Exam 57: Judith Jarvis Thomson

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -In the case of Bystander's Three Options, Thomson claims that killing the one is akin:

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -Thomson claims that the willingness to give up one's life simply to save five strangers is:

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -Explain the trolley problem. Describe the two cases that generate the problem, and the verdicts people usually give to these cases. As it has traditionally been conceived, what would an adequate solution to the trolley problem consist of? Do you think such a solution is possible? Why or why not?

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -According to Thomson, one may let five die if the only permissible means of saving them is killing oneself.

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -Thomson endorses the view that our negative duties are weightier than our positive duties.

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -Foot claimed that negative duties:

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -Thomson claims that in the case of the runaway trolley, the driver __________, and a bystander __________.

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -According to Foot, if one is faced with a choice between letting five die or killing one:

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -According to Thomson, we should not be troubled that so many people have tried to solve the trolley problem for so many years and come up wanting.

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -Thomson believes that if one is given the choice between killing five people, killing one other person, or killing oneself:

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -In Foot's case of the Judge's Two Options, most people say that:

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track. Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible. -State the two principles that Foot proposed in response to the trolley problem. Do you think these principles are correct? If so, what argument can be given in their defense? If not, can you think of a counterexample to either principle?