Exam 16: G.E.Moore

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -Moore claims that if one were to define good as something else, then:

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -According to Moore, the most important sense of "definition" is that in which a definition states what parts invariably compose a certain whole.

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -Moore wants to discover the nature of the object or idea that the word 'good' usually stands for.

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -Moore argues that until a definition of "good" is known it will be impossible to:

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -Moore claims that for any complex definition of good, we can always be ask with significance whether it is itself good.

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -According to Moore, any analysis, when it is carried as far as it will go, refers us to:

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -According to Moore, "good" is the only object of thought that is incapable of definition.

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -According to Moore, the good is indefinable.

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -According to Moore, all propositions about the good are:

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -When asked "what is good?" Moore answers:

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -In Moore's view, the most important kind of definition states:

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it. Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property. -In seeking a definition, Moore is seeking to discover how most competent speakers use the word in question.