Exam 29: Philippa Foot

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -Foot denies that the fact that one morally ought to have certain ends is a reason to adopt those ends.

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -How does Foot respond to the objection that her view is "destructive of morality"? Do you find her response to this objection to be adequate? Why or why not?

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -Foot claims that we should think of imperatives as statements to the effect that something ought to be done or that it would be good to do it.

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -According to Foot, for an action to be truly moral it must be done for its own sake.

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -Foot asserts that common opinion agrees with Kant that one must accept the rules of morality whatever one's interests or desires.

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -Foot claims that a person who rejects morality because he sees no reason to obey its rules is guilty of:

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -Foot recommends that we:

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -Foot claims that the normative character of a moral judgment does not guarantee its:

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -What is a hypothetical imperative, and what does Foot mean by saying that moral norms are hypothetical imperatives? Do you agree with her or not? Defend your answer.

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -How does Foot think we should view our own commitment to morality? What do you think is the strongest objection to this view? Do you think the objection succeeds?

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -Foot claims it is usually assumed that moral considerations necessarily:

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires. Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat. Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." -Foot maintains modern philosophers take moral judgments to be: