Exam 17: Oligopoly

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When prisoners' dilemma games are repeated over and over, sometimes the threat of penalty causes both parties to cooperate.

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The Sherman Act made cooperative agreements

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When individuals are damaged by an illegal arrangement to restrain trade, which law allows them to pursue civil action and recover up to three times the damages sustained?

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Table 17-5 The information in the table below shows the total demand for premium-channel digital cable TV subscriptions in a small urban market. Assume that each digital cable TV operator pays a fixed cost of $200,000 (per year) to provide premium digital channels in the market area and that the marginal cost of providing the premium channel service to a household is zero. Table 17-5 The information in the table below shows the total demand for premium-channel digital cable TV subscriptions in a small urban market. Assume that each digital cable TV operator pays a fixed cost of $200,000 (per year) to provide premium digital channels in the market area and that the marginal cost of providing the premium channel service to a household is zero.    -Refer to Table 17-5. Assume there are two profit-maximizing digital cable TV companies operating in this market. Further assume that they are not able to collude on the price and quantity of premium digital channel subscriptions to sell. What price will premium digital channel cable TV subscriptions be sold at when this market reaches a Nash equilibrium? -Refer to Table 17-5. Assume there are two profit-maximizing digital cable TV companies operating in this market. Further assume that they are not able to collude on the price and quantity of premium digital channel subscriptions to sell. What price will premium digital channel cable TV subscriptions be sold at when this market reaches a Nash equilibrium?

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Table 17-13 Two home-improvement stores (Lopes and HomeMax) in a growing urban area are interested in expanding their market share. Both are interested in expanding the size of their store and parking lot to accommodate potential growth in their customer base. The following game depicts the strategic outcomes that result from the game. Increases in annual profits of the two home-improvement stores are shown in the table below. Table 17-13 Two home-improvement stores (Lopes and HomeMax) in a growing urban area are interested in expanding their market share. Both are interested in expanding the size of their store and parking lot to accommodate potential growth in their customer base. The following game depicts the strategic outcomes that result from the game. Increases in annual profits of the two home-improvement stores are shown in the table below.    14. -Refer to Table 17-13. If both stores follow a dominant strategy, Lopes's annual profit will grow by 14. -Refer to Table 17-13. If both stores follow a dominant strategy, Lopes's annual profit will grow by

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Figure 17-5. Two companies, ABC and QRS, are sellers in the same market. Each company decides whether to charge a high price or a low price. In the figure, the dollar amounts are payoffs and they represent annual profits for the two companies. Figure 17-5. Two companies, ABC and QRS, are sellers in the same market. Each company decides whether to charge a high price or a low price. In the figure, the dollar amounts are payoffs and they represent annual profits for the two companies.   -Refer to Figure 17-5. Suppose the outcome of the game is one in which ABC's profit is $4 million and QRS's profit is $14 million. The most likely explanation for this outcome is that -Refer to Figure 17-5. Suppose the outcome of the game is one in which ABC's profit is $4 million and QRS's profit is $14 million. The most likely explanation for this outcome is that

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The prisoners' dilemma provides insights into the

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If a market is a duopoly and additional firms enter and do not cooperate, then

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Figure 17-3. Hector and Bart are roommates. On a particular day, their apartment needs to be cleaned. Each person has to decide whether to take part in cleaning. At the end of the day, either the apartment will be completely clean (if one or both roommates take part in cleaning), or it will remain dirty (if neither roommate cleans). With happiness measured on a scale of 1 (very unhappy) to 10 (very happy), the possible outcomes are as follows: Figure 17-3. Hector and Bart are roommates. On a particular day, their apartment needs to be cleaned. Each person has to decide whether to take part in cleaning. At the end of the day, either the apartment will be completely clean (if one or both roommates take part in cleaning), or it will remain dirty (if neither roommate cleans). With happiness measured on a scale of 1 (very unhappy) to 10 (very happy), the possible outcomes are as follows:    -Refer to Figure 17-3. The possible outcome in which both Hector and Bart clean is analogous to which of the following outcomes of the duopoly game? -Refer to Figure 17-3. The possible outcome in which both Hector and Bart clean is analogous to which of the following outcomes of the duopoly game?

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When firms are faced with making strategic choices to maximize profit, economists typically use

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Antitrust laws tend to target restraint of trade as characterized by .

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A group of firms that act in unison to maximize collective profits is called a

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If the output effect from increased production is larger than the price effect, then an oligopolist would increase production.

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Table 17-28 Suppose that two firms determine that each could lower its costs and increase its profits if both reduced their advertising budgets. But in order for the plan to work, each firm must agree to refrain from advertising. Each firm believes that advertising works by increasing the demand for the firm's product, but each firm also believes that if neither firm advertises, the cost savings will outweigh the lost sales. The table below lists each firm's individual profits: Firm A Breaks agreement Maintains agreement and advertises and does not advertise Table 17-28 Suppose that two firms determine that each could lower its costs and increase its profits if both reduced their advertising budgets. But in order for the plan to work, each firm must agree to refrain from advertising. Each firm believes that advertising works by increasing the demand for the firm's product, but each firm also believes that if neither firm advertises, the cost savings will outweigh the lost sales. The table below lists each firm's individual profits: Firm A Breaks agreement Maintains agreement and advertises and does not advertise    -Refer to Table 17-28. What is the outcome of this game? -Refer to Table 17-28. What is the outcome of this game?

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Table 17-16 This table shows a game played between two players, A and B. The payoffs are given in the table as (Payoff to A, Payoff to B). Table 17-16 This table shows a game played between two players, A and B. The payoffs are given in the table as (Payoff to A, Payoff to B).    -Refer to Table 17-16. Which of the following statements is true regarding this game? -Refer to Table 17-16. Which of the following statements is true regarding this game?

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The prisoners' dilemma game

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Table 17-27 Each year the United States considers renewal of Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status with Farland (a mythical nation). Historically, legislators have made threats of not renewing MFN status because of human rights abuses in Farland. The non-renewal of MFN trading status is likely to involve some retaliatory measures by Farland. The payoff table below shows the potential economic gains associated with a game in which Farland may impose trade sanctions against U.S. firms and the United States may not renew MFN status with Farland. The table contains the dollar value of all trade-flow benefits to the United States and Farland. Table 17-27 Each year the United States considers renewal of Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status with Farland (a mythical nation). Historically, legislators have made threats of not renewing MFN status because of human rights abuses in Farland. The non-renewal of MFN trading status is likely to involve some retaliatory measures by Farland. The payoff table below shows the potential economic gains associated with a game in which Farland may impose trade sanctions against U.S. firms and the United States may not renew MFN status with Farland. The table contains the dollar value of all trade-flow benefits to the United States and Farland.    -Refer to Table 17-27. This particular game -Refer to Table 17-27. This particular game

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Tying is always profitable for a monopoly.

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Table 17-6 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Kunal and Naj, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Kunal and Naj work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump, to bring the water to town, and to sell it at whatever price the market will bear. Assume Kunal and Naj can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water are shown in the table below. Table 17-6 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Kunal and Naj, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Kunal and Naj work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump, to bring the water to town, and to sell it at whatever price the market will bear. Assume Kunal and Naj can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water are shown in the table below.    -Refer to Table 17-6. Suppose the town enacts new antitrust laws that prohibit Kunal and Naj from operating as a monopolist. What will the new price of water be once the Nash equilibrium is reached? -Refer to Table 17-6. Suppose the town enacts new antitrust laws that prohibit Kunal and Naj from operating as a monopolist. What will the new price of water be once the Nash equilibrium is reached?

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If one firm left a duopoly market where the firms did not cooperate then

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