Exam 39: J.L.Mackie

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false. Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence. -Critically examine one of Mackie's two main arguments against the existence of objective moral values. Describe the argument in detail, and then raise what you take to be the most serious objection to the argument. Do you think Mackie's argument succeeds? Defend your answer.

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false. Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence. -According to Mackie, the best explanation for why different cultures have different moral beliefs is that moral beliefs tend to reflect ways of life.

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false. Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence. -According to Mackie, we commit the pathetic fallacy when we:

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false. Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence. -According to Mackie, non-cognitivism and naturalism can account for the fact that:

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false. Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence. -Mackie intends for his moral skepticism to be:

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false. Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence. -What different senses of "moral skepticism" does Mackie distinguish? Which one represents his position?

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false. Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence. -According to Mackie, the fact that an action is a piece of deliberate cruelty logically entails that the action is wrong.

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false. Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence. -Mackie objects to error theory on the grounds that:

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false. Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence. -The argument from relativity begins by pointing out:

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false. Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence. -Mackie claims that the assertion that there exist intrinsically prescriptive entities is:

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false. Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence. -Mackie's moral skepticism is a linguistic thesis about what moral statements mean.

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false. Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence. -According to Mackie's use of the term, a "moral skeptic" is someone who: