The best strategy for each player if this game is repeated is: \[\begin{array} { | l | l | c | } \hline & \text { A: Cheat } & \text { A: Collaborate } \\ \hline \text { B: Cheat } & \text { A: } 1 , \text { B: } - 1 & \text { A: } - 1 , \text { B: } 1 \\ \hline \text { B: Collaborate } & \text { A: } - 1 , \text { B:1 } & \text { A: } 1 , \text { B: } - 1 \\ \hline \end{array}\]

A) his or her dominant strategy. B) a mixed strategy. C) to cheat. D) to collaborate. A) his or her dominant strategy. B) a mixed strategy. C) to cheat. D) to collaborate.

Consider the following payoff matrix facing two criminals. \[\begin{array} { | l | l | l | } \hline & { \text { A: Confess } } & \text { A: Not Confess } \\ \hline \text { B: Confess } & \text { A: 20yrs, B: 20yrs } & \text { A: 50yrs, B: 2yrs } \\ \hline \text { B: Not Confess } & \text { A: 2yrs, B: 50yrs } & \text { A: 10yrs, B: 10yrs } \\ \hline \end{array}\] Their options are to confess or not to confess. The payoffs represent the number of years each will spend in jail. The Nash equilibrium for the payoff matrix shown is:

A) A: 20 years, B: 20 years. B) A: 50 years, B: 2 years. C) A: 2 years, B: 50 years. D) A: 10 years, B: 10 years. A) A: 20 years, B: 20 years. B) A: 50 years, B: 2 years. C) A: 2 years, B: 50 years. D) A: 10 years, B: 10 years.

A) will always be reached. B) is always reached in game playing. C) sometimes may not be reached because people assume others react rationally. D) sometimes may not be reached because people do not assume that others act rationally. A) will always be reached. B) is always reached in game playing. C) sometimes may not be reached because people assume others react rationally. D) sometimes may not be reached because people do not assume that others act rationally.

A) the payoffs are mixed during each round. B) the order of who chooses first is mixed. C) moves can be predicted. D) players try to avoid demonstrating a pattern. A) the payoffs are mixed during each round. B) the order of who chooses first is mixed. C) moves can be predicted. D) players try to avoid demonstrating a pattern.

The equilibrium solution for the following payoff matrix is: \(\begin{array}{|l|l|l|} \hline & {\text { A }} & {\text { A }} \\ \hline \text { B } & \text { A: }-1, B:-1 & \text { A: } 5, B: 0 \\ \hline \text { B } & \text { A: } 2, B: 2 & \text { A: } 10, \text { B: } 1 \\ \hline \end{array}\)

A) ?1, ?1. B) 5, 0. C) 2, 2. D) 10, 1. A) ?1, ?1. B) 5, 0. C) 2, 2. D) 10, 1.

What is true about the following payoff matrix? \[\begin{array} { | l | l | c | } \hline & { \text { A: not cooperate } } & \text { A: cooperate } \\ \hline \text { B: do not cooperate } & \text { A: } 2 , \mathrm {~B} : 2 & \text { A: } 1 , \text { B: } 3 \\ \hline \text { B: cooperate } & \text { A: } 3 , \mathrm {~B} : 1 & \text { A: } 0 , \text { B: } 0 \\ \hline \end{array}\]

A) Players cannot jointly do better by cooperating. B) Players cannot escape the 0-0 payoff. C) Player A is better off lying that he will not cooperate and then cooperate. D) Player B is better off lying that she will not cooperate and then cooperate. A) Players cannot jointly do better by cooperating. B) Players cannot escape the 0-0 payoff. C) Player A is better off lying that he will not cooperate and then cooperate. D) Player B is better off lying that she will not cooperate and then cooperate.