Exam 17: Oligopoly

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Table 17-20 Nadia and Maddie are two college roommates who both prefer a clean common space in their dorm room, but neither enjoys cleaning. The roommates must each make a decision to either clean or not clean the dorm room's common space. The payoff table for this situation is provided below, where the higher a player's payoff number, the better off that player is. The payoffs in each cell are shown as (payoff for Nadia, payoff for Maddie). Table 17-20 Nadia and Maddie are two college roommates who both prefer a clean common space in their dorm room, but neither enjoys cleaning. The roommates must each make a decision to either clean or not clean the dorm room's common space. The payoff table for this situation is provided below, where the higher a player's payoff number, the better off that player is. The payoffs in each cell are shown as (payoff for Nadia, payoff for Maddie).    -Refer to Table 17-20. If Maddie chooses to clean, then Nadia will -Refer to Table 17-20. If Maddie chooses to clean, then Nadia will

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In the prisoners' dilemma game, self-interest leads

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Table 17-21 The Chicken Game is named for a contest in which drivers test their courage by driving straight at each other. John and Paul have a common interest to avoid crashing into each other, but they also have a personal, competing interest to not turn first to demonstrate their courage to those observing the contest. The payoff table for this situation is provided below. The payoffs are shown as (John, Paul). Table 17-21 The Chicken Game is named for a contest in which drivers test their courage by driving straight at each other. John and Paul have a common interest to avoid crashing into each other, but they also have a personal, competing interest to not turn first to demonstrate their courage to those observing the contest. The payoff table for this situation is provided below. The payoffs are shown as (John, Paul).    -Refer to Table 17-21. If Paul chooses Drive Straight, what will John choose to do and what will John's payoff equal? -Refer to Table 17-21. If Paul chooses Drive Straight, what will John choose to do and what will John's payoff equal?

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Table 17-1 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Rochelle and Alec, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Rochelle and Alec work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Rochelle and Alec can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the table below: Table 17-1 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Rochelle and Alec, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Rochelle and Alec work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Rochelle and Alec can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the table below:    21. -Refer to Table 17-1. If Rochelle and Alec operate as a profit-maximizing monopoly in the market for water, how many gallons of water will be produced and sold? 21. -Refer to Table 17-1. If Rochelle and Alec operate as a profit-maximizing monopoly in the market for water, how many gallons of water will be produced and sold?

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When price is above marginal cost, selling one more unit at the current price will increase profit. This concept is known as the

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Table 17-27 Each year the United States considers renewal of Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status with Farland (a mythical nation). Historically, legislators have made threats of not renewing MFN status because of human rights abuses in Farland. The non-renewal of MFN trading status is likely to involve some retaliatory measures by Farland. The payoff table below shows the potential economic gains associated with a game in which Farland may impose trade sanctions against U.S. firms and the United States may not renew MFN status with Farland. The table contains the dollar value of all trade-flow benefits to the United States and Farland. Table 17-27 Each year the United States considers renewal of Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status with Farland (a mythical nation). Historically, legislators have made threats of not renewing MFN status because of human rights abuses in Farland. The non-renewal of MFN trading status is likely to involve some retaliatory measures by Farland. The payoff table below shows the potential economic gains associated with a game in which Farland may impose trade sanctions against U.S. firms and the United States may not renew MFN status with Farland. The table contains the dollar value of all trade-flow benefits to the United States and Farland.    -Refer to Table 17-27. Pursuing its own best interests, Farland will impose trade sanctions against U.S. firms -Refer to Table 17-27. Pursuing its own best interests, Farland will impose trade sanctions against U.S. firms

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A dominant strategy is a strategy that is best for a player in a game regardless of the strategies chosen by the other players.

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Table 17-4 The table shows the town of Mauston's demand schedule for gasoline. For simplicity, assume the town's gasoline seller(s) incur no costs in selling gasoline. Table 17-4 The table shows the town of Mauston's demand schedule for gasoline. For simplicity, assume the town's gasoline seller(s) incur no costs in selling gasoline.    -Refer to Table 17-4. If there are exactly four sellers of gasoline in Mauston and if they collude, then which of the following outcomes is most likely? -Refer to Table 17-4. If there are exactly four sellers of gasoline in Mauston and if they collude, then which of the following outcomes is most likely?

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Why are the actions of firms interdependent in an oligopoly market but not in a monopolistically competitive market?

