Exam 17: H.A.Prichard

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -According to Prichard, we can know that an action is right by:

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -Prichard claims that moral philosophy rests on a mistaken question, which is:

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -Prichard claims that morality and virtue:

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -According to Prichard, we cannot feel an obligation to:

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -According to Prichard, what is the difference between morality and virtue? From what kinds of motives do moral actions and virtuous actions arise, on his view?

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -Prichard claims that although moral knowledge cannot be proven, it can be directly apprehended.

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -Prichard claims that virtue and morality are the same thing.

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -What is the mistake on which Prichard thinks moral philosophy rests? What reasons does he give for thinking it is a mistake? Do you agree with him?

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -Prichard compares Moral Philosophy to:

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -Prichard claims that whether an action is right or wrong depends on the motive behind the action.

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -Prichard claims that we can prove that one ought to do something by showing that it will promote one's own self-interest.

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory. Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations. -How does Prichard think we can come to have moral knowledge? How does his view differ from the views he discusses in the first half of his paper? Which do you think is more plausible?