Exam 20: John Dewey

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview. The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior. There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct. -Dewey argues that value-expressions are not truth-apt.

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview. The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior. There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct. -According to Dewey, an end-in-view proposition is warranted insofar as:

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview. The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior. There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct. -According to Dewey, valuations require statement in verifiable propositions.

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview. The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior. There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct. -Dewey claims that persons modify their desires in light of the effort it would take to satisfy them.

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview. The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior. There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct. -Dewey claims that the measure of the value a person attaches to a given end is:

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview. The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior. There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct. -Dewey claims that the difference between "what is desired" and "what is desirable" is:

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview. The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior. There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct. -Dewey maintains that desires arise:

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview. The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior. There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct. -According to Dewey, desires are matured by:

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview. The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior. There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct. -Dewey maintains that the measure of the value a person attaches to a given end is determined by her behavior. What is Dewey's argument for this position? Do you find his argument plausible? Why or why not?

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview. The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior. There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct. -Dewey argues that a theory of valuation must be empirically verifiable. Why does he impose this desideratum? Do you find this desideratum plausible? Why or why not?

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview. The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior. There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct. -According to Dewey, the problem of value arose:

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview. The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior. There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct. -According to Dewey, what is the relation of "means" to "ends"? Do you agree with Dewey that it is absurd to value and end apart from the means by which it is to be attained. Why or why not?