concepts can be defined, according to Moore?

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 19

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -When it comes to defining good, Moore claims that many past philosophers are guilty of:

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 20

Showing 1 - 20 of 32

Exam 16: G.E.Moore

Plato

Aristotle

Epicurus

Cicero

Epictetus

Augustine

Thomas Aquinas

Thomas Hobbes

Joseph Butler

David Hume

Immanuel Kant

Jeremy Bentham

John Stuart Mill

Henry Sidgwick

Friedrich Nietzsche

H.A.Prichard

A.J.Ayer

C.L.Stevenson

John Dewey

R.M.Hare

J.J.C.Smart

Bernard Williams

W.D.Ross

John Rawls

David Gauthier

T.M.Scanlon

Barbara Herman

Philippa Foot

Christine Korsgaard

Thomas Nagel

Susan Wolf

Jean-Paul Sartre

G.E.M.Anscombe

Julia Annas

Nomy Arpaly

Virginia Held

Gilbert Harman

J.L.Mackie

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

Mary Midgley

James Rachels

Judith Jarvis Thomson

Don Marquis

James Rachels

Philippa Foot

Peter Singer

Travis Timmerman

Tom Regan

Henry Shue

Karen Hanson

Laurence Thomas

Celia Wolf-Devine

N.Ann Davis

Margaret Crouch

Judith Jarvis Thomson

Judith Jarvis Thomson

Thomas Nagel

Richard Taylor

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