Exam 29: Philippa Foot

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -In what sense are the norms of etiquette nonhypothetical? Why does Foot deny that the norms of etiquette are categorical imperatives? Are moral norms relevantly different than the norms of etiquette?

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -Foot concludes that:

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -Foot claims that one can refute a claim about what one morally ought to do by pointing out that doing so would not serve one's interests or desires.

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -According to Foot, it is generally supposed that Kant established beyond doubt:

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -Foot conceives of rationality as essentially involving:

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -Foot claims that those who insist that everyone has reason to care about morality:

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -According to Foot, sentences enunciating the rules of etiquette are typically used:

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -A categorical imperative is:

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -Foot claims that in describing moral judgments as categorical, Kant was "ascribing to them a special dignity and necessity." What particular feature was Kant ascribing to moral judgments, and why does Foot deny that moral judgments have this feature? Do you find her arguments convincing?

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -Foot claims that a person is just:

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -According to Foot, people may follow either morality or etiquette without asking why they should do so, but equally well they may not.

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -According to Foot, all categorical imperatives automatically supply reasons to anyone to whom they apply.

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -Foot argues that the rules of etiquette are not genuine categorical imperatives because:

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -Foot concludes that moral judgments have no better claim to be categorical imperatives than do statements about matters of etiquette.

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -Foot argues that the rules of etiquette fail to apply to people who do not care about them.

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -According to Foot's presentation of Kant, a hypothetical imperative states an action is good:

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -What is rationality, according to Foot? What relationship does she think obtains between rationality and morality? Do you agree with her?

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -Foot claims that in describing moral judgments as categorical, Kant was:

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -What is the difference between a categorical and a hypothetical imperative? Why do many people think that morality must be regarded as consisting of categorical imperatives?

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -According to Foot, it is always irrational to act immorally.