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Table 17-26 Two prescription drug manufacturers (Firm A and Firm B) are faced with lawsuits from states to recover the healthcare related expenses associated with side-effects from its drugs. Each drug manufacturer has evidence that indicates that taking its prescription drug causes liver failure. State prosecutors do not have access to the same data used by drug manufacturers and thus will have difficulty recovering full costs without the help of at least one of the drug manufacturer's studies. Each firm has been presented with an opportunity to lower its liability in the suit if it cooperates with attorneys representing the states. Table 17-26 Two prescription drug manufacturers (Firm A and Firm B) are faced with lawsuits from states to recover the healthcare related expenses associated with side-effects from its drugs. Each drug manufacturer has evidence that indicates that taking its prescription drug causes liver failure. State prosecutors do not have access to the same data used by drug manufacturers and thus will have difficulty recovering full costs without the help of at least one of the drug manufacturer's studies. Each firm has been presented with an opportunity to lower its liability in the suit if it cooperates with attorneys representing the states.    Refer to Table 17-26. Pursuing its own best interests, Firm A will concede that taking their prescription drug causes liver failure e. only if Firm B concedes that taking its drug causes liver failure. f. only if Firm B does not concede that taking its drug causes liver failure. g. regardless of whether Firm B concedes that taking its drug causes liver failure. h. None of the above. In pursuing its own best interests, Firm A will in no case concede that taking its prescription drug causes liver failure. ANSWER: d POINTS: 1 DIFFICULTY: Difficulty: Moderate LEARNING OBJECTIVES: ECON.MANK.15.84 - LO: 17-2 NATIONAL STANDARDS: United States - BUSPROG: Analytic TOPICS: DISC: Game Theory KEYWORDS: BLOOM'S: Application NOTES: r -Refer to Table 17-26. If both firms follow a dominant strategy, Firm A's profits (losses) will be Refer to Table 17-26. Pursuing its own best interests, Firm A will concede that taking their prescription drug causes liver failure e. only if Firm B concedes that taking its drug causes liver failure. f. only if Firm B does not concede that taking its drug causes liver failure. g. regardless of whether Firm B concedes that taking its drug causes liver failure. h. None of the above. In pursuing its own best interests, Firm A will in no case concede that taking its prescription drug causes liver failure. ANSWER: d POINTS: 1 DIFFICULTY: Difficulty: Moderate LEARNING OBJECTIVES: ECON.MANK.15.84 - LO: 17-2 NATIONAL STANDARDS: United States - BUSPROG: Analytic TOPICS: DISC: Game Theory KEYWORDS: BLOOM'S: Application NOTES: r -Refer to Table 17-26. If both firms follow a dominant strategy, Firm A's profits (losses) will be

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The prisoners' dilemma is an important game to study because

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An equilibrium occurs in a game when

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To move the allocation of resources closer to the social optimum, policymakers should typically try to induce firms in an oligopoly to

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If four firms comprise the entire golf club industry, the market would be

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Table 17-12 The table shows the town of Driveaway's demand schedule for gasoline. Assume the town's gasoline seller(s) incurs a cost of $2 for each gallon sold, with no fixed cost. Table 17-12 The table shows the town of Driveaway's demand schedule for gasoline. Assume the town's gasoline seller(s) incurs a cost of $2 for each gallon sold, with no fixed cost.    -Refer to Table 17-12. Suppose there are exactly two sellers of gasoline in Driveaway: Amogo and Spilmerica. If Amogo sells 150 gallons and Spilmerica sells 100 gallons, then -Refer to Table 17-12. Suppose there are exactly two sellers of gasoline in Driveaway: Amogo and Spilmerica. If Amogo sells 150 gallons and Spilmerica sells 100 gallons, then

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There are two types of markets in which firms face some competition yet are still able to have some control over the prices of their products. Those two types of market are

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Scenario 17-2. Imagine that two oil companies, BQ and Exxoff, own adjacent oil fields. Under the fields is a common pool of oil worth $144 million. Drilling a well to recover oil costs $5 million per well. If each company drills one well, each will get half of the oil and earn a $67 million profit ($72 million in revenue - $5 million in costs). Assume that having X percent of the total wells means that a company will collect X percent of the total revenue. -Refer to Scenario 17-2. Exxoff's dominant strategy would lead to what sort of well-drilling behavior?

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How does free trade relate to the theory of oligopoly?

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Table 17-24 Two firms are considering going out of business and selling their assets. Each considers what happens if the other goes out of business. The payoff matrix below shows the net gain or loss to each firm. Table 17-24 Two firms are considering going out of business and selling their assets. Each considers what happens if the other goes out of business. The payoff matrix below shows the net gain or loss to each firm.    -Refer to Table 17-24. Which firms have a dominant strategy? -Refer to Table 17-24. Which firms have a dominant strategy?

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In an oligopoly, the total output produced in the market is

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