Exam 37: Virginia Held

Virginia Held: Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory Held argues that the history of moral philosophy is deeply infected by male bias, so much so that even the main concepts of the discipline reflect a lack of respect for women's experiences. In particular, Held discusses three broad ideas in moral philosophy that she finds particularly problematic from a feminist perspective. The first is the traditional conception of the relationship between reason and emotion. Many philosophers have held that reason should play a primary role in ethics, either by discovering universal moral principles, or impartially calculating the costs and benefits of various actions. Against this, Held argues for giving the emotions a prominent role in our moral lives, especially the emotions of care that accompany close relationships. Second, Held criticizes the traditional interpretation of the distinction between the public and the private. On this conception, "the public realm is seen as the distinctively human realm in which man transcends his animal nature, while the private realm of the household is seen as the natural region in which women merely reproduce the species." Held objects to this conception, and argues that motherhood equally "transcends animal nature," especially insofar as it involves helping children to develop as moral beings. Held finds the relationship of care implicit in motherhood to be of particular moral importance, and regards traditional moral philosophy as deficient for neglecting it. Finally, Held critiques the common conception of the self as a rational individual, independent and largely self-interested. She argues that close attention to the experiences of women yields a conception of the self as deeply enmeshed in particular relationships in which self-interest and altruism are no longer easy to distinguish. Given these three instances of male bias, Held argues, moral philosophy is in need of a radical transformation to take adequate account of the experiences of women. -According to Held, women often pay attention to feelings of empathy and caring to determine what to do rather than relying on abstract rules of reason.

Virginia Held: Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory Held argues that the history of moral philosophy is deeply infected by male bias, so much so that even the main concepts of the discipline reflect a lack of respect for women's experiences. In particular, Held discusses three broad ideas in moral philosophy that she finds particularly problematic from a feminist perspective. The first is the traditional conception of the relationship between reason and emotion. Many philosophers have held that reason should play a primary role in ethics, either by discovering universal moral principles, or impartially calculating the costs and benefits of various actions. Against this, Held argues for giving the emotions a prominent role in our moral lives, especially the emotions of care that accompany close relationships. Second, Held criticizes the traditional interpretation of the distinction between the public and the private. On this conception, "the public realm is seen as the distinctively human realm in which man transcends his animal nature, while the private realm of the household is seen as the natural region in which women merely reproduce the species." Held objects to this conception, and argues that motherhood equally "transcends animal nature," especially insofar as it involves helping children to develop as moral beings. Held finds the relationship of care implicit in motherhood to be of particular moral importance, and regards traditional moral philosophy as deficient for neglecting it. Finally, Held critiques the common conception of the self as a rational individual, independent and largely self-interested. She argues that close attention to the experiences of women yields a conception of the self as deeply enmeshed in particular relationships in which self-interest and altruism are no longer easy to distinguish. Given these three instances of male bias, Held argues, moral philosophy is in need of a radical transformation to take adequate account of the experiences of women. -Held argues that emotions:

Virginia Held: Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory Held argues that the history of moral philosophy is deeply infected by male bias, so much so that even the main concepts of the discipline reflect a lack of respect for women's experiences. In particular, Held discusses three broad ideas in moral philosophy that she finds particularly problematic from a feminist perspective. The first is the traditional conception of the relationship between reason and emotion. Many philosophers have held that reason should play a primary role in ethics, either by discovering universal moral principles, or impartially calculating the costs and benefits of various actions. Against this, Held argues for giving the emotions a prominent role in our moral lives, especially the emotions of care that accompany close relationships. Second, Held criticizes the traditional interpretation of the distinction between the public and the private. On this conception, "the public realm is seen as the distinctively human realm in which man transcends his animal nature, while the private realm of the household is seen as the natural region in which women merely reproduce the species." Held objects to this conception, and argues that motherhood equally "transcends animal nature," especially insofar as it involves helping children to develop as moral beings. Held finds the relationship of care implicit in motherhood to be of particular moral importance, and regards traditional moral philosophy as deficient for neglecting it. Finally, Held critiques the common conception of the self as a rational individual, independent and largely self-interested. She argues that close attention to the experiences of women yields a conception of the self as deeply enmeshed in particular relationships in which self-interest and altruism are no longer easy to distinguish. Given these three instances of male bias, Held argues, moral philosophy is in need of a radical transformation to take adequate account of the experiences of women. -Held claims that a feminist ethic will be a relativist "situation ethic."

