Exam 17: Business Strategy and Oligopoly

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If the prisoners' dilemma game is repeated, the co-operate outcome can be supported as an equilibrium.

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The only market where firms need not to be concerned about balancing the price effect and the output effect when making production decisions is a:

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Table 16-3 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Robert and John, own wells that produce water for safe drinking.Each Saturday, Robert and John work together to decide how many litres of water to pump, bring the water to town, and sell it at whatever price the market will bear.To keep things simple, suppose that Robert and John can pump as much water as they want without cost; therefore, the marginal cost of water equals zero.The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water are shown in the table.  Weekly quantity (in litres)  Price ($)per litre  Weekly total revenue (and  total profit) ($) 012$0511551010100159135208160257175306180355175404160453135502100551556000\begin{array}{|c|c|c|}\hline \text { Weekly quantity (in litres) } & \text { Price (\$)per litre } & \begin{array}{c}\text { Weekly total revenue (and } \\\text { total profit) (\$) }\end{array} \\\hline 0 & 12 & \$ 0 \\\hline 5 & 11 & 55 \\\hline 10 & 10 & 100 \\\hline 15 & 9 & 135 \\\hline 20 & 8 & 160 \\\hline 25 & 7 & 175 \\\hline 30 & 6 & 180 \\\hline 35 & 5 & 175 \\\hline 40 & 4 & 160 \\\hline 45 & 3 & 135 \\\hline 50 & 2 & 100 \\\hline 55 & 1 & 55 \\\hline 60 & 0 & 0 \\\hline\end{array} -Refer to Table 16-3.The socially efficient level of water supplied to the market would be:

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Table 16-3 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Robert and John, own wells that produce water for safe drinking.Each Saturday, Robert and John work together to decide how many litres of water to pump, bring the water to town, and sell it at whatever price the market will bear.To keep things simple, suppose that Robert and John can pump as much water as they want without cost; therefore, the marginal cost of water equals zero.The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water are shown in the table.  Weekly quantity (in litres)  Price ($)per litre  Weekly total revenue (and  total profit) ($) 012$0511551010100159135208160257175306180355175404160453135502100551556000\begin{array}{|c|c|c|}\hline \text { Weekly quantity (in litres) } & \text { Price (\$)per litre } & \begin{array}{c}\text { Weekly total revenue (and } \\\text { total profit) (\$) }\end{array} \\\hline 0 & 12 & \$ 0 \\\hline 5 & 11 & 55 \\\hline 10 & 10 & 100 \\\hline 15 & 9 & 135 \\\hline 20 & 8 & 160 \\\hline 25 & 7 & 175 \\\hline 30 & 6 & 180 \\\hline 35 & 5 & 175 \\\hline 40 & 4 & 160 \\\hline 45 & 3 & 135 \\\hline 50 & 2 & 100 \\\hline 55 & 1 & 55 \\\hline 60 & 0 & 0 \\\hline\end{array} -Refer to Table 16-3.Since Robert and John operate as a profit-maximising monopoly in the market for water, what price will they charge to sell 45 litres of water?

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The general term for market structures that fall somewhere in between monopoly and perfect competition is:

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Table 16-4 In the following duopoly game, the two firms can either set the price of their product high or low.In this market, customers are very price sensitive: when one firm sets a low price it steals the majority of customers from its competitor.The game is represented in the table below. Firm B High Price Low Price Firm A High Price Firm A gets \5 00 Firm A get \3 00 Firm B gets \5 00 Firm B gets \6 00 Low Price Firm A gets \6 00 Firm A gets \4 00 Firm B gets \3 00 Firm B gets \4 00 -Refer to table 16-4.The dominant strategy for the firms are:

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Binding agreements concerning production levels between oligopolists can lead the involved firms to:

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According to the information provided, what is PM Inc.'s dominant strategy?

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Table 16.7 The USA and China are locked in negotiations to cut emissions.The following table represents the pay-offs from cutting emissions and continuing to pollute: Table 16.7 The USA and China are locked in negotiations to cut emissions.The following table represents the pay-offs from cutting emissions and continuing to pollute:    -Refer to Table 16-7.If China plays its dominant strategy, its payoff at the Nash Equilibrium will be: -Refer to Table 16-7.If China plays its dominant strategy, its payoff at the Nash Equilibrium will be:

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If there are many firms participating in a market, the market is either:

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Which of the following happens when the prisoners' dilemma game is repeated numerous times in an oligopoly market? (i) the firms might reach the monopoly outcome (ii) the firms might reach the cooperative outcome (iii) society will always be better off

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Arming a country is a dominant strategy for each country is in an arms race.

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Table 16-1 The table below shows the total demand for viewing a rare penguin species at a local reserve.Ecotour companies have to build discreet viewing hides for tourists to view the penguins.Each ecotour company has to pay a fixed fee of $5000 for the right to build on the reserve.Assume that hides can be supplied to tourists at zero marginal cost.Tickets are sold to tourists to use the viewing hides. Quantity (Visits) Price(\ ticket) 0 48 2000 36 4000 24 6000 12 8000 8 10000 4 12000 0 Quantity (Visits) Price(\ ticket) Revenue 0 12 0 1000 10 10 2000 8 16 3000 6 18 4000 4 16 5000 2 10 6000 0 0 Any firm can change tickets by steps of 500 only.Any 500 step of quantity is assumed to be sold at the midpoint of the two prices (eg.3500 tickets would be sold for $5) -Refer to Table 16-1.Assume that there are two profit-maximising ecotourist companies operating in this market.Further assume that they are not able to collude on the price and quantity of tickets they sell.How much profit will each firm earn when this market reaches a Nash equilibrium?

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Once a cartel is formed, the market is in effect served by:

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Describe the output and price effects that influence the profit-maximising decision faced by a firm in an oligopoly market.How does this differ from output and price effects in a monopoly market?

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The tit-for-tat strategy in repeated prisoners' dilemma games:

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Table 16.7 The USA and China are locked in negotiations to cut emissions.The following table represents the pay-offs from cutting emissions and continuing to pollute: Table 16.7 The USA and China are locked in negotiations to cut emissions.The following table represents the pay-offs from cutting emissions and continuing to pollute:    -Refer to Table 16-7.If the USA plays its dominant strategy, its payoff at the Nash Equilibrium will be: -Refer to Table 16-7.If the USA plays its dominant strategy, its payoff at the Nash Equilibrium will be:

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Table 16-2 In the following duopoly game, the two firms can either set the price of their product high or low.The game is represented in the table below. Firm B High Price Low Price Firm A High Price Firm A gets \1 000 Firm A get \1 250 Firm B gets \1 000 Firm B gets \1 100 Low Price Firm A gets \8 00 Firm A gets \9 00 Firm B gets \8 00 Firm B gets \9 00 -Refer to Table 16-2.If the two firms wanted to achieve the optimal level of profit they would:

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Table 16-6 Two pita-bread stores (Pita Pan and Pita Wrapbit) have both recently opened up in a new suburb and are interested in expanding their market share.Both are considering advertising in the surrounding area to entice more customers to come to their stores.The following table depicts the strategic outcome that results from the game.The profits of the two pita-bread stores under two advertising scenarios are shown. Table 16-6 Two pita-bread stores (Pita Pan and Pita Wrapbit) have both recently opened up in a new suburb and are interested in expanding their market share.Both are considering advertising in the surrounding area to entice more customers to come to their stores.The following table depicts the strategic outcome that results from the game.The profits of the two pita-bread stores under two advertising scenarios are shown.   -Refer to Table 16-6.The dominate strategies of Pita Pan and Pita Wrapbit are: -Refer to Table 16-6.The dominate strategies of Pita Pan and Pita Wrapbit are:

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If the number of firms in an oligopoly grows smaller, an oligopolistic market looks less and less like:

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