Exam 34: G.E.M.Anscombe

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -According to Anscombe, the expression "morally ought" no longer signifies a real concept.

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -Anscombe claims that "the differences between the well-known English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance." What objection does she raise to all such theories? Do you find her objection compelling?

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -Anscombe argues that modern moral philosophers should look back to Aristotle to help elucidate the nature of moral obligation.

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -How does Anscombe respond to Hume's suggestion that it is impossible to infer an "ought" from an "is"? Do you find her response to this problem satisfactory? Why or why not?

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -Anscombe claims that an adequate moral psychology would include:

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -Anscombe claims that the expression morally ought "no longer signifies a real concept at all." What reason does she give for thinking this? Do you think she is right? Defend your answer.

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -Anscombe recommends that we stop using the notion of moral obligation. What does she recommend that we replace this concept with? What do you think would be the costs and benefits of making this revision to our moral thought?

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -Anscombe criticizes Sidgwick on the grounds that:

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -Anscombe claims that punishing a man for what he is clearly understood not to have done is a paradigm case of injustice.

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -Anscombe criticizes Butler on the grounds that:

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -Anscombe maintains that Aristotle provides an adequate account of human flourishing.

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure. Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so. -Anscombe objects to consequentialism on the grounds that it does not absolutely prohibit certain actions, such as intentionally killing an innocent person.