Exam 40: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism. We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation. Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected. -Sinnott-Armstrong cites a number of psychological studies. Examine closely one of these studies, and explain how it supports his thesis. Are there reasons to be suspicious of, say, studies that rely on the moral intuitions of undergraduates? Why or why not.

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism. We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation. Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected. -Sinnott-Armstrong cites a number of principles that, if applicable, indicate that our beliefs require further confirmation. His critics, Sinnott-Armstrong notes, argue that his position leads to moral skepticism. How does he respond? Do you find this response compelling. Why or why not?

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism. We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation. Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected. -According to Greene and Haidt, moral judgments are:

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism. We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation. Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected. -According to Sinnott-Armstrong, many of our moral beliefs:

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism. We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation. Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected. -When surveying 52 undergraduates at Dartmouth College, Sinnott-Armstrong found:

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism. We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation. Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected. -Sinnott-Armstrong argues that the following illusions might infect our moral beliefs:

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism. We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation. Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected. -Unlike Moore, Sinnott-Armstrong argues that we can directly infer positive moral conclusions from descriptive premises in psychology or biology.

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism. We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation. Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected. -Identify the version of moral intuitionism that is the focus of Sinnott-Armstrong's attack. Why might moral intuitionism of this sort be attractive? Might any of these attractive features be used to fend off Sinnott-Armstrong's attack? Why or why not?

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism. We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation. Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected. -Sinnott-Armstrong maintains that his list of "principles for when confirmation is needed" applies to:

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism. We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation. Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected. -Sinnott-Armstrong admits that some moral beliefs might not be captured by his five principles. He maintains, nevertheless, that they still require confirmation. How does Sinnott-Armstrong argue for this claim? Do you find this argument plausible? Defend your answer.

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism. We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation. Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected. -According to Sinnott-Armstrong, to say that moral believers are justified independently of an inferential ability is:

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism. We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation. Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected. -Sinnott-Armstrong claims that rational intuitionists see basic moral beliefs as analogous to: