Exam 30: Exchange
Exam 1: Budget Constraint58 Questions
Exam 1: A: Budget Constraint30 Questions
Exam 2: Preferences49 Questions
Exam 2: A: Preferences30 Questions
Exam 3: Utility57 Questions
Exam 3: A: Utility29 Questions
Exam 4: Choice63 Questions
Exam 4: A: Choice31 Questions
Exam 5: Demand79 Questions
Exam 5: A: Demand22 Questions
Exam 6: Revealed Preference58 Questions
Exam 6: A: Revealed Preference26 Questions
Exam 7: Slutsky Equation51 Questions
Exam 7: A: Slutsky Equation30 Questions
Exam 8: Buying and Selling75 Questions
Exam 8: A: Buying and Selling30 Questions
Exam 9: Intertemporal Choice61 Questions
Exam 9: A: Intertemporal Choice30 Questions
Exam 10: Asset Markets46 Questions
Exam 10: A: Asset Markets30 Questions
Exam 11: Uncertainty39 Questions
Exam 11: A: Uncertainty25 Questions
Exam 12: Risky Assets16 Questions
Exam 12: A: Risky Assets10 Questions
Exam 13: Consumers Surplus42 Questions
Exam 13: A: Consumers Surplus30 Questions
Exam 14: Market Demand101 Questions
Exam 14: A: Market Demand25 Questions
Exam 15: Equilibrium48 Questions
Exam 15: A: Equilibrium20 Questions
Exam 16: Auctions36 Questions
Exam 16: A: Auctions25 Questions
Exam 17: Technology52 Questions
Exam 17: A: Technology30 Questions
Exam 18: Profit Maximization52 Questions
Exam 18: A: Profit Maximization21 Questions
Exam 19: Cost Minimization77 Questions
Exam 19: A: Cost Minimization26 Questions
Exam 20: Cost Curves51 Questions
Exam 20: A: Cost Curves20 Questions
Exam 21: Firm Supply41 Questions
Exam 21: A: Firm Supply15 Questions
Exam 22: Industry Supply49 Questions
Exam 22: A: Industry Supply33 Questions
Exam 23: Monopoly76 Questions
Exam 23: A: Monopoly30 Questions
Exam 24: Monopoly Behavior34 Questions
Exam 24: A: Monopoly Behavior20 Questions
Exam 25: Factor Markets24 Questions
Exam 25: A: Factor Markets20 Questions
Exam 26: Oligopoly56 Questions
Exam 26: A: Oligopoly30 Questions
Exam 27: Game Theory34 Questions
Exam 27: A: Game Theory25 Questions
Exam 28: Game Applications28 Questions
Exam 28: A: Game Applications25 Questions
Exam 29: Behavioral Economics34 Questions
Exam 30: Exchange68 Questions
Exam 30: A: Exchange30 Questions
Exam 31: Production35 Questions
Exam 31: A: Production25 Questions
Exam 32: Welfare27 Questions
Exam 32: A: Welfare25 Questions
Exam 33: Externalities42 Questions
Exam 33: A: Externalities25 Questions
Exam 34: Information Technology24 Questions
Exam 34: A: Information Technology15 Questions
Exam 35: Public Goods26 Questions
Exam 35: A: Public Goods20 Questions
Exam 36: Asymmetric Information31 Questions
Exam 36: A: Asymmetric Information20 Questions
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Adelino and Benito consume only two goods, X and Y. They trade only with each other and there is no production. Adelino's utility function is given by U(xA, yA) = 2xA + 5yA and Benito's utility function is given by U(xB, yB)
. In the Edgeworth box constructed for Adelino and Benito, the set of Pareto optimal allocations is
(Multiple Choice)
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Jack Spratt's utility function is U(F, L) = L. His wife's utility function is U(F, L) = F. If Jack's initial endowment is 100 units of F and 50 units of L and if Jack's wife's initial endowment is 60 units of F and 100 units of L, then in an Edgeworth box for Jack and his wife, an allocation of F and L will be Pareto optimal only if it is at a corner of the box.
(True/False)
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An economy has two people, Charlie and Doris. There are two goods, apples and bananas. Charlie has an initial endowment of 6 apples and 6 bananas. Doris has an initial endowment of 12 apples and 3 bananas. Charlie's utility function is U(A C, B C ) = A C B C, where A C is his apple consumption and B C is his banana consumption. Doris's utility function is U(A D, B D ) = A D B D, where A D and B D are her apple and banana consumptions. At every Pareto optimal allocation,
(Multiple Choice)
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Colette and Hans both consume the same goods in a pure exchange economy. Colette is originally endowed with 15 units of good 1 and 12 units of good 2. Hans is originally endowed with 97 units of good 1 and 4 units of good 2. They both have the utility function U(x1, x2) =
. If we let good 1 be the numeraire, so that p1 = $1, then what will be the equilibrium price of good 2?
(Multiple Choice)
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If an allocation is Pareto optimal and if indifference curves between the two goods have no kinks, then
(Multiple Choice)
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Dan and Marilyn consume two goods, x and y. They have identical Cobb-Douglas utility functions. Initially Dan owns 10 units of x and 10 units of y. Initially Marilyn owns 40 units of x and 20 units of y. They make exchanges to reach a Pareto optimal allocation which is better for both than the no-trade allocation. Which of the following is not necessarily true about the allocation they trade to?
(Multiple Choice)
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Astrid's utility function is U(HA, CA) = HACA. Birger's utility function is min{HB, CB}. If Astrid's initial endowment is no cheese and 13 units of herring and if Birger's initial endowments are 8 units of cheese and no herring, then where p is a competitive equilibrium price of herring and cheese is the numeraire, it must be that demand equals supply in the herring market. This implies that
(Multiple Choice)
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Morris has the utility function U(b, w) = 4b + 16w and Philip has the utility function U(b, w) = bw, where b is the number of books consumed per month and w is bottles of wine consumed per month. If we draw an Edgeworth box with books on the horizontal axis and wine on the vertical axis and if we measure Morris's consumptions from the lower left corner of the box, then the contract curve contains
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