Exam 17: Oligopoly

The practice of requiring someone to buy two or more items together, rather than separately, is called

Table 17-1 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Rochelle and Alec, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Rochelle and Alec work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Rochelle and Alec can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the table below: 21. -Refer to Table 17-1. If Rochelle and Alec operate as a profit-maximizing monopoly in the market for water, how many gallons of water will be produced and sold?

In the game in which two oil companies own adjacent oil fields, the companies will not use the oil efficiently because

Table 17-21 The Chicken Game is named for a contest in which drivers test their courage by driving straight at each other. John and Paul have a common interest to avoid crashing into each other, but they also have a personal, competing interest to not turn first to demonstrate their courage to those observing the contest. The payoff table for this situation is provided below. The payoffs are shown as (John, Paul). -Refer to Table 17-21. If Paul chooses Drive Straight, what will John choose to do and what will John's payoff equal?

A tit-for-tat strategy, in a repeated game, is one in which a player starts by cooperating and then does whatever the other player did last time.

George and Jerry are competitors in a local market. Each is trying to decide if it is better to advertise on TV, on radio, or not at all. If they both advertise on TV, each will earn a profit of $3,000. If they both advertise on radio, each will earn a profit of $5,000. If neither advertises at all, each will earn a profit of $10,000. If one advertises on TV and the other advertises on radio, then the one advertising on TV will earn $4,000 and the other will earn $2,000. If one advertises on TV and the other does not advertise, then the one advertising on TV will earn $8,000 and the other will earn $5,000. If one advertises on radio and the other does not advertise, then the one advertising on radio will earn $9,000 and the other will earn $6,000. If both follow their dominant strategy, then George will

Figure 17-3. Hector and Bart are roommates. On a particular day, their apartment needs to be cleaned. Each person has to decide whether to take part in cleaning. At the end of the day, either the apartment will be completely clean (if one or both roommates take part in cleaning), or it will remain dirty (if neither roommate cleans). With happiness measured on a scale of 1 (very unhappy) to 10 (very happy), the possible outcomes are as follows: -Refer to Figure 17-3. If this game is played only once, then the most likely outcome is that

Scenario 17-3. Consider two countries, Kinglandia and Rovinastan, that are engaged in an arms race. Each country must decide whether to build new weapons or to disarm existing weapons. Each country prefers to have more arms than the other because a large arsenal gives it more influence in world affairs. But each country also prefers to live in a world safe from the other country's weapons. The following table shows the possible outcomes for each decision combination. The numbers in each cell represent the country's ranking of the outcome (10 = best outcome, 1 = worst outcome). -Refer to Scenario 17-3. If each country only makes a choice of whether to build or disarm one time and Rovinastan chooses to build new weapons, then Kinglandia will

Table 17-2 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Abby and Brad, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Abby and Brad work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Abby and Brad can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost is zero. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the table below: -Refer to Table 17-2. Suppose the town enacts new antitrust laws that prohibit Abby and Brad from operating as a monopoly. What will be the price of water once Abby and Brad reach a Nash equilibrium?

Table 17-20 Nadia and Maddie are two college roommates who both prefer a clean common space in their dorm room, but neither enjoys cleaning. The roommates must each make a decision to either clean or not clean the dorm room's common space. The payoff table for this situation is provided below, where the higher a player's payoff number, the better off that player is. The payoffs in each cell are shown as (payoff for Nadia, payoff for Maddie). -Refer to Table 17-20. What is Nadia's dominant strategy?

Cartels with a small number of firms have a greater probability of reaching the monopoly outcome than do cartels with a larger number of firms.

Table 17-24 Two firms are considering going out of business and selling their assets. Each considers what happens if the other goes out of business. The payoff matrix below shows the net gain or loss to each firm. -Refer to Table 17-24. Which firm's dominant strategy is to sell?

A situation in which firms choose their best strategy given the strategies chosen by the other firms in the market is called

Table 17-6 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Kunal and Naj, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Kunal and Naj work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump, to bring the water to town, and to sell it at whatever price the market will bear. Assume Kunal and Naj can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water are shown in the table below. -Refer to Table 17-6. Suppose the town enacts new antitrust laws that prohibit Kunal and Naj from operating as a monopolist. Once the Nash equilibrium is reached, how much profit will each producer earn?

Table 17-24 Two firms are considering going out of business and selling their assets. Each considers what happens if the other goes out of business. The payoff matrix below shows the net gain or loss to each firm. -Refer to Table 17-24. Which firms have a dominant strategy?

If an oligopolist is part of a cartel that is collectively producing the monopoly level of output, then that oligopolist has the incentive to increase production with the aim of

As the number of firms in an oligopoly market

Table 17-24 Two firms are considering going out of business and selling their assets. Each considers what happens if the other goes out of business. The payoff matrix below shows the net gain or loss to each firm. -Refer to Table 17-24. What is the Nash equilibrium?

Table 17-12 The table shows the town of Driveaway's demand schedule for gasoline. Assume the town's gasoline seller(s) incurs a cost of $2 for each gallon sold, with no fixed cost. -Refer to Table 17-12. Suppose we observe that the price of a gallon of gasoline in Driveaway is $2. Given this observation, which of the following scenarios is most likely?

Table 17-29 Suppose that two firms, Wild Willy's Wonderdrink (Firm W) and Hyper Hank's Hydration (Firm H), comprise the market for energy drinks. Each firm determines that it could lower its costs and increase its profits if both firms reduced their advertising budgets. But for the plan to work, each firm must agree to refrain from advertising. Each firm believes that advertising works by increasing the demand for the firm's energy drinks, but each firm also believes that if neither firm advertises, the cost savings will outweigh the lost sales. The table below lists each firm's individual profits: Firm W Breaks agreement Maintains agreement and advertises and does not advertise -Refer to Table 17-29 Does either Firm W or Firm H have a dominant strategy?