Virginia Held: Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory Held argues that the history of moral philosophy is deeply infected by male bias, so much so that even the main concepts of the discipline reflect a lack of respect for women's experiences. In particular, Held discusses three broad ideas in moral philosophy that she finds particularly problematic from a feminist perspective. The first is the traditional conception of the relationship between reason and emotion. Many philosophers have held that reason should play a primary role in ethics, either by discovering universal moral principles, or impartially calculating the costs and benefits of various actions. Against this, Held argues for giving the emotions a prominent role in our moral lives, especially the emotions of care that accompany close relationships. Second, Held criticizes the traditional interpretation of the distinction between the public and the private. On this conception, "the public realm is seen as the distinctively human realm in which man transcends his animal nature, while the private realm of the household is seen as the natural region in which women merely reproduce the species." Held objects to this conception, and argues that motherhood equally "transcends animal nature," especially insofar as it involves helping children to develop as moral beings. Held finds the relationship of care implicit in motherhood to be of particular moral importance, and regards traditional moral philosophy as deficient for neglecting it. Finally, Held critiques the common conception of the self as a rational individual, independent and largely self-interested. She argues that close attention to the experiences of women yields a conception of the self as deeply enmeshed in particular relationships in which self-interest and altruism are no longer easy to distinguish. Given these three instances of male bias, Held argues, moral philosophy is in need of a radical transformation to take adequate account of the experiences of women. -Explain Held's criticisms of atomistic views of the self. What does she think is mistaken about these conceptions, and what harm does she claim this causes? Do you agree with her? Why or why not?

Virginia Held: Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory Held argues that the history of moral philosophy is deeply infected by male bias, so much so that even the main concepts of the discipline reflect a lack of respect for women's experiences. In particular, Held discusses three broad ideas in moral philosophy that she finds particularly problematic from a feminist perspective. The first is the traditional conception of the relationship between reason and emotion. Many philosophers have held that reason should play a primary role in ethics, either by discovering universal moral principles, or impartially calculating the costs and benefits of various actions. Against this, Held argues for giving the emotions a prominent role in our moral lives, especially the emotions of care that accompany close relationships. Second, Held criticizes the traditional interpretation of the distinction between the public and the private. On this conception, "the public realm is seen as the distinctively human realm in which man transcends his animal nature, while the private realm of the household is seen as the natural region in which women merely reproduce the species." Held objects to this conception, and argues that motherhood equally "transcends animal nature," especially insofar as it involves helping children to develop as moral beings. Held finds the relationship of care implicit in motherhood to be of particular moral importance, and regards traditional moral philosophy as deficient for neglecting it. Finally, Held critiques the common conception of the self as a rational individual, independent and largely self-interested. She argues that close attention to the experiences of women yields a conception of the self as deeply enmeshed in particular relationships in which self-interest and altruism are no longer easy to distinguish. Given these three instances of male bias, Held argues, moral philosophy is in need of a radical transformation to take adequate account of the experiences of women. -Held claims that the associations between philosophical concepts and gender:

Virginia Held: Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory Held argues that the history of moral philosophy is deeply infected by male bias, so much so that even the main concepts of the discipline reflect a lack of respect for women's experiences. In particular, Held discusses three broad ideas in moral philosophy that she finds particularly problematic from a feminist perspective. The first is the traditional conception of the relationship between reason and emotion. Many philosophers have held that reason should play a primary role in ethics, either by discovering universal moral principles, or impartially calculating the costs and benefits of various actions. Against this, Held argues for giving the emotions a prominent role in our moral lives, especially the emotions of care that accompany close relationships. Second, Held criticizes the traditional interpretation of the distinction between the public and the private. On this conception, "the public realm is seen as the distinctively human realm in which man transcends his animal nature, while the private realm of the household is seen as the natural region in which women merely reproduce the species." Held objects to this conception, and argues that motherhood equally "transcends animal nature," especially insofar as it involves helping children to develop as moral beings. Held finds the relationship of care implicit in motherhood to be of particular moral importance, and regards traditional moral philosophy as deficient for neglecting it. Finally, Held critiques the common conception of the self as a rational individual, independent and largely self-interested. She argues that close attention to the experiences of women yields a conception of the self as deeply enmeshed in particular relationships in which self-interest and altruism are no longer easy to distinguish. Given these three instances of male bias, Held argues, moral philosophy is in need of a radical transformation to take adequate account of the experiences of women. -According to psychologists such as Carol Gilligan, the moral reasoning of women:

