Exam 46: Philippa Foot

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -How does Foot respond to Thomson's case of the violinist? What conclusions does she reach about the morality of abortion? Do you think she is correct? Defend your answer.

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -Foot claims that it makes an important moral difference whether or not one is the agent of harm.

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -In the Rescue II case, Foot claims that:

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -Describe Foot's cases of Rescue I and Rescue II. What verdict does she give on each of these cases, and how does she justify it? Do you find her account plausible?

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -In the Rescue I case, Foot claims that:

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -According to Foot, what distinction underlies the moral difference between killing and letting die? Why does she think this distinction is important? Do you agree with her?

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -Foot claims that it takes more to justify an interference than to justify the withholding of goods or services.

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -Foot defines a positive duty as:

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -A negative right is a right to refrain from performing an action.

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -What does it mean to be "the agent" of a harm that befalls someone else? Is it morally important whether one is "the agent" of a harm rather than merely allowing it to happen? Why or why not?

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -According to Foot, the crucial moral distinction at issue in cases like turning off a respirator is:

Philippa Foot: Killing and Letting Die If a doctor has a scarce drug that can be used either to save one person or save five, it seems permissible for her to give the drug to the five, even if it means allowing the one to die. On the other hand, it does not seem permissible for the doctor to carve up one person and use his organs to save the lives of five others. According to Foot, cases like these seem to show that there is a morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Yet this distinction seems to improperly classify other cases. For example, there does not seem to be a significant difference between turning off a dying patient's respirator and deliberately refusing to turn it on. Foot explains these cases in terms of a morally important distinction between being the agent of a harm - i.e., being the agent that initiates a sequence that results in the harm - and simply allowing an existing harm to befall a person. This distinction, Foot claims, can be given an even more fundamental explanation in terms of a distinction between two types of duties. Negative duties are duties of noninterference, whereas positive duties are duties to provide goods or services. According to Foot, our negative duties are typically more stringent than our positive duties, and this explains why it is often worse to be the agent of a harm than to merely allow the same harm to befall someone. Foot concludes by applying this distinction to the issue of abortion. In particular, Foot argues that Thomson's famous violinist analogy is faulty. While unplugging oneself from the violinist does not make one the agent of harm to the violinist, aborting a fetus does make one the agent of harm. Given this, Foot suggests, abortion is morally impermissible if the fetus has the moral status of a person. -Foot claims that Thomson's case of the violinist involves __________, and abortion involves __________.