Exam 17: Oligopoly

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As the number of firms in an oligopoly industry decreases, the market moves closer to a _________ market.

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A cooperative agreement among oligopolists is less likely to be maintained,

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In some games, the noncooperative equilibrium is bad for the players and bad for society.

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The equilibrium quantity in markets characterized by oligopoly is

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As the number of firms in an oligopoly increases, the

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Table 17-11 Only two firms, ABC and XYZ, sell a particular product. The table below shows the demand curve for their product. Each firm has the same constant marginal cost of $8 and zero fixed cost. Table 17-11 Only two firms, ABC and XYZ, sell a particular product. The table below shows the demand curve for their product. Each firm has the same constant marginal cost of $8 and zero fixed cost.    -Refer to Table 17-11. If this market were perfectly competitive instead of oligopolistic, what quantity would be produced? -Refer to Table 17-11. If this market were perfectly competitive instead of oligopolistic, what quantity would be produced?

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The Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits executives of competing companies from

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Explain the practice of tying and discuss why it is controversial.

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As a group, oligopolists would always be better off if they would act collectively

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Briefly describe the practice of resale price maintenance.

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Figure 17-4. Aaron and Ed are roommates. After a big snowstorm, their driveway needs to be shoveled. Each person has to decide whether to take part in shoveling the driveway. At the end of the day, either the driveway will be shoveled (if one or both roommates take part in shoveling), or it will remain unshoveled (if neither roommate shovels). With happiness measured on a scale of 1 (very unhappy) to 10 (very happy), the possible outcomes are as follows: Figure 17-4. Aaron and Ed are roommates. After a big snowstorm, their driveway needs to be shoveled. Each person has to decide whether to take part in shoveling the driveway. At the end of the day, either the driveway will be shoveled (if one or both roommates take part in shoveling), or it will remain unshoveled (if neither roommate shovels). With happiness measured on a scale of 1 (very unhappy) to 10 (very happy), the possible outcomes are as follows:    -Refer to Figure 17-4. In pursuing his own self-interest, Aaron will -Refer to Figure 17-4. In pursuing his own self-interest, Aaron will

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Scenario 17-5 Assume that a local restaurant sells two items, salads and steaks. The restaurant's only two customers on a particular day are Mr. Carnivore and Ms. Leafygreens. Mr. Carnivore is willing to pay $20 for a steak and $7 for a salad. Ms. Leafygreens is willing to pay only $8 for a steak, but is willing to pay $12 for a salad. Assume that the restaurant can provide each of these items at zero marginal cost. -Refer to Scenario 17-5. How much additional profit can the restaurant earn by switching to the use of a tying strategy to price salads and steaks rather than pricing these goods separately?

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Which potentially anti-competitive business practice is often justified on the grounds that it corrects for the free rider problem?

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Antitrust laws in general are used to

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Table 17-9 The table shows the demand schedule for a particular product. Table 17-9 The table shows the demand schedule for a particular product.    -Refer to Table 17-9. Suppose the market for this product is served by two firms that have formed a cartel. If the marginal cost of production is $0 and there is no fixed cost, the combined profit of the cartel will be -Refer to Table 17-9. Suppose the market for this product is served by two firms that have formed a cartel. If the marginal cost of production is $0 and there is no fixed cost, the combined profit of the cartel will be

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Suppose that Thierry and Abdul are duopolists. Thierry is producing 700 units of output, and Abdul is producing 500 units of output. When Abdul produces 500 units, Thierry maximizes profit by producing 700 units. When Thierry produces 700 units of output, Abdul maximizes profit by producing 500 units. Thierry and Abdul are

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In the case of oligopolistic markets, self-interest makes cooperation difficult and it often leads to an undesirable outcome for the firms that are involved.

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Table 17-27 Each year the United States considers renewal of Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status with Farland (a mythical nation). Historically, legislators have made threats of not renewing MFN status because of human rights abuses in Farland. The non-renewal of MFN trading status is likely to involve some retaliatory measures by Farland. The payoff table below shows the potential economic gains associated with a game in which Farland may impose trade sanctions against U.S. firms and the United States may not renew MFN status with Farland. The table contains the dollar value of all trade-flow benefits to the United States and Farland. Table 17-27 Each year the United States considers renewal of Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status with Farland (a mythical nation). Historically, legislators have made threats of not renewing MFN status because of human rights abuses in Farland. The non-renewal of MFN trading status is likely to involve some retaliatory measures by Farland. The payoff table below shows the potential economic gains associated with a game in which Farland may impose trade sanctions against U.S. firms and the United States may not renew MFN status with Farland. The table contains the dollar value of all trade-flow benefits to the United States and Farland.    -Refer to Table 17-27. When this game reaches a Nash equilibrium, the value of trade flow benefits will be -Refer to Table 17-27. When this game reaches a Nash equilibrium, the value of trade flow benefits will be

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Figure 17-2. Two companies, Acme and Pinnacle, each decide whether to produce a good quality product or a poor quality product. In the figure, the dollar amounts are payoffs and they represent annual profits for the two companies. Figure 17-2. Two companies, Acme and Pinnacle, each decide whether to produce a good quality product or a poor quality product. In the figure, the dollar amounts are payoffs and they represent annual profits for the two companies.   -Refer to Figure 17-2. Acme and Pinnacle agree to cooperate so as to maximize total profit. If this game is played repeatedly and Acme uses a tit-for-tat strategy, it will choose a -Refer to Figure 17-2. Acme and Pinnacle agree to cooperate so as to maximize total profit. If this game is played repeatedly and Acme uses a tit-for-tat strategy, it will choose a

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As the number of firms in an oligopoly market

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