Exam 17: The Evolution of Sociality

Imagine you are studying horns in male deer, and you hypothesize that horns are costly honest signals that help to prevent male fights. What three predictions should you use to test your hypothesis?

Which of the following represents a Nash equilibrium in the hawk-dove game? Assume that the cost of a fight is greater than the benefit of the resource that is being fought over.

Konrad Lorenz argued that "for the good of the species," animal fights (such as male-male combat) are rarely lethal. Which of the following is the most compelling counterargument to this assertion?

Among which of the following groups of organisms is cooperation via reciprocal altruism most likely to evolve (assuming all else is equal)?

If the prisoner's dilemma game is played only once, what would we NOT expect to see?

An alarm call benefits multiple individuals, both related and unrelated (r ? 0). Can this behavior still evolve according to Hamilton's rule? (There are 1, 2, . . . , A individuals that are related to the donor by r₁, r₂,…, r_A and receive benefits b₁, b₂,…, b_A)

Which of the following is NOT an accurate interpretation of Paul Sherman's work on alarm calls in Belding's ground squirrels, as shown in the figure?

In order for a game to be a true prisoner's dilemma, which of the following conditions must be met? P  Punishment for mutual defection, R  Reward for mutual cooperation, S  "Sucker's" payoff, T  Temptation to defect

Which of the following statements is FALSE regarding haplodiploid mating systems and eusociality?

For any given allele copy in a diploid, sexually reproducing parent, what is the chance that the allele will be passed on to each of its offspring?