Virginia Held: Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory Held argues that the history of moral philosophy is deeply infected by male bias, so much so that even the main concepts of the discipline reflect a lack of respect for women's experiences. In particular, Held discusses three broad ideas in moral philosophy that she finds particularly problematic from a feminist perspective. The first is the traditional conception of the relationship between reason and emotion. Many philosophers have held that reason should play a primary role in ethics, either by discovering universal moral principles, or impartially calculating the costs and benefits of various actions. Against this, Held argues for giving the emotions a prominent role in our moral lives, especially the emotions of care that accompany close relationships. Second, Held criticizes the traditional interpretation of the distinction between the public and the private. On this conception, "the public realm is seen as the distinctively human realm in which man transcends his animal nature, while the private realm of the household is seen as the natural region in which women merely reproduce the species." Held objects to this conception, and argues that motherhood equally "transcends animal nature," especially insofar as it involves helping children to develop as moral beings. Held finds the relationship of care implicit in motherhood to be of particular moral importance, and regards traditional moral philosophy as deficient for neglecting it. Finally, Held critiques the common conception of the self as a rational individual, independent and largely self-interested. She argues that close attention to the experiences of women yields a conception of the self as deeply enmeshed in particular relationships in which self-interest and altruism are no longer easy to distinguish. Given these three instances of male bias, Held argues, moral philosophy is in need of a radical transformation to take adequate account of the experiences of women. -Held claims that the values of "the household":

Virginia Held: Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory Held argues that the history of moral philosophy is deeply infected by male bias, so much so that even the main concepts of the discipline reflect a lack of respect for women's experiences. In particular, Held discusses three broad ideas in moral philosophy that she finds particularly problematic from a feminist perspective. The first is the traditional conception of the relationship between reason and emotion. Many philosophers have held that reason should play a primary role in ethics, either by discovering universal moral principles, or impartially calculating the costs and benefits of various actions. Against this, Held argues for giving the emotions a prominent role in our moral lives, especially the emotions of care that accompany close relationships. Second, Held criticizes the traditional interpretation of the distinction between the public and the private. On this conception, "the public realm is seen as the distinctively human realm in which man transcends his animal nature, while the private realm of the household is seen as the natural region in which women merely reproduce the species." Held objects to this conception, and argues that motherhood equally "transcends animal nature," especially insofar as it involves helping children to develop as moral beings. Held finds the relationship of care implicit in motherhood to be of particular moral importance, and regards traditional moral philosophy as deficient for neglecting it. Finally, Held critiques the common conception of the self as a rational individual, independent and largely self-interested. She argues that close attention to the experiences of women yields a conception of the self as deeply enmeshed in particular relationships in which self-interest and altruism are no longer easy to distinguish. Given these three instances of male bias, Held argues, moral philosophy is in need of a radical transformation to take adequate account of the experiences of women. -Held claims that once gender bias is removed from our traditional moral concepts, these concepts will:

Virginia Held: Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory Held argues that the history of moral philosophy is deeply infected by male bias, so much so that even the main concepts of the discipline reflect a lack of respect for women's experiences. In particular, Held discusses three broad ideas in moral philosophy that she finds particularly problematic from a feminist perspective. The first is the traditional conception of the relationship between reason and emotion. Many philosophers have held that reason should play a primary role in ethics, either by discovering universal moral principles, or impartially calculating the costs and benefits of various actions. Against this, Held argues for giving the emotions a prominent role in our moral lives, especially the emotions of care that accompany close relationships. Second, Held criticizes the traditional interpretation of the distinction between the public and the private. On this conception, "the public realm is seen as the distinctively human realm in which man transcends his animal nature, while the private realm of the household is seen as the natural region in which women merely reproduce the species." Held objects to this conception, and argues that motherhood equally "transcends animal nature," especially insofar as it involves helping children to develop as moral beings. Held finds the relationship of care implicit in motherhood to be of particular moral importance, and regards traditional moral philosophy as deficient for neglecting it. Finally, Held critiques the common conception of the self as a rational individual, independent and largely self-interested. She argues that close attention to the experiences of women yields a conception of the self as deeply enmeshed in particular relationships in which self-interest and altruism are no longer easy to distinguish. Given these three instances of male bias, Held argues, moral philosophy is in need of a radical transformation to take adequate account of the experiences of women. -In what two ways have most philosophers conceived of the role of reason in ethics, according to Held? What alternative does she provide? Do you find her account plausible? Why or why not?

Virginia Held: Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory Held argues that the history of moral philosophy is deeply infected by male bias, so much so that even the main concepts of the discipline reflect a lack of respect for women's experiences. In particular, Held discusses three broad ideas in moral philosophy that she finds particularly problematic from a feminist perspective. The first is the traditional conception of the relationship between reason and emotion. Many philosophers have held that reason should play a primary role in ethics, either by discovering universal moral principles, or impartially calculating the costs and benefits of various actions. Against this, Held argues for giving the emotions a prominent role in our moral lives, especially the emotions of care that accompany close relationships. Second, Held criticizes the traditional interpretation of the distinction between the public and the private. On this conception, "the public realm is seen as the distinctively human realm in which man transcends his animal nature, while the private realm of the household is seen as the natural region in which women merely reproduce the species." Held objects to this conception, and argues that motherhood equally "transcends animal nature," especially insofar as it involves helping children to develop as moral beings. Held finds the relationship of care implicit in motherhood to be of particular moral importance, and regards traditional moral philosophy as deficient for neglecting it. Finally, Held critiques the common conception of the self as a rational individual, independent and largely self-interested. She argues that close attention to the experiences of women yields a conception of the self as deeply enmeshed in particular relationships in which self-interest and altruism are no longer easy to distinguish. Given these three instances of male bias, Held argues, moral philosophy is in need of a radical transformation to take adequate account of the experiences of women. -In modern moral philosophy, the priority accorded to reason is exemplified by Kant's Categorical Imperative and rational choice theory by according to Held.

Virginia Held: Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory Held argues that the history of moral philosophy is deeply infected by male bias, so much so that even the main concepts of the discipline reflect a lack of respect for women's experiences. In particular, Held discusses three broad ideas in moral philosophy that she finds particularly problematic from a feminist perspective. The first is the traditional conception of the relationship between reason and emotion. Many philosophers have held that reason should play a primary role in ethics, either by discovering universal moral principles, or impartially calculating the costs and benefits of various actions. Against this, Held argues for giving the emotions a prominent role in our moral lives, especially the emotions of care that accompany close relationships. Second, Held criticizes the traditional interpretation of the distinction between the public and the private. On this conception, "the public realm is seen as the distinctively human realm in which man transcends his animal nature, while the private realm of the household is seen as the natural region in which women merely reproduce the species." Held objects to this conception, and argues that motherhood equally "transcends animal nature," especially insofar as it involves helping children to develop as moral beings. Held finds the relationship of care implicit in motherhood to be of particular moral importance, and regards traditional moral philosophy as deficient for neglecting it. Finally, Held critiques the common conception of the self as a rational individual, independent and largely self-interested. She argues that close attention to the experiences of women yields a conception of the self as deeply enmeshed in particular relationships in which self-interest and altruism are no longer easy to distinguish. Given these three instances of male bias, Held argues, moral philosophy is in need of a radical transformation to take adequate account of the experiences of women. -Held advocates doing away with the distinction between "public" and "private" entirely.

Virginia Held: Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory Held argues that the history of moral philosophy is deeply infected by male bias, so much so that even the main concepts of the discipline reflect a lack of respect for women's experiences. In particular, Held discusses three broad ideas in moral philosophy that she finds particularly problematic from a feminist perspective. The first is the traditional conception of the relationship between reason and emotion. Many philosophers have held that reason should play a primary role in ethics, either by discovering universal moral principles, or impartially calculating the costs and benefits of various actions. Against this, Held argues for giving the emotions a prominent role in our moral lives, especially the emotions of care that accompany close relationships. Second, Held criticizes the traditional interpretation of the distinction between the public and the private. On this conception, "the public realm is seen as the distinctively human realm in which man transcends his animal nature, while the private realm of the household is seen as the natural region in which women merely reproduce the species." Held objects to this conception, and argues that motherhood equally "transcends animal nature," especially insofar as it involves helping children to develop as moral beings. Held finds the relationship of care implicit in motherhood to be of particular moral importance, and regards traditional moral philosophy as deficient for neglecting it. Finally, Held critiques the common conception of the self as a rational individual, independent and largely self-interested. She argues that close attention to the experiences of women yields a conception of the self as deeply enmeshed in particular relationships in which self-interest and altruism are no longer easy to distinguish. Given these three instances of male bias, Held argues, moral philosophy is in need of a radical transformation to take adequate account of the experiences of women. -A number of feminists have argued that the "ethic of justice" should be superseded by: