Exam 12: The Economics of Information

Suppose Chris is offered the following gamble:  with probability 0.1 he will win $90, with probability 0.4 he will win $50, and with probability 0.5 he will lose $60. The expected value of this gamble is found by solving:

If sellers have more information about the quality of goods than do buyers, then:

Carson and Fran are both thrill seekers. Carson has health insurance and Fran does not. One can predict that:

Suppose that there are two types of houses for sale: those with solid foundations and those with cracked foundations. In all other respects, the two types of houses are identical. Houses with solid foundations are worth $200,000, while those with cracked foundations are worth $200,000 minus the $20,000 to fix the crack, or $180,000. Sellers know which type of house they have, but buyers cannot detect whether the foundation has a crack. Suppose that 80 percent of the houses for sale have a solid foundation and 20 percent of the houses for sale have a cracked foundation. In the long run, we would expect:

According to the textbook, middlemen:

It is spring, and several graduates of State U are seeking employment. State U graduates have evenly distributed GPAs, from 2.0 to 4.0, with an average GPA of 3.0. The largest employer in town, Acme Dynamite, is interviewing candidates, hoping to hire a few hard workers. While Acme does not require students to submit a transcript with their applications, the hiring officer believes that high GPAs signal a willingness to work hard. Suppose that all State U students have the same academic ability when they enter college and do not learn anything in college that will be useful to them while working at Acme. Students differ only in their willingness to work hard and study for their classes. In this case:

A risk-neutral individual will:

The difference between the price of electronic equipment in a retail store and on the Internet partly reflects:

Lou and Toby both live in a little town and are trying to sell their cars. Both of their cars have a blue book value of $10,000. Lou has an American car like most of the people in town own. Toby owns the only Bulgarian car in town. If people in their town are risk averse, then who will get closest to the blue book value for his car?

In the absence of laws requiring individuals to purchase insurance, insurance is most attractive to:

Several web sites, like Pricewatch.com, allow consumers to input the name of a product, and the site then returns a list of suppliers with their respective prices for the product. This:

Statistical discrimination occurs when:

Mel is thinking of going on a cruise. Mel values a cruise in nice weather at $2,000 and values a cruise in bad weather at $50. The probability of nice weather is 60 percent and the probability of bad weather is 40 percent. Trip insurance is sometimes available. If purchased, it allows travelers to delay the cruise until the weather is nice. If Mel is risk-neutral, then in the absence of trip insurance, the most she will be willing to pay for the cruise is:

Suppose that there are two types of houses for sale: those with solid foundations and those with cracked foundations. In all other respects, the two types of houses are identical. Houses with solid foundations are worth $200,000, while those with cracked foundations are worth $200,000 minus the $20,000 to fix the crack, or $180,000. Sellers know which type of house they have, but buyers cannot detect whether the foundation has a crack. Suppose that 80 percent of the houses for sale have a solid foundation and 20 percent of the houses for sale have a cracked foundation. If buyers are risk-neutral and know the that 80 percent of the houses for sale have a solid foundation while 20 percent have a cracked foundation, then how much will buyers be willing to pay for a house?

Alex, who is risk-neutral, is looking for a one-bedroom apartment to rent for the month of August while he's on vacation in Seattle. All of the one-bedroom apartments in the neighborhood where he wants to stay are of equal quality, but 70 percent rent for $700 per month, 20 percent rent for $600 per month, and 10 percent rent for $500 per month. The first apartment Alex finds rents for $700 per month. If the cost to Alex of searching for an apartment is $40, then searching for another apartment is a gamble with an expected value of:

Suppose Ginger is going to buy a house and a dishwasher. Assuming the marginal cost of searching for both is the same, one can predict that Ginger will

Frank is considering moving to Denver. There is a 70 percent chance that he will find a job that pays $1,000 more than what he currently earns and a 30 percent chance he will find one that pays $3,000 less. The expected value of moving to Denver is:

Adam Smith's invisible hand only leads to an efficient outcome when

Even though conspicuous consumption can serve as a credible signal of ability, it can lead to socially inefficient outcomes because:

The free-rider problem arises